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1Introduction
Scott W. Murray
This collection has its origins in a modest, multidisciplinary confer-
ence—“Understanding Atrocities: Remembering, Representing and 
Teaching Genocide”—held at Mount Royal University in Calgary, Alberta, 
in February 2014. The conference brought together leading experts, emer-
ging and established scholars in the field of genocide studies, as well as 
undergraduate and graduate students, secondary school teachers, com-
munity members, and policy-makers in order to share new scholarship 
and new teaching perspectives on the global, transhistorical problem of 
genocide. Inspired by the goal of creating a forum bridging scholarly and 
community-based efforts to understand genocide, the conference aimed 
to augment the important specialized contributions of academic scholar-
ship with insights and perspectives from teachers, non-profit groups inter-
ested in peace and conflict studies, members of Indigenous communities, 
and other interested members of civil society. Concerned with the auto-
matic—and often, therefore, unexamined—identification of genocide with 
atrocity, our aim was the investigation of how this historical relationship 
frames and complicates possibilities for the understanding and prevention 
of genocide.
A key feature of the scholarly study of genocide has been a steady 
broadening of perspectives, beginning with efforts to look beyond the uni-
versality of the Holocaust as the genocide. When the journal Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies was established in 1986, its commitment to carrying out a 
scholarly, multidisciplinary examination of the Holocaust included a will-
ingness to consider the subject of other genocides, but it explicitly excluded 
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the publication of “memoirs, literary, dramatic or musical efforts.”1 Over a 
decade later the Journal of Genocide Research (JGR) continued to supple-
ment what were once primarily historical studies of genocide worldwide 
with other social science perspectives, while leaving room for contribu-
tions to a “Poet’s Corner” and an “Art Gallery” (although it has since re-
verted back to being primarily a historical journal).2 Today the subject is 
studied from every possible disciplinary perspective in the social sciences 
and humanities, and it includes genocides that have occurred throughout 
history and across the globe. The breadth of the contributions to this vol-
ume reflects this remarkable evolution in our thinking about genocide, 
while also affirming its status as an essentially “contested concept.”
One challenge we face today, therefore, is to find ways of making 
this immense, complex, ever-expanding body of scholarship accessible 
to non-academic audiences, a need stemming from growing pressure to 
educate people about genocide, primarily with an eye to prevention. It 
was with this aim in mind that the International Association of Genocide 
Scholars (IAGS) and the International Institute for Genocide and Human 
Rights Studies (IIGHRS) teamed up in 2006 to create Genocide Studies 
and Prevention (GSP), which, in promoting the development of “new ideas 
on the prevention of genocidal death-making,” aimed to “go beyond safe, 
approved, and established paradigms of scholarship and science,” and 
was “open to the unusual, the daring, and the courageous.”3 Similarly, 
the didactic promise of emerging scholarship on genocide and its power 
therefore to shape policy-making was a key theme at a 2012 symposium 
revealingly entitled “Imagine the Unimaginable: Ending Genocide in the 
21st Century,” held at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 
(USHMM) in cooperation (also revealingly) with the US Council on For-
eign Relations and CNN.4 At this same symposium, polling revealed by 
the USHMM showed that two-thirds of Americans believe that education 
is key to genocide prevention, while also displaying what historian Tim-
othy Snyder identified as a lamentable lack of historical awareness about 
almost all other instances of mass atrocity other than the Holocaust.5 
The conflict in Darfur, Sudan, which raged most devastatingly between 
2004 and 2010, was vital in stimulating this new activist interest in geno-
cide more broadly, which in turn helped precipitate the growing distinc-
tion between what Jens Meierhenrich has described as the predominant 
“vocational imperatives” at work in genocide studies today—advocacy and 
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scholarship.6 The former, which animated the work of such early scholars in 
the field as Israel Charny and Gregory Stanton, regards the academic study 
of genocidal violence in such places as Cambodia, Rwanda, the former 
Yugoslavia, and Sudan as sterile unless it gives practical, policy-focused 
application to the Holocaust-inspired slogan “never again.” Consequently, 
the IAGS, in addition to organizing conferences and publishing GSP, has 
passed a series of resolutions since 2005 condemning the conduct of such 
states as Syria, Iran, Turkey, and Zimbabwe, while also calling for military 
intervention in Darfur.7 According to Dirk Moses, this movement toward 
awakening the “consciousness of the scholarly community,” as well as the 
winding down of divisive debates over the uniqueness of the Holocaust, 
have opened up a discursive space “for a non-sectarian, non-competi-
tive, and non-hierarchical analysis of modern genocide.”8 Nevertheless, 
the IAGS’s controversial advocacy concerning Darfur, which belonged to 
what some described as an ill-informed humanitarian effort that damaged 
efforts to find local solutions to the crisis,9 highlights concerns over what 
Meierhenrich called the “continued prevalence of moralism in the study 
of genocide studies.”10 This in turn has helped to strengthen, therefore, the 
position of the second of genocide studies’ vocational imperatives—i.e., 
scholarship. Manifested in the labours of Jürgen Zimmerer, Donald Blox-
ham, Dan Stone, Ben Kiernan, and Alexander Hinton, among others—and 
expressed organizationally through the formation in 2005 of the Inter-
national Network of Genocide Scholars (INOGS), which publishes the 
research-focused JGR—this emphasis on scholarship over advocacy has, 
according to Meierhenrich, placed genocide studies on a more solid theor-
etical and empirical footing, and represents a “maturation” of the field.11
Far from achieving anything like a consensus, genocide studies schol-
ars continue to spar over the raison d’être of the field—and pace Moses’s 
prediction of accord, GSP was relaunched in 2014 as Genocide Studies 
International (GSI) in order to address renewed concerns that the latest 
scholarship on genocide studies has been similarly unsuccessful in influ-
encing policy-making in order to aid with prevention. Echoing the lament 
of Gabriel Schoenfeld almost twenty years ago regarding the “academiciz-
ation” of Holocaust history, the editors of GSI now argued that “esoteric 
discussions of abstractions using vocabulary that turns off the public” are 
emblematic of a “genocide industry” that, through a combination of disci-
plinary navel-gazing and a stubborn resistance to seeing the enormous 
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complexity of genocidal phenomena, consistently fails to transform schol-
arly rhetoric into “concrete, effective policy.”12 And so it goes.
In a limited but sincere effort to transcend these debates and div-
isions within the field of genocide studies, the organizers of the “Under-
standing Atrocities” conference aimed to raise public awareness, stimu-
late new kinds of teaching and learning on the subject, and, if possible, 
positively affect public policy by selecting a universally held assumption 
about genocide—namely, that it is an atrocity—as the centre of gravity 
for wide-ranging discussions about the nature and consequences of this 
“ongoing scourge.”13 Deliberately broad in scope and intellectual ambition, 
the conference asked participants to consider such questions as: Why is 
genocide carried out with such viciousness and cruelty? How, if at all, does 
the demonization of perpetrators of atrocity prevent us from confronting 
the complicity of others, or of ourselves? What are the limits of the law, of 
history, of literature, and of education in understanding and representing 
genocidal atrocity? What are the challenges we face in teaching and learn-
ing about extreme events such as these, and how does the language we 
use contribute to or impair what can be taught and learned about geno-
cide? Dan Stone, in asking whether it can even be said that a discipline 
of genocide studies exists, argued that scholars in this field, rather than 
engaging solely in comparative studies of genocide, “must attempt to de-
velop general, empirically informed, theoretical statements about geno-
cide as such—what it is, when it happens, who supports it, and so on.”14 
The routine identification of genocide with atrocity surely constitutes just 
such a statement—and so our concern, therefore, is with the effects of this 
identification on contemporary understandings of genocide, as both a phe-
nomenon and an experience.
One example of these effects that will be familiar to anyone who has 
taught Holocaust history is how deeply students are affected by the sub-
ject matter of such courses, and how often this generates a strong, largely 
unreflective sympathy for arguments regarding the Holocaust’s unique-
ness. Because no other mass atrocity in history has been so thoroughly 
investigated and made visible to the public in every media imaginable, it is 
very difficult getting students to problematize even basic historiographical 
claims like uniqueness, even though doing so is necessarily preliminary to 
understanding the astonishing complexity of the Holocaust as a historical 
phenomenon. Confronted—indeed, battered—by their encounters with 
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the Holocaust via popular culture, students become resistant to perspec-
tives they believe might diminish the rhetorical power of the Holocaust 
story to teach us such lessons as “never again,” the “triumph of the human 
spirit,” and “all it takes for evil to triumph is for good men to do noth-
ing”—discursive strategies whose commemorative function also, unfortu-
nately, complicates the scholarly project.15
The power of the language of atrocity, therefore, to frame debates and 
proscribe judgments on phenomena such as genocide is considerable. 
Consider an episode from nineteenth-century European history in which 
“atrocitarian” language raised concerns among contemporaries about the 
effects such rhetoric had on the public’s ability to judge properly either 
the events themselves or their government’s response to those events. At 
issue was the April 1876 uprising of Bulgarian nationalists against the 
Ottoman Empire—a revolt put down brutally by Ottoman forces, who 
destroyed whole villages and killed upwards of ten thousand people in 
a short five-week period. Unsurprisingly, the Ottomans’ conduct gener-
ated strong reactions from people throughout Europe—prompting, for 
example, British Liberal Party leader William Gladstone to write a best-
selling pamphlet entitled the Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the 
East, in which he exclaimed:
There is not a criminal in a European gaol, there is not a cannibal 
in the South Sea Islands, whose indignation would not rise and 
overboil at the recital of that which has been done, which has too 
late been examined, but which remains unavenged; which has left 
behind all the foul and all the fierce passions that produced it, and 
which may again spring up, in another murderous harvest, from 
the soil soaked and reeking with blood, and in the air tainted with 
every imaginable deed of crime and shame.16
 
The British prime minister at the time, Benjamin Disraeli, condemned 
Gladstone’s use of such rhetoric on the grounds that it seriously compli-
cated his government’s efforts to respond to the broader European crisis 
arising from the slow demise of the Ottoman Empire.17 “The first and 
cardinal point, at the present moment,” Disraeli wrote to Sir Strafford 
Northcote, the chancellor of the exchequer, “is that no member of the Gov-
ernment should countenance the idea that we are hysterically ‘modifying’ 
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our policy, in consequence of the excited state of the public mind. If such 
an idea gets about, we shall become contemptible.”18 The ascription of the 
label “genocidal” to the group known variously as ISIS, ISIL, the Islamic 
State, and Daesh almost immediately after it began committing atrocities 
against prisoners in 2014, and the overwrought response of some Western 
states to the domestic threats this group poses, is a contemporary example 
of the same phenomenon.19
The need to distinguish, therefore, between genocide and atrocity 
seems clear, and is preliminary to Amarnath Amarasingam and Chris-
topher Powell’s application, in their contribution to this volume, of the 
concept of “proto-genocide” to the current situation in Sri Lanka. Amaras-
ingam and Powell, extending the scholarship of Zygmunt Bauman, Ben 
Kiernan, Mark Levene, and Richard Rubenstein, among others, are con-
cerned with genocide as a systemic feature of the modern sovereign state.20 
Their notion of proto-genocide, drawing on both Gregory Stanton’s model 
of the ten stages of genocide, and Tony Barta’s argument that genocide 
must be understood with reference to “relations of destruction” rather 
than policies and intentions, conceives of genocide as a distinctively mod-
ern phenomenon connected with the success of the nation-state.21 Con-
sequently, the steady growth of Sinhala nationalism since the end of the 
Sri Lankan Civil War in 2009, and the concomitant suppression, socially, 
culturally, and economically, of Tamils’ collective identity, may be prefa-
tory to a more coherent program of cultural extermination and therefore 
of genocide. The widespread atrocities committed by the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment against the Tamil minority, and the ongoing exclusion of Tamils 
from what Helen Fein terms “the universe of obligation,” indicates that 
some, but not yet all, of the conditions under which genocide will likely 
occur currently exist in Sri Lanka—a situation that merits attention from 
the international community.22
Further evidence of the proto-genocidal threat existing in Sri Lanka is 
that government’s conduct in the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Com-
mission (LLRC), which operated in northern Sri Lanka between 2009 and 
2011. Dismissed by Amnesty International as a “dangerous charade,” and 
criticized by, among others, the Canadian government and the European 
Union for its lack of accountability and balance in apportioning blame for 
the atrocities of the civil war, the LLRC nevertheless participated in the 
construction of what Alexander Hinton has called a “transitional justice 
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imaginary” in which “violent pasts are delimited and narrowed, erasing 
historical complexities and suggesting an essentialized notion of regres-
sive being.”23 According to Laura Beth Cohen, whose chapter examines the 
Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center and Cemetery to the Victims of the 
1995 Genocide, transitional justice mechanisms may collide with the ways 
in which, at sites of atrocity, local memory persists and intrudes upon the 
present. Scholars such as Hinton, Roger Duthie, and Priscilla Hayner all 
argue for the importance of transitional justice initiatives, which never-
theless function uneasily alongside efforts to commemorate sites of atroc-
ity—parallel processes which, as Judy Barsalou and Victoria Baxter have 
shown, remain highly politicized because they occur in changing frames 
of time relative to the events being commemorated.24 Thus, as Cohen dem-
onstrates, atrocities like the Srebrenica genocide, when mediated by transi-
tional justice mechanisms, may become anchored in a persistent, ongoing 
present that prevents the construction of what Hinton describes as teleo-
logical historical narratives that frame the atrocities in terms of pre- and 
post-conflict states.25 In other words, genocide-as-atrocity elides both the 
broader historical frame to which the genocide belongs and the ongoing 
effects of the violence in post-conflict societies, such that time itself be-
comes “uncanny,” allowing the traumatic legacy of the genocide to persist. 
Consider, by way of contrast, the situation in Canada, where the first 
paragraph of the 2015 report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Canada (TRC) identifies the “cultural genocide” of Indigenous peo-
ples as both a goal and an outcome of Canada’s residential school system, 
among other instruments of settler colonialism in North America. The 
TRC report, in asserting that “reconciliation must become a way of life,” 
unambiguously identifies the effects of Canada’s genocidal legacy on both 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples, and situates the atrocities of the 
residential school system within an explicit historical framework intend-
ed to resist evasion and forgetfulness.26 Moreover, the transitional justice 
imaginary performed in the report of Canada’s TRC depicts reconciliation 
as “an ongoing individual and collective process,” rather than simply a 
short-term, interim mechanism for Canada’s transition to an idealized 
post-conflict future.27 Unsurprisingly, however, the TRC’s conclusions 
also revived a long-running debate over the nature of genocide—namely, 
whether it requires the physical extermination of a people or can subsist 
solely in the destruction of a group’s social and/or cultural existence.28 This 
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same topic is examined further here by Adam Muller, who reassesses the 
impact of settler colonialism on Indigenous peoples in Canada in light of 
Raphael Lemkin’s original conception of the crime of genocide.29 On the 
one hand, what Muller calls “the partial and political character” of the 
1948 UN Genocide Convention refers in part to its silence on the matter of 
cultural genocide, despite Lemkin’s own view that such a thing exists and 
that it is often an outcome of European colonialism. On the other hand, 
both Lemkin and the convention identified the “intent to destroy” as an 
essential element of genocide, which, in assessing the genocide committed 
against Indigenous people in Canada, has proven to be highly problematic. 
Muller, drawing on the work of such disparate authorities as the German 
jurist Kai Ambos and the Canadian genocide studies scholar Andrew 
Woolford, proposes a more nuanced understanding of intent in the com-
mission of genocide—one that extends culpability beyond simply those 
who act with a specific genocidal purpose. In so doing, he not only makes 
a powerful case that the treatment of Indigenous people in Canada was 
indeed genocide, but also challenges the kind of forgetfulness that cultural 
historian Peter Burke, with whom Muller opens his chapter, described as a 
luxury enjoyed by history’s victors.30
The prevalence and persistence of historical amnesia operates, how-
ever, in various ways, arising in some instances from the atrocities that 
constitute the tissue of the genocide itself. Outright denial is both the most 
common and the most extreme example of this—extreme in the sense that 
genocidal atrocity strikes us as something that ought to be undeniable, but 
which, thanks in part to what Stone calls “the merry-go-round of defin-
itional debates,” is in fact all too common.31 Consequently, several papers 
in this volume speak to this issue directly by challenging denials. Only 
one concerns events—the Armenian genocide—that belong to the “can-
on” of genocides, while two others grapple with more contested atroci-
ties—namely, the enslavement of black Americans, and settler-colonial 
genocide against Indigenous peoples in Canada. Raffi Sarkissian’s study of 
the Toronto District School Board’s struggle to integrate the history of the 
Armenian genocide into its high school history curriculum highlights the 
intractability of denialist arguments, while echoing the work of Geoffery 
Short and Samuel Totten in arguing convincingly for the broad education-
al value of teaching students about genocide and crimes against humanity 
using various examples, including that of the Armenians.32 Steven Jacobs’s 
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essay below on William Patterson’s 1951 petition to the United Nations, 
entitled We Charge Genocide: The Crime of the Government against the 
Negro People, traces the unfortunate fate of this remarkable document, 
and urges us to reconsider its significance for the field of genocide stud-
ies. Little studied (like the broader theme of North American slavery and 
genocide), this unsuccessful petition belongs nonetheless to the legacy of 
both Lemkin’s denial that the African-American experience entailed the 
“destruction, death [and] annihilation” that distinguished genocide, and 
his views on Africans more generally.33 
But it is Kristin Burnett, Lori Chambers, and Travis Hay’s relentless 
interrogation of the media discourse concerning the 2012 state of emer-
gency declared in several northern Ontario First Nations’ communities 
in response to housing crises there that confronts most directly how 
historical amnesia and, in this case, deeply racist and sexist stereotypes 
help facilitate the denial of mass atrocities, such as the ongoing geno-
cide of Indigenous peoples in Canada. Frankly acknowledging their own 
settler privilege (and, I would add, that enjoyed by every contributor to 
this volume), Burnett, Chambers, and Hay draw on the post-colonial 
arguments of Sherene Razack, Joyce Green, and Emma LaRocque, who 
have shown that the rhetorical strategies of settler colonialism have long 
been dedicated to the construction of Indigenous difference in order to 
dehumanize and marginalize Indigenous peoples; as well as Indigenous 
feminists such as Paula Gunn Allen and Andrea Smith, who locate the 
type of sexist and racist discourse used to describe Chief Theresa Spen-
ce’s widely publicized 2012 protest in a larger constellation of gendered, 
heteropatriarchal thinking.34 
Straddling the contested space between definition and denial are the 
histories of smaller groups (nations, peoples, etc.) who, while on the mar-
gins of events, can often get caught up nonetheless in the maelstrom of 
violence genocide unleashes. Israel Charny and Tessa Hoffman, drawing 
on the once contentious debate over just how widely the boundaries of the 
“Holocaust” should be drawn when it comes to identifying non-Jewish vic-
tim groups,35 have both argued that genocide studies should adopt a more 
inclusive approach to the study of the victims of mass atrocity, including 
groups incidental to the genocidal project itself.36 It is this perspective that 
informs Andrew Basso’s contribution to this volume, in which he compara-
tively reassesses the Turkish destruction of Greek and Assyrian Christian 
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minorities alongside the Armenians, and the victimization of Hutu and 
Twa populations in the Rwandan genocide. In so doing, Basso reveals that 
it may not always be perpetrators who engage in denial through the dis-
tortion of collective memory, as victims of genocide who assume control 
of post-conflict regimes may also seek to distort the historical record for 
their own political ends.
Representations of genocide provide us with perhaps the most direct 
means for investigating the genocide-as-atrocity formulation. The geno-
cide studies literature described above considers historical, sociological, 
and anthropological representations of genocide, primarily with an eye to 
understanding how genocide happens, while the last three chapters in this 
volume consider the problem of representation from an artistic perspec-
tive, thereby aiming to bring us closer to understanding the experience of 
genocidal atrocity. Sarah Minslow, who has developed an undergraduate 
course on the subject of war and genocide in children’s literature, strug-
gled with how to get her students past the atrociousness of genocide to 
a place where they could to assess whether children’s literature about 
genocide is “good” or “bad”—a task accomplished by complicating ideas 
of the “child,” and then by locating the moral dilemmas faced by literary 
characters and how they respond to these within the specific, complex 
contexts in which they find themselves. In so doing, Minslow confronts 
the challenges of representing atrocity artistically, which, while neces-
sary in children’s literature,37 is much harder to accomplish there than 
representations of genocide—and this latter fact, I would suggest, raises 
important questions about the necessity of their pairing in other genres. 
Lorraine Markotic’s chapter on Bernhard Schlink’s bestselling novel The 
Reader—a book, like the film Schindler’s List, that’s widely used to teach 
high school and university students about the Holocaust—argues that it 
is not enough to simply remember and represent atrocities past. Instead, 
we need to think about how we are remembering and representing, reflect 
upon what thoughts we might be excluding, what conceptions we might 
be considering only in a restricted or limited form, and how our thinking 
might, even in small ways, echo the very thinking of the time period of 
the atrocities. Schlink’s writing here and elsewhere, like the Historiker-
streit (or “historians’ quarrel”) of the 1980s, postwar filmic representations 
of German history such as Heimat (1984), and responses to Europa Eur-
opa (1990), indicates that coming to terms with their country’s troubled 
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past—Vergangenheitsbewältigung—remains a challenge for Germans.38 
What Markotic reveals is that The Reader effectively denies its readers the 
possibility of thinking outside the frame of its narrative structure, thereby 
circumscribing thinking itself in a way that not only mirrors the thoughts 
of the novel’s main protagonist, but is also disturbingly reminiscent of the 
Nazi perspective both during and after the war. Markotic’s analysis of The 
Reader illustrates the importance of thinking about how we think about 
the past, something the novel—despite its reflective protagonist—insidi-
ously forecloses.
Over thirty years ago Lawrence Langer proposed that only artistic 
representations of the Holocaust “can lead the uninitiated imagination 
from the familiar realm of man’s fate to the icy atmosphere of the death 
camps”—an accomplishment that becomes “ever more necessary as that 
event recedes in time and new generations struggle to comprehend why 
a civilized country in the midst of the twentieth century coolly decided 
to murder all of Europe’s Jews.”39 It remains to be seen, however, if this is 
true. On the one hand, we’re now more than twice as distant from those 
events as was Langer when he made his plea for this “necessary art,” and 
so the poignancy of his remarks increases with the passing of the last few 
remaining survivors of the Holocaust. On the other hand, as genocidal 
atrocities have continued to occur, and as we’ve gradually come to rec-
ognize and acknowledge past atrocities as genocide, new arguments have 
emerged regarding the seductive power of art to represent violence in ways 
that history cannot.40 Patrick Anderson and Jisha Menon, for example, 
claim that the spectacular quality of violent acts deepens their cultural 
impact, and they warn therefore that performative representations of vio-
lence may become constitutive of “the context in which violence is ration-
alized and excused.” This resonates with Shoshana Felman’s claim that 
trial testimony often re-enacts the trauma of violent acts, which can never 
truly be disclosed fully either through testimony or any other means.41 
Informed by this scholarship, Donia Mounsef examines here how some 
contemporary artistic performance, contrary to longstanding assump-
tions about both decorum on the stage and the dramatic unrepresent-
ability of traumatic violence, is able to effect remarkably dense encounters 
with the ethical problems of atrocity. While the tension between atrocity 
and representation is as old as the Oresteia, the artists Mounsef discusses 
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take their audiences beyond the trauma of atrocity to its survival, with the 
spaces of their performance thus becoming important sites of resistance.
◆◆◆
Langer, introducing a collection of essays dedicated to challenging the 
irrepressible human desire to find redemption in the horrors of the Holo-
caust, wrote:
Our age of atrocity clings to the stable relics of faded eras, as if 
ideas like natural innocence, innate dignity, the inviolable spirit, 
and the triumph of art over reality were immured in some kind 
of immortal shrine, immune to the ravages of history and time. 
… As a result, the habit of discussing the past with a familiar dis-
course continues, while new models for dealing with mass murder 
intellectually, morally, historically, and philosophically do not 
proliferate.42
 
A dispiriting prediction indeed—and one that rings true when we consider 
how contemporary popular culture continues to fiercely resist facing up to 
the unsettling implications of the twentieth century’s confrontation with 
what Primo Levi called the “Gorgon.”43 However, the essays contained 
here—and indeed, the expansive state of the field of genocide studies gen-
erally—give the lie to Langer’s subsequent claim that scholars and activists 
working in this field are paralyzed by the darkness of their topic, becom-
ing like Dante’s fictional Dante, who can never again “return to the light” 
should he choose to look into the face of atrocity.44 What follows is just 
such a confrontation—and the results, I would suggest, are both disquiet-
ing and encouraging, but never timid. In a similar vein, Susan Sontag, like 
Hannah Arendt, regarded the Holocaust as incomprehensible, and that 
ultimately “the only response is to continue to hold the event in mind, to 
remember it.”45 The goal of understanding atrocities, like efforts to under-
stand the Holocaust, while aspirational, will surely remain as elusive as 
the USHMM’s goal of ending genocide in the twenty-first century. Never-
theless, as with the study of the Holocaust, we understand the compos-
ition, causes, consequences, and experience of genocide better today than 
we did even just a decade ago, and this broader understanding of the 
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phenomenon derives in large part from the adoption of new disciplinary 
perspectives and investigative methodologies. Our aim in this volume is 
to contribute to that project in the spirit of scholarly collaboration, and in 
so doing to continue to hold these tragic events in mind, and to remem-
ber them.
NOTES
 1 Yehuda Bauer, “Editor’s Introduction,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 1, no. 1 (1986): 1.
 2 “From the Editor: Apologia Rationalis,” Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 1 (1999): 
9–10.
 3 Israel W. Charny and Roger W. Smith, “Why GSP?” Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, 
no. 1 (2006): i–ii.
 4 “Imagine the Unimaginable: Ending Genocide in the 21st Century,” United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, 24 July 2012, http://www.ushmm.org/confront-geno-
cide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-events/imagine-the-unimaginable-ending-
genocide-in-the-21st-century/complete-symposium (accessed 1 July 2014).
 5 Mark Penn, “Imagine the Unimaginable.”
 6 Jens Meierhenrich, “Introduction: the Study and History of Genocide,” in Genocide: A 
Reader, ed. J. Meierhenrich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 7–10.
 7 “Resolutions,” International Association of Genocide Scholars, http://www.genocides-
cholars.org/resources/resolutions (accessed 15 July 2015).
 8 A. Dirk Moses, “The Holocaust and Genocide,” in The Historiography of Genocide, 
ed. Dan Stone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 547. For a similarly optimistic 
assessment of the state of the field, see Adam Jones, “Diffusing Genocide Studies, 
Defusing Genocides,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 3 (2011): 270–278.
 9 See, for example, Mahmood Mamdani, “The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, 
Insurgency,” London Review of Books 29, no. 5 (8 March 2007): 5–8.
 10 Meierhenrich, “Introduction,” 9.
 11 Ibid. See, for example, Jürgen Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge 
zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2011); Donald 
Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction 
of the Ottoman Armenians (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Dan Stone, 
The Holocaust, Fascism and Memory: Essays in the History of Ideas (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013); Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and 
Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); 
Alexander Hinton, Why Did they Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005).
 12 Gabriel Schoenfeld, “Auschwitz and the Professors,” Commentary 105, no. 6 (June 
1998), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/auschwitz-and-the-professors/ 
(accessed 1 October 2015); Herbert Hirsch, “Preventing Genocide and Protecting 
Human Rights: A Failure of Policy,” Genocide Studies International 8, no.1 (2014): 4–5.
 13 Charny and Smith, “Why GSP?” i.
Scott W. Murray14
 14 Stone, “Introduction,” The Historiography of Genocide, 2.
 15 Doris Bergen, “Studying the Holocaust: Is History Commemoration?” in The Holo-
caust and Historical Methodology, ed. Dan Stone (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 
158–159; Gavriel Rosenfeld, “The Politics of Uniqueness: Reflections on the Recent 
Polemical Turn in Holocaust and Genocide Scholarship,” Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies 13, no. 1 (1999): 28–61.
 16 William Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (London: William 
Clowes and Sons, 1876), 31.
 17 While Gary Bass has used the term “atrocitarian” to describe policy-makers inspired to 
intervene in international affairs on humanitarian grounds, Disraeli himself did not, as 
far I know, use the term to describe those whom he variously called the “infuriate and 
merciless humanitarians” and the “priests and professors” who rallied to Gladstone’s 
call to action. Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention 
(Toronto: Random House, 2008), 6; as cited in George Buckle, The Life of Benjamin 
Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (London: MacMillan, 1920), 6: 62, 194.
 18 As quoted in Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, 6: 61.
 19 At the time of writing, the United States had declared that ISIS was “responsible for 
genocide against groups in areas under its control, including Yezidis, Christians, and 
Shia Muslims.” John Kerry, “Remarks on Daesh and Genocide,” US Department of 
State, 17 March 2016, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/254782.htm 
(accessed 1 July 2016). See also John Kerry, “To Defeat Terror, We Need the World’s 
Help: The Threat of ISIS Demands a Global Coalition,” New York Times, 29 August 
2014; “Religious leaders say Isis persecution of Iraqi Christians has become genocide,” 
Guardian (London), 9 August 2014; Stephen Harper, “Statement by the Prime Minister 
of Canada on passage of second ISIL motion in Parliament,” Government of Canada, 
30 March 2015, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/03/30/statement-prime-minister-cana-
da-passage-second-isil-motion-parliament (accessed 15 October 2015).
 20 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1991); Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil; Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the 
Nation-State, Vols. 1–2 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005); Richard Rubenstein, “Afterword: 
Genocide and Civilization,” in Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies 
of Mass Death, eds. I. Wallimann, M. N. Dobkowski, and R. Rubenstein (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1987), 283–298.
 21 Gregory Stanton, “The Ten Stages of Genocide,” Genocide Watch, 2013, http://www.
genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html (accessed 1 October 2015); Tony 
Barta, “Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia,” in 
Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and case studies of mass death, eds. I. Walli-
mann and M. N. Dobkowski (New York: Greenwood, 1987), 237–252.
 22 Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National Response and Jewish Victimization 
during the Holocaust (New York: Free Press, 1979), 4.
 23 “When Will They Get Justice? Failures of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 
Commission,” Amnesty International, September 2011, http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/info/ASA37/008/2011/en (accessed 1 September 2015); John Baird, “Minister 
Baird Comments on Final Report of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 
Commission,” Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 11 January 2012, 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=650369 (accessed 1 September 2015); “EU 
Declaration on Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission,” European 
INTRODUCTION 15
Union Delegation to the United Nations, 23 February 2012, http://eu-un.europa.eu/
articles/en/article_11881_en.htm (accessed 1 September 2015); Alexander Laban 
Hinton, “Transitional Justice Time: Uncle San, Aunty Yan, and Outreach at the Khmer 
Rouge Tribunal,” in Genocide and Mass Atrocities in Asia: Legacies and Prevention, eds. 
Deborah Mayersen, and Annie Pohlman (Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 87.
 24 Alexander Laban Hinton, ed., Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Real-
ities after Genocide and Mass Violence (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
2010); Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge 
of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2010); Judy Barsalou and Victoria Baxter, 
The Urge to Remember: The Role of Memorials in Social Reconstruction and Transitional 
Justice (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, January 2007). See also Paul 
Harvey Williams, Memorial Museums: The Global Rush to Commemorate Atrocities 
(Oxford: Berg, 2007).
 25 Alexander Hinton, “Introduction: Toward an Anthropology of Transitional Justice,” in 
Transitional Justice, 1–22. See also Hinton, “Transitional Justice Time,” 94.
 26 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Rec-
onciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada (2015), 240.
 27 Ibid., 6.
 28 On the TRC and cultural genocide, see Letters, “Setting the record straight on the 
TRC,” National Post (Toronto), 5 June 2015, http://news.nationalpost.com/full-com-
ment/letters/letters-setting-the-record-straight-on-the-trc (accessed 15 September 
2015); David MacDonald, “Five reasons the TRC chose ‘cultural genocide’, ” Globe 
and Mail (Toronto), 6 July 2015, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/five-rea-
sons-the-trc-chose-cultural-genocide/article25311423/ (accessed 15 September 2015). 
On “cultural genocide” generally, and its application to the treatment of Indigenous 
peoples specifically, see Lawrence Davidson, Cultural Genocide (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2012); Israel Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide,” 
in Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, ed. G. J. Andreopoulos (Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 64–94; William Schabas, Genocide 
in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009); Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North America, eds. Andrew Woolford, Jeff 
Benvenuto, and Alexander Laban Hinton (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014); 
Andrew Woolford, “Ontological Destruction: Genocide and Canadian Aboriginal 
Peoples,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4 no.1 (2009): 81–97; David MacDonald and 
Graham Hudson, “The Genocide Question and Indian Residential Schools in Canada,” 
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 45, no. 2 
(2012): 427–449; Ward Churchill, Kill the Indian, Save the Man: The Genocidal Impact 
of American Indian Residential Schools (San Francisco: City Lights Publishers, 2004); 
Robert van Krieken, “Cultural Genocide in Australia,” in The Historiography of Geno-
cide, ed. Dan Stone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 128–155; “United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” 13 September 2007, http://www.
un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. (accessed 1 September 2015).
 29 The scholarship on Lemkin, once a neglected figure, is growing quickly: Raphael 
Lemkin, Totally unofficial: the autobiography of Raphael Lemkin, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013); “Special Issue: New Approaches to 
Raphael Lemkin,” Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 3 (2013): 247–338; Steven Jacobs, 
Lemkin on Genocide (Lanthan, MD: Lexington Books, 2012); Dominik J. Schaller and 
Scott W. Murray16
Jürgen Zimmerer, eds., The origins of genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a historian of mass 
violence (London: Routledge, 2009); John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the struggle for 
the Genocide Convention (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); “Special Issue: Raphael 
Lemkin: the ‘founder of the United Nation’s Genocide Convention’ as a historian of 
mass violence,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 (2005): 443–560; Samuel Totten 
and Steven L. Jacobs, eds., Pioneers of genocide studies: confronting mass death in the 
century of genocide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).
 30 Kai Ambos, “What Does ‘Intent to Destroy’ in Genocide Mean?” International Review 
of the Red Cross 91, no. 876 (2009): 833–858; Andrew Woolford, “Nodal Repair and 
Networks of Destruction: Residential Schools, Colonial Genocide, and Redress in 
Canada,” Settler Colonial Studies 3, no.1 (2013): 61–77.
 31 Stone, “Introduction,” The Historiography of Genocide, 2. I do not mean to suggest that 
scholars engaged in legitimate academic debates over the nature of genocide, which 
have been ongoing since Raphael Lemkin coined the term (and have arisen in part 
because of inconsistencies in Lemkin’s own usage), are promoting genocide denial—but 
simply that deniers unfailingly seek to exploit differences among scholars as “proof” 
that the phenomena itself is fabricated. While the denial of specific genocides—the 
Holocaust and Armenian genocide in particular—have generated a large scholarly 
response, genocide denial as an activity has received relatively little scholarly attention, 
except from social justice organizations concerned with combatting genocide. See, for 
example, Israel W. Charny, “The psychology of denial: A contribution to the psychol-
ogy of denial of genocide,” Journal of Armenian Studies 4, nos. 1–2 (1992): 289–306; 
Israel W. Charny, “A classification of denials of the Holocaust and other genocides,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 1 (2003): 11–34; Gregory Stanton, “The 12 Ways 
to Deny a Genocide,” Genocide Watch, 15 June 2005, http://www.genocidewatch.org/
genocide/12waystodenygenocide.html (accessed 15 July 2015); Human Rights Watch, 
“Genocide Denial: Incitement or Hate Speech?” HRW World Report 2007, www.hrw.
org/wr2k7/essays/shrinking/4.htm (accessed 15 July 2015); Yair Auron, The Banality 
of Denial: Israel and the Armenian Genocide (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 
2003); Sonja Biserko and Edina Becirevic, “Denial of genocide—on the possibility of 
normalising relations in the region,” Bosnian Institute, 23 October 2009, http://www.
bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2638 (accessed 1 June 2015); Deborah E. 
Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (New York: 
Free Press, 1993). 
 32 See, for example, Geoffrey Short, “Learning from Genocide? A study in the failure 
of Holocaust education,” Intercultural Education 16, no. 4, (2005): 367–380; Samuel 
Totten, Teaching about Genocide: Issues, Approaches, and Resources (London: IAP, 
2004).
 33 Raphael Lemkin, “Nature of Genocide; Confusion With Discrimination Against 
Individuals Seen,” New York Times, 14 June 1953. On We Charge Genocide, see Ann 
Curthoys and John Docker, “Defining Genocide,” in The Historiography of Genocide, 
15–21. On American slavery and genocide, see L. M. Thomas, Vessels of Evil: American 
Slavery and the Holocaust (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993). On Lemkin’s 
“inappropriate and racist” views of Africans, see D. J. Schaller, “Raphael Lemkin’s view 
of European colonial rule in Africa: between condemnation and admiration,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 7, no. 4 (2005): 531–538.
 34 See, for example, Sherene Razack, Looking White People in the Eye: Gender Race, Class 
and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
INTRODUCTION 17
1998); Joyce Green, “The Complexity of Indigenous Identity Formation and Politics in 
Canada: Self-Determination and Decolonisation, International Journal of Critical Indig-
enous Studies 2, no. 2 (2009): 36–46; Emma LaRoque, When the Other Is Me: Native 
Resistance Discourse, 1850–1990 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010); Paula 
Gunn Allen, The Sacred Hoop (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986); Andrea Smith, Conquest: 
Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide (Brooklyn, NY: South End Press, 2005).
 35 See, for example, Michael Berenbaum, ed., A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted 
and Murdered by the Nazis (New York: New York University Press, 1990); Linda 
Altman, The Forgotten Victims of the Holocaust (Berkeley Heights, NJ: Enslow, 2003); 
Israel Gutman and Shmuel Krakowski, Unequal Victims: Poles and Jews During World 
War Two (New York: Holocaust Library, 1986); Guenter Lewy, The Nazi Persecution of 
the Gypsies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
 36 Israel W. Charny, “The Integrity and Courage to Recognize All the Victims of a Geno-
cide,” in The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign 
of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912–1922) and Its Aftermath: History, 
Law, Memory, eds. Tessa Hofmann et al. (Scarsdale, NY: Melissa International Ltd., 
2011), 21–38; Tessa Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide: The Massacres and Deportations 
of the Greek Population of the Ottoman Empire (1912–1923),” in The Genocide of the 
Ottoman Greeks, 39–54.
 37 Lawrence Langer, The Holocaust and Literary Imagination (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1975); Kimberley Reynolds, Radical Children’s Literature: Future Visions 
and Aesthetic Transformations in Juvenile Fiction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010); Susan Honeyman, Elusive Childhood: Impossible Representations in Modern 
Fiction (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2005); Adrienne Kertzer, “ ‘Do You 
Know What “Auschwitz” Means?’ Children’s Literature and the Holocaust,” The Lion 
and the Unicorn 23, no. 2 (1999): 238–256.
 38 On the Historikerstreit, see Charles Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, 
and German National Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); 
Richard J. Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape 
from the Nazi Past (New York: Pantehon, 1989); Peter Baldwin, ed., Reworking the Past: 
Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians’ Debate (Boston: Beacon, 1990). On postwar 
German film, see Eric L. Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in 
Postwar Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Anton Kaes, From 
Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1989); Małgorzata Pakier, The Construction of European Holocaust Memory: 
German and Polish Cinema after 1989 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang 2013). Schlink’s other 
works that reflect his efforts at Vergangenheitsbewältigung include Guilt about the Past 
(Brisbane: Queensland University Press, 2009) and Homecoming (Toronto: Random 
House, 2008).
 39 Lawrence Langer, “The Americanization of the Holocaust on Stage and Screen,” in 
Admitting the Holocaust: Collected Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
174–175. Langer later broadened his view to include recorded testimony, diaries, and 
memoirs as helping us “to interpret the various layers of memory through which the 
event was experienced by its victims and survivors.” The key element here is “experi-
ence.” See Langer, “Introduction,” Admitting the Holocaust, 7. For a counterargument, 
see Inga Clendinnen, “Representing the Holocaust: The Case for History,” Michigan 
Quarterly Review 37, no. 1 (1998): n.p.
Scott W. Murray18
 40 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psycho-
analysis and History (New York: Routledge, 1991).
 41 Patrick Anderson and Jisha Menon, “Introduction: Violence Performed,” in Violence 
Performed: Local Roots and Global Routes of Conflict, eds. Patrick Anderson and Jisha 
Menon (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 5–6; Shoshana Felman, The Juridical 
Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002).
 42 Langer, “Introduction,” Admitting the Holocaust, 5.
 43 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1988), 83.
 44 “Turn your back and keep your eyes shut tight;
  For should the Gorgon come and you look at her,
  Never again would you return to the light.”
  Dante, The Inferno, trans. John Ciardi (New York: New American Library, 1954), canto 
9, lines 52–54.
 45 As cited in Michael Alan Signer, Humanity at the Limit: The Impact of the Holocaust 
Experience on Jews and Christians (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 40.
19
Atrocity and Proto-Genocide  
in Sri Lanka
Christopher Powell and Amarnath Amarasingam
Introduction
This paper discusses the concept of “proto-genocide.” This concept adds 
clarity to studies of cultural genocide by helping to distinguish between 
situations where a collective identity is under violent attack and situa-
tions of full-blown genocide. The distinction between “genocide” and 
“proto-genocide” is analogous to the distinction, in the conservation status 
of species, between “endangered” or “critically endangered” and “vulner-
able” or “near threatened.”1 Proto-genocide helps to define the boundaries 
of the genocide concept while still relating it to less totalizing forms of 
ethnic violence. 
Our argument has three main components. First, we discuss the ques-
tion of what distinguishes genocide from other atrocities, and hence what 
are the ultimate practical implications of a campaign against genocide. 
This discussion provides the rationale for a concept of proto-genocide. 
Second, we address the boundaries of the concept of genocide. Since cul-
tures change all the time, it is important to distinguish cultural change, 
even in the context of violence and atrocity, from genocide per se. To this 
end we propose our notion of proto-genocide, in which enabling condi-
tions for genocide are established but wholesale cultural extermination 
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is not yet underway. Finally, we examine the current situation of Tamils 
in Sri Lanka. Although the historical pattern of severe atrocities against 
Tamil people has led some commentators to describe the situation as geno-
cidal,2 we argue that these events can be more precisely understood as an 
instance of proto-genocide. This analysis supports the view that tendencies 
toward genocide are a systemic feature of modern global society.
The Atrocity of Genocide
It seems a truism to point out that genocide is an atrocity. For many, it is 
the worst of all atrocities, the “crime of crimes.”3 The danger with this way 
of thinking is that the atrociousness of genocide becomes, implicitly, part 
of its definition so that one must prove an act is atrocious before one can 
establish that it is genocidal and, conversely, the atrocious quality of an act 
contributes to the case for its being considered genocidal. We propose that 
scholars should identify and set aside this kind of thinking wherever they 
encounter it. Just as atrocity cannot be its own explanation,4 it cannot be 
its own definition either. This is because the label “atrocity” refers not to 
intrinsic properties of an act, but to our responses to it. To call something 
an “atrocity” expresses not only moral objection but an incalculable sur-
plus of moral outrage. In other words, the concept of “atrocity” expresses a 
traumatized response. Traumatic experiences are those experiences which 
are so painful they cannot be assimilated normally.5 Assimilating them, 
either personally or collectively, requires the expression and acknowledge-
ment of the incalculable pain they cause, but it also requires that this pain 
be translated from an endlessly recurring lived experience to a perception 
which can be contained and which does not overwhelm our other facul-
ties. The concept of genocide was born in the historical experience of trau-
matic violence, especially the trauma of the Nazi Holocaust. We must hon-
our those experiences, especially as new or ongoing genocides continue 
to traumatize their victims and to create vicarious trauma in bystanders. 
But to understand the source of this trauma we must distinguish between 
genocide and the trauma it causes, between “genocide” and “atrocity.” We 
must understand genocide as a structured social process. 
If genocide is a structured social process, then it can be defined by its 
formal properties. Dispute over those formal properties has made geno-
cide an essentially contested concept.6 One crucial point of contention 
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has been whether genocide essentially comprises or necessarily includes 
physical extermination implicitly,7 or whether the eradication of a group’s 
social and cultural existence should also be called genocide without quali-
fication.8 This question can be debated through the trading of moral intui-
tions, but it can also be advanced by considering what purpose we intend 
for the concept of genocide, what kind of practical difference in the world 
we are trying to make by using it.
Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term and campaigned for the crim-
inalization of genocide in international law, stated clearly that his purpose, 
in part, was to protect human cultural diversity:
The world represents only so much culture and intellectual vigor 
as are created by its component national groups. … The destruc-
tion of a nation, therefore, results in the loss of its future contribu-
tions to the world.9
 
In contemporary terms, we can say that Lemkin was concerned with 
ethnodiversity.10 The anthropologist Wade Davis uses the term “ethno-
sphere,” in direct analogy to the term “biosphere,” to refer to the global 
totality of all human cultures.11 Different cultures enable different forms 
of human experience; different “ways of worldmaking”12 at the conceptual 
level are articulated with different forms of practical relation among hu-
mans and between humans and the natural world.13 This is valuable in it-
self, and may be necessary to the collective future of humanity. But human 
ethnodiversity is severely threatened. For instance, of approximately six 
thousand extant human languages, fully half are not being taught to in-
fants and are therefore threatened with extinction, while only six hundred 
are spoken by a population base broad enough to be considered secure.14 
Genocide is therefore a global and systemic problem because it contributes 
to the drastic collapse of the ethnosphere.
A number of scholars have approached genocide as a systemic rather 
than a contingent feature of the modern state.15 When genocide is treat-
ed as a contingent feature of the modern state, its causes are expected to 
appear in unique or at least unusual features of the perpetrator society, 
such as the distinctive ideologies associated with social revolutions, for 
instance. Systemic approaches recognize the unique features of each geno-
cide, but also consider the ways in which conflicts or practices that are 
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common among modern states can contribute to the occurrence of geno-
cide. Systemic analysis identifies the otherwise normal aspects of modern 
social life which may need to be changed or compensated for in order to 
eradicate genocide altogether. Powell’s contribution to this literature fo-
cuses on how the institutional power of states is coupled with personal 
social identity.16 The modern sovereign state exists as a dynamic network 
of relations of “deferentiation.” In deferentiation, power struggles involv-
ing physical or symbolic violence are temporarily resolved when one party 
performs deference towards the other, thereby deferring further violence 
and establishing a hierarchical identity-difference relation. Through this 
process, subjects obtain security for themselves while reproducing the 
conditions of possibility for social violence. The practices of performing 
deference, determined by the contingencies of local power struggles, are 
fetishized as abstract social norms, while subjects are motivated to invest 
their social identity in the figure of the sovereign. Genocide occurs when 
social collectivities which have been partially but incompletely assimilated 
into these networks (and therefore bear markers of social difference, in-
cluding different identities, norms, and cultural practices), come to be pos-
itioned as radically Other, hence excluded from relations of identification 
and moral solidarity, and when the interest and impunity exist to motivate 
and enable the massive project of systematic group destruction. State for-
mation, or what Norbert Elias called “the civilizing process,” is therefore a 
contradictory process, producing both human security and the conditions 
for violence of varying degrees.17
In the context of this broad historical process, Lemkin’s normative 
entrepreneurship on behalf of the criminalization of genocide can be 
understood as an expression of the contradictions of the state system 
itself. It was possible for Lemkin to invent and successfully market the 
concept of genocide because modern sovereignty simultaneously raises 
and disappoints the hope of peace and security for all. Specifically, the 
modern state raises the theoretical possibility of universal citizenship 
and universal human rights, but also creates a new security dilemma 
premised on the question of whose normative standards and cultural 
identity will inform the relations of deferentiation on which state power 
depends in practice. This strategic situation invites a distinctly modern 
politics of “imagined communities” based on ethnic nationalism.18 Thus 
the genocide concept appears as a reaction against and resistance to the 
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over-coupling of state power with social identity, and the concept appears 
when it does in history precisely because this over-coupling can be per-
ceived as a systemic problem.
The genocide concept, therefore, serves two purposes, which in the 
current historical formation are connected: the protection of the diversity 
of the ethnosphere, and a resistance to the over-coupling of state power 
with socio-cultural identity. From this perspective, what defines genocide 
is not so much the intentions of those engaged in its perpetration, or even 
the moral qualities of the acts involved, but its distinctive qualities as a 
process in which the use of violence tends towards the destruction of a 
socio-cultural collectivity as such. Thus, genocide does not always require 
a campaign of deliberate physical extermination; it can be perpetrated 
through what Tony Barta has called “relations of genocide” perpetrated by 
a “genocidal society” in which an entire people is “subject to remorseless 
pressures of destruction inherent in the very nature of the society.”19 These 
remorseless pressures can result from what Nancy Scheper-Hughes calls 
the “small wars” conducted in “the normative, ordinary social spaces of 
public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital charity wards, nursing 
homes, city halls, jails and public morgues.”20 In these small wars, not all 
members of the perpetrator group need intend or even be aware of the 
overall genocidal trajectory of the actions in which they participate. Geno-
cide may be achieved through a variety of measures that dissolve the social 
institutions and relationships necessary for the perpetuation of group life 
without featuring a coordinated program of mass killing.21
However, this conceptual approach may be objected to on the grounds 
that it makes the boundaries of the genocide concept unacceptably vague. 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish genocidal from non-genocidal at-
tacks on collective life. We do this by investigating an important process at 
the boundary of genocide: proto-genocide. 
The Boundaries of Genocide
The one constant of all culture is change, so what differentiates genocid-
al from non-genocidal situations where atrocities are being committed? 
Powell defines genocide as “an identity-difference relation of categorical 
obliteration.”22 This terse formulation makes several key points. First, so-
cial relations are understood as being practical. A genocidal relation is not 
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a genocidal ideology or even a genocidal discourse (although it may in-
clude these), but a sustained flow of practice distinguished by the quality of 
transformation it effects in the actors involved.23 As a process of practical 
transformation, genocidal relations, like all other social relations, involves 
power differentials. Power differentials can be mutually reciprocal; that 
is, in a situation of equality, all parties to the relation are mutually inter-
dependent and can hold each other accountable. More often they are to 
some degree asymmetric, and at the furthest extreme of this asymmetry 
interdependence is transformed into impunity, a condition in which one 
party can do what they wish to the other(s) without being held account-
able in return. Martin Shaw conceptualizes genocide precisely in terms of 
power dynamics and defines genocidal action as 
action in which armed power organizations treat civilian social 
groups as enemies and aim to destroy their real or putative social 
power, by means of killing, violence and coercion against individ-
uals whom they regard as members of the groups.24
 
This conception goes to the heart of the matter: genocide involves a 
power struggle in which one group faces the realistic possibility of 
total destruction.
What does the destruction of a group involve, if not the physical an-
nihilation of its members? Relational sociology conceptualizes groups as 
“figurations,” ever-evolving dynamic networks of relations among indi-
viduals. Elias uses the metaphor of a dance to illustrate how the social in-
stitutions which we commonly describe in static terms—the family, the 
state, the church, and so on—can be more fully understood as patterns 
in the flow of action among individuals.25 To destroy a figuration, there-
fore, is to disrupt this flow and sunder these relations. A group can be 
destroyed, as such, without killing a single member if the members are 
prevented from engaging in the practices which renew their connections 
to each other and are prevented from sustaining their shared distinctive-
ness from non-members.26
Powell proposes three conditions under which genocide can and will 
occur: identity-difference polarization, interest, and impunity. In essence,
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a network of actors joined together by common identity will pur-
sue genocide across the boundary of difference if a sufficient in-
terest exists to mobilize such a large-scale action and if the actors 
have the impunity to do so.27
 
First, identity-difference polarization allows perpetrators and victims to 
be defined as groups and for the former to define the latter as radical-
ly Other.28 Defining groups as Other excludes the potential victims from 
what Helen Fein terms “the universe of obligation.”29 For Fein, individuals 
or groups inside this “universe” are people “toward whom obligations are 
owed, to whom rules apply, and whose injuries call for amends.”30 When 
individuals or groups are excluded from this universe, they become cat-
egories of people who are so radically Othered and excluded that they are 
rendered abject.31 However, abjection is not a sufficient condition for geno-
cide. Many oppressed groups—homosexuals, transgendered persons, Afri-
can-Americans—have at various historical moments been rendered abject 
without being subjected to genocide. Given the resilience of social groups, 
genocide inevitably requires a sustained application of force. Such force 
can be applied incidentally, however, without genocide being a primary 
or even conscious motivation, but merely as a means to the realization of 
some other massive project such as colonialism. The second condition that 
must be present in order for genocide to take place is that there must be an 
interest motivating the genocidal action. Someone must benefit from the 
application of force which overcomes the resistance of the victims, even 
if this benefit is not explicitly recognized. And third, for genocide to take 
place, the capacity to resist it must be overcome; since this means the vio-
lent annihilation of the victim’s “we” identity, which the victim will resist 
as a matter of life and death, the power relation between the two must be 
one of impunity.
These elements are dynamic and continue to take shape during the 
genocidal process itself. However, a non- or proto-genocidal situation may 
be distinguished from a genocidal situation by the absence of one or more 
of these elements. For instance, within a social configuration that includes 
potential perpetrator and potential victim, identity-difference relations 
may be substantially polarized without the potential perpetrator having 
either the interest or the impunity necessary to instantiate genocide. A 
proto-genocidal situation is one in which the developmental process of the 
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whole configuration is tending towards the establishment of these three 
conditions. A non-genocidal situation is one in which one or more of the 
three conditions may be partially present, but in which there is no develop-
mental tendency towards the establishment of all three.
Proto-Genocide in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka is a small island off the southern coast of India, a little more than 
25,000 square miles in size. While its close proximity to its larger neigh-
bour has meant that religious, cultural, and social influences from India 
have always been present in the country, the Palk Strait that separates Sri 
Lanka and India has buffered the island-nation from shifts in the Indian 
political climate.32 Sri Lanka’s significant ethnic and religious diversity lies 
at the centre of its social and political history. Of the roughly twenty mil-
lion people in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese, who mostly identify as Buddhist, 
comprise the majority ethnic group, with 74 percent of the population. 
The Tamil community is made up of both Sri Lankan Tamils (12.6 per-
cent) and Indian Tamils (5.6 percent), most of whom are Hindu, but with 
a significant number of Christians (mostly Catholic). The Muslims of Sri 
Lanka make up about 7 percent of the population.33 And the smaller ethnic 
groups consist of the Burghers (0.4 percent), who are descendants of Euro-
pean settlers, and the Veddas, the Indigenous peoples of Sri Lanka. 
Initially ethnic tensions, which became an intimate part of Sri Lankan 
society throughout the twentieth century, were for the most part about 
language and access to government services.34 These tensions eventually 
spilled over into full-scale violence in the 1970s, increasingly coloured by 
Tamil demands for autonomy and territorial rights. While the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers) became the dominant, and 
often only, Sri Lankan Tamil fighting force, numerous other groups were 
active in the 1970s and 1980s. Over time, most of their leaders either were 
killed by the LTTE or crossed over to the government’s side.35 Beginning 
in the early 1980s, the LTTE launched a bloody campaign against the Sri 
Lankan government, fighting for a separate homeland for the Tamils, 
called Tamil Eelam. The civil war continued until May 2009, when the 
Sri Lankan armed forces defeated the Tigers in Mullivaikkal, a tiny spit 
of land in northeastern Sri Lanka. Civilian casualties were high, with 
the United Nations estimating that anywhere between forty and seventy 
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thousand civilians lost their lives.36 Since the war’s end, the government of 
Sri Lanka often argues that the country did not have an ethnic problem—
only a “terrorism problem”—and that there was in fact no “war” to speak 
about.37 Such rewriting of the past, and lack of acknowledgement of Tamil 
grievances and demands, has coloured how the government has engaged 
with the people of the former war zones since the guns went silent. 
As such, Sri Lankan Tamils’ current situation provides, we argue, 
an example of a proto-genocidal situation. We assert that the numerous 
human rights violations committed against Tamils by the Sri Lankan 
government and the military, while atrocious, have not been specifically 
genocidal—so far. The decisive factor concerns the figuration of relational 
processes through which Sri Lankan Tamil culture and identity are (re)
produced over time. Anti-Tamil atrocities in Sri Lanka has certainly af-
fected how these processes have taken place, in ways that are very painful 
and destructive for individuals. The situation is one of grave human rights 
concern which deserves more international attention than it is getting. 
However, this persecution has not—so far—threatened to destroy the 
Tamil collective identity as such. This could change quickly, however. Since 
the collapse of Tamil military resistance to the Sri Lankan government 
in 2009, several developments have worked to systematically undermine 
Tamils’ social power, and if these developments continue then Tamils 
could become acutely vulnerable to genocide. Indeed, many activists and 
academics already use the language of genocide to describe the plight of 
the Tamil community on the island since independence,38 pointing to the 
1981 burning of the Jaffna library, the numerous riots and pogroms since 
then, and the last stages of the civil war, as well as events in the postwar 
period, as clear evidence of genocide. 
All three enabling conditions for genocide are partially fulfilled in this 
case. To begin with, identity-difference relations between Tamils and Sin-
halese have been strongly polarized for many years, as evidenced below 
by the exclusionary mythology of Sinhalese nationalism. Meanwhile, in-
centives exist for further persecution of Tamils: ethnically exclusionary 
Sinhalese nationalism and anti-Tamil chauvinism has for many years pro-
vided political leaders with marginal returns, in the state and in civil so-
ciety, while the appropriation of land and business opportunities in Tamil 
homelands provides economic incentives for Sinhalese soldiers. Finally, a 
number of developments push the power relations between Tamils and 
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Sinhalese within the Sri Lankan state further from a condition of recipro-
cal interdependence and towards a condition of impunity.
Identity-Difference Polarization
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist ideology defines Tamils as historical oppres-
sors and enemies of the Sinhala nation. This ideology began to emerge 
in the colonial period. In true Orientalist fashion,39 the British occupiers 
denied that the Sinhala people had any historical record until the “dis-
covery,” in the 1830s, of the Mahavamsa, a historical chronicle written in 
the sixth century by the monk Mahanama, whereupon the Mahavamsa 
was construed as the authentic historical document defining the essence 
of the Sinhala people.40 Modern interpretations of the text privileged the 
role of the monarch Dutthagamini, who overthrew the Chola dynasty and 
restored Buddhism to the island, thereby establishing Sinhalese and Tam-
ils as historical enemies.41 Through the work of anti-colonial leaders like 
Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933) and Walpola Rahula (1907–1997), 
this polarized view of Sinhala-Tamil relations was incorporated into the 
Sri Lankan national narrative.42 
This ideological framework began to be realized in practice after in-
dependence in 1948. After its profound defeat in the 1952 election, the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) under S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike aggressively 
exploited communal tensions to win the 1956 election.43 Declaring that Sri 
Lanka’s 1948 independence from Britain was not yet complete, Bandar-
anaike promised that, if the SLFP were elected, only Sinhala, and not Tam-
il, would be given official language status. Further developments in 1956, 
including the celebration of the 2,500-year anniversary of the Buddha’s 
entry into nirvana and the publication of The Betrayal of Buddhism by the 
All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, further asserted an essential bond between 
Sinhala nationalism and the Buddhist religion. Bandaranaike’s election 
in 1956 “established a link between the government and the Buddhist re-
ligion that has been essential to the political and religious history of Sri 
Lanka since that time.”44 Shortly after his victory, Bandaranaike proposed 
the Official Language Act, which declared Sinhala to be the only official 
language in Sri Lanka. This act would become a long-running symbol of 
Sinhala nationalism and would solidify in the minds of many Tamils the 
belief that the Sinhala leadership could not be trusted to uphold the rights 
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of minority populations.45 There was an immediate backlash to the Lan-
guage Act by Sri Lankan Tamils, represented by the Federal Party, who 
argued that the legislation placed their language, culture, and economic 
position in jeopardy. 
After Bandaranaike’s assassination in 1959 by a Buddhist monk, his 
widow, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike, carried forward many of 
her husband’s policies and aggressively enforced the Sinhala-only act. 
What made matters worse was a government policy to hire Sinhala into 
government service. In May 1972, Bandaranaike and the United Front also 
used their overwhelming majority to introduce a new constitution. The 
new constitution made the country a republic, officially changed the name 
of the island from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, declared Sri Lanka to be a “Unitary 
State,” gave Buddhism a “foremost place” in the country, and made it the 
state’s duty to “protect and foster Buddhism.” In the very same month that 
the constitution was passed, the Federal Party, the Tamil Congress, and 
the Ceylon Workers’ Congress formed the Tamil United Front (TUF). 
Perhaps the single most important issue which aggravated ethnic ten-
sions, leading many Tamil youth to throw their support behind militant 
movements, was the matter of university admissions.46 In the 1960s stu-
dents were educated in one of three language streams: Sinhala, Tamil, or 
English. There existed, then, three different sets of entrance exams, which 
would be evaluated by three sets of examiners. In the late 1970s, critics began 
to allege (falsely) that Tamil students benefited from Tamil-language exa-
miners’ favouritism. To correct this alleged bias, a language-based system 
of standardization was introduced, which inevitably favoured Sinhalese 
students. The numerical scores of applicants in each of the three languages 
were adjusted to fit a common scale, which was based on the number of 
applicants in each language. As Sinhala youth were more numerous than 
Tamils, it meant that the scores of Sinhala students were raised in relation 
to Tamil and English applicants. “District quotas” introduced in 1974 fur-
ther established the primacy of ethnicity over achievement in determining 
university entrance. “Under this system, residents of ‘backward’ districts 
were given preferential admissions treatment. Under criteria devised by 
the Education Ministry, these were mostly districts with heavy Kandyan 
and Muslim populations.”47 The district quotas had a significant impact on 
the number of Tamils admitted to university science programs. In a single 
year, the number of admissions dropped by a third.48
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After these changes, existing Tamil political leaders lost legitimacy and 
militant movements like the LTTE began to emerge. Alongside this rise 
of Tamil militancy, the Tamil United Front made changes to its political 
objectives. In May 1976, a convention was held in the Northern Province 
constituency of Vaddukoddai, during which the TUF reconstituted itself 
as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).49 The insertion of the word 
“liberation” reflected the growing belief that fairness, political rights, and 
economic opportunities would not be guaranteed to Tamils as a minority 
population within a united Sri Lanka. The TULF manifesto for the 1977 
elections makes it clear how far Tamil-Sinhala relations had deteriorated 
in the previous seven years: 
What is the alternative now left to the nation that has lost its rights 
to its language, rights to its citizenship, rights to its religions and 
continues day by day to lose its traditional homeland to Sinhalese 
Colonization? What is the alternative now left to a nation that lies 
helpless as it is being assaulted, looted and killed by hooligans in-
stigated by the ruling race and by the security forces of the State? 
… There is only one alternative and that is to proclaim with the 
stamp of finality and fortitude that we alone shall rule over our 
land our forefathers ruled. Sinhalese imperialism shall quit our 
homeland.50 
 
As Richardson notes, “this manifesto marked a sea change in Tamil pol-
itical organizations and attitudes in the short space of seven years—from 
Federal Party to Tamil United Liberation Front, from demands for language 
rights and devolution of power to demands for political independence.”51 
While a full examination of the course of the civil war cannot be 
undertaken here,52 it should be sufficient to point out that following com-
munal violence during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s—includ-
ing the riots of 1977 and 1981, the burning of the Jaffna library (and the 
subsequent loss of over ninety thousand rare Tamil manuscripts), the 
pogroms of Black July 1983, and subsequent Indian involvement in the 
training and funding of Tamil militant groups—the civil war reached un-
precedented levels of destruction. Consequently, the LTTE became one of 
the most feared rebel groups of the twentieth century, equipped with an 
air force, a navy, an intelligence wing, an international propaganda and 
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funding structure, as well as close to ten thousand well-trained cadres 
ready to die for the cause of national liberation.53
Interest in Persecution and Genocide
While ethnic tensions simmered in the country from the time of independ-
ence from the British in 1948, the riots of Black July 1983 fundamentally 
altered the course of ethnic tensions in the country. The shooting death 
of thirteen Sri Lankan soldiers in the north of the country by the LTTE 
set the stage for what would become one of the bloodiest decades in the 
country’s history. Sri Lankan president J. R. Jayewardene tried to keep the 
funeral for the dead soldiers from turning into a political demonstration. 
However, the arrival of the bodies from Jaffna to Colombo on 24 July was 
delayed by several hours, and the funeral had to be cancelled. This pro-
voked a riot which continued for a week. Hundreds of Tamil and Indian 
businesses were burned, homes were destroyed, and many were beaten, 
shot, or burned alive in their houses or vehicles. Many women were raped 
or forced to exhibit themselves in front of heckling crowds. Perhaps the 
most infamous incident occurred at the Welikade maximum security pris-
on, about 4 miles north of Colombo. On the afternoon of 25 July, Sinhalese 
prisoners gained entry into the wing of the prison holding Tamil polit-
ical detainees and killed thirty-seven of them with knives and clubs while 
guards stood idly by. Overall estimates of the number of people killed dur-
ing Black July range from two hundred to two thousand, mostly Tamil. In 
addition to lives lost, the events of July 1983 also forced some one hundred 
thousand Tamils into refugee camps when their homes, vehicles, shops, 
and belongings were destroyed. Around thirty thousand people also be-
came unemployed due to work sites being destroyed.
The events of Black July help to explain who benefits from ethnic per-
secution of Tamils, and how. It is no secret that the violence was highly 
organized, and that it greatly benefited the business class as well as cer-
tain political leaders.54 Economic liberalization operated, and continues to 
operate, as a vehicle for this benefit:
Economic liberalisation, as a set of economic policies with asym-
metrically distributed short-term effects, activates the individual’s 
understanding of how ethnicity affects his material well-being 
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because of pre-existing ethnic divisions of labour. Political entre-
preneurs attempt to utilise this process in order to politicise eth-
nicity and transform it into a reliable and efficient basis for ethnic 
group cohesion and collective behaviour.55
 
As far back as the 1956 elections, Prime Minister Bandaranaike “combined 
the promise of selective incentives along ethnic lines with the use of mo-
bilizational resources.”56 From 1970 to 1977, Biziouras argues, Sri Lanka 
experienced a low level of economic liberalization during which Sinhalese 
political entrepreneurs could selectively allocate to segments of the Tamil 
population the various incentives they would receive. With increasing eco-
nomic liberalization after 1977, and ethnic tensions already simmering, a 
kind of ethnic outbidding became prominent. During this period, the 
Sinhalese UNP political entrepreneurs, cognisant of the need 
to outbid their SLFP opponents in terms of selective incentives, 
actively distributed selective incentives to their ethnic brethren: 
public-sector jobs, public investment in infrastructural projects 
in Sinhalese-majority areas, preferential access to policy-makers, 
and tailored policies to meet specific demands by the Sinhalese 
critical masses.57
 
The 1983 Black July pogrom was not, therefore, a case of deep-seated en-
mity between Sinhalese and Tamil people finally erupting onto the streets, 
but rather an expression of the connections between state power, ethno-re-
ligious identity, and economic incentives, and the need for this power to 
translate into economic incentives as well. As Biziouras notes, 
the Sinhalese who participated in the Colombo riots demanded 
material resources, jobs and access to state subsidies and were led 
by Sinhalese UNP leaders. … [These attacks] were actively organ-
ised and implemented on the basis of attacking the Tamils’ eco-
nomic resources. These attacks were implemented by rank-and-
file JSS (Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya, or National Workers Asso-
ciation) members, coordinated by the UNP Minister of Industry 
Cyril Matthew, often targeting the properties of Colombo-area 
Tamil merchants.58 
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More recent attacks, not against Tamils but against the Muslim population 
in Colombo—such as the attacks on mosques and Muslim-owned busi-
nesses in 2013 and 2014—have similar undertones. 
Slide Towards Impunity
Suppression of Political Representation
As respected political scientist A. J. Wilson noted, from the beginning of 
British rule in Sri Lanka, Tamils “remained a community apart … [who] 
did not wish to be assimilated, and maintained a group consciousness as a 
separate community and civilization with their own language, culture and 
territory, and the Hindu faith as their distinguishing characteristics.”59 
There has, however, always been a debate in the country about whether 
minorities can be “Sri Lankan too” while practising their respective reli-
gious and cultural traditions, and whether the structure of the state is able 
to include other national identities within its borders. As Karthigesu Si-
vathamby once asked, “Cannot a Tamil be a Sri Lankan too? Does being a 
Sri Lankan Tamil imply that his/her Tamilness cannot be as publicly stat-
ed as his or her ‘Sri Lankaness’? Cannot Tamilness and the Sri Lankaness 
coexist? For Sri Lankan Tamils, these are soul-shattering questions.”60 As 
Sivathamby points out, whatever internal debates once existed, this iden-
tity, as shown above, has been increasingly at risk since independence, and 
particularly since the outbreak of civil war in the 1980s. We argue here, 
however, that even with the end of the war in May 2009, the preservation 
of Tamil collective identity remains at risk. 
One of the most pernicious aspects of postwar Sri Lanka has been the 
continued attack on Sri Lankan, and particularly Tamil, civil society. For 
instance, on 10 January 2012, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa’s brother and secretary of the Defence and Urban Development 
Ministry, delivered a lecture to the Sri Lanka Foundation Institute and As-
sociated Newspapers of Ceylon Limited. The president’s brother, arguably 
the second most powerful man in Sri Lanka, began his lecture by stating 
that the country still faces “several threats” following the end of protracted 
civil war. The very first threat he mentioned, and which he discussed at 
length, was the “reorganization of the LTTE in the international arena.”61 
Mentioning several Tamil diaspora groups by name, he argued that even 
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after the defeat of the LTTE, “the rump of the LTTE’s global establishment 
is still active.” Rajapaksa argued, for example, that the “unwavering in-
tent” of LTTE-linked groups overseas “is the division of Sri Lanka and the 
establishment of a separate state.” He went on to note: “Most of them say 
they engage only in political activism and not violence. Almost all of them 
pretend to have a democratic face. But make no mistake. The Tiger has not 
changed its stripes.”62 
While the defense secretary’s remarks do not necessarily reflect in es-
sence the views of mainstream Sri Lankans or the broader international 
community, such a stark verdict on diaspora activism by someone as 
powerful as the president’s brother and defense minister is worrisome to 
say the least. To make matters worse, in April 2014, the government of Sri 
Lanka proscribed as “terrorist fronts” sixteen organizations and released 
the names of more than four hundred individuals who were banned from 
entering the country.63 The timing of the proscription, occurring concur-
rently with the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, signalled to many that the government decision was, as Hu-
man Rights Watch stated, “aimed at restricting peaceful activism by the 
country’s Tamil minority” against the government.64 Many things were 
worrisome about this decision. For example, it made it difficult for Tamil 
political parties on the island to receive support and funding from abroad, 
it made it impossible for many diaspora activists associated with these 
banned organizations from visiting family and friends in the country, 
and it made it quite dangerous for NGO groups and aid workers to receive 
support, financially or otherwise, from diaspora organizations who have a 
vested interest in the country.65 The full ripple effect of the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment’s actions remains to be seen, but it is clear that the government is 
increasingly worried about diaspora activists and organizations, and that 
it is not shy about targeting them. 
However, the government has not only targeted overseas diaspora 
organizations. Many civil society organizations in the former war zones 
struggle to function under government interference and surveillance. A 
case in point is the Northern Provincial Council (NPC). In the diaspora 
and the former war zones of Sri Lanka following the war, there was much 
talk about the potential for the establishment of such a council to move 
the country towards a modicum of devolution and power-sharing. As 
Kumaravadivel has written, however, the NPC, even after the elections 
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were finally held in September 2013, continues to suffer from interference 
and heavy-handedness from the government in Colombo as well as the 
governor of the Northern Province (who is appointed by the president).66 
As Kumaravadivel notes, “In the South, the Governors are dormant. They 
do not interfere with the Provincial Council administrations. However 
in the North and East, wherein the Governor’s chair is occupied by two 
retired army personnel, the Governors make maximum use of their con-
stitutionally granted power. The 13th amendment gives the Governor a 
choice as to whether s/he wants to be active or not. In the North and East 
the Governors act like Viceroys from an alien land.”67 
In addition to its crackdown on diaspora organizations and its interfer-
ence in the affairs of the NPC, the defence ministry, in July 2014, “banned 
non-governmental organizations from holding press conferences, aware-
ness campaigns, training for journalists, workshops and disseminating 
press releases on everything from voter rights to exposing corruption.”68 
While this ban applies to NGOs across the country, it has of course had 
a chilling effect in the former war zones of the north as well. Attacks on 
journalists have also been on the rise. As the civil war was again raging 
after 2006, Keith Nohayr of the Nation was kidnapped and beaten before 
being released, J. S. Tissanayagam was detained and went through arduous 
court proceedings before being pardoned, and Lasantha Wickrematunge, 
a prominent anti-government journalist and editor of the Sunday Leader, 
was killed by four armed assassins on 8 January 2009.69 As the Commit-
tee to Protect Journalists noted, at least twenty-six journalists have been 
driven into exile between 2008 and 2013, Tamil journalists in the north 
and east of the country have been continuously attacked and targeted for 
their reporting,70 and the offices of respected Tamil newspapers have been 
targeted by arsonists.71 
Militarization, the Loss of Economic Livelihood, and Women’s 
Insecurity
As the International Crisis Group (ICG) pointed out, the issue of liveli-
hood and economic development in the north has been intimately tied 
to the continued militarization of the former war zones.72 According to 
the ICG, “Since the war ended in 2009, hundreds of millions of dollars 
have poured into the province, but the local populations, mostly left des-
titute by the conflict, have seen only slight improvements in their lives. 
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Instead of giving way to a process of inclusive, accountable development, 
the military is increasing its economic role, controlling land and seem-
ingly establishing itself as a permanent occupying presence.”73 Even as the 
Northern Province is among the least densely populated, the number of 
military troops stationed there is very substantial. According to some es-
timates, sixteen of the Sri Lankan army’s nineteen brigades are located in 
Tamil-dominated areas, with a soldier-to-civilian ratio of 1:11—one of the 
highest in the world.74 
To be sure, militarization does not refer only to the presence of the 
military in the north and east.75 Unlike in the years immediately follow-
ing the end of the war, soldiers are not always seen wandering the city 
streets of the north. Rather, militarization persists in a more sustained and 
routinized kind of way. The economic aspects of militarization, in addi-
tion to security issues, are becoming increasingly worrisome to people in 
the former war zones. As scholars and activists have noted, the military 
has been involved with a variety of economic initiatives in the country: 
running security companies, a catering service, hotel chains, farming, and 
conducting whale watching tours.76 The military is often accused by people 
in the north of flooding the market with their own goods at reduced prices 
since they have virtually no overhead costs. This frustration extends to 
land rights as well.77 Many people interviewed in the north by Amaras-
ingam are distressed by the fact that the military is being given lands in the 
former war zones. This is being done, as one activist put it, to “purposeful-
ly redraw the demographic makeup of the region” and to eventually nullify 
the argument that the north is a “Tamil homeland” with a unique culture 
and tradition, which deserves to govern itself with a sense of autonomy.78 
As Fonseka and Jegatheeswaran point out, “Four years after the war, the 
military continues to play a major role in the acquisition and alienation of 
land in the North and East … [and] the large-scale acquisitions happening 
in the North and East appear to be directed by the central government 
and the military with limited information available to local officials and 
affected populations.”79
Within the broader context of militarization and postwar insecurity, 
it is women who struggle most at the hands of both the military and mem-
bers of the Tamil population. Three decades of civil war has resulted in over 
forty thousand female-headed households, with husbands and older male 
children having been killed in the war. This, combined with inadequate 
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housing and limited livelihood options, has put many women in situa-
tions of vulnerability.80 During research visits to the north, Amarasingam 
was often told that women were much safer during the time of the LTTE. 
Under the LTTE, sexual violence was apparently harshly dealt with, which 
served as a deterrent. In the postwar environment, women’s vulnerability 
has increased drastically in the context of militarization. As Fonseka and 
Raheem point out, most roads in the north have significant military pres-
ence in one form or another, and this “has had a bearing on women who 
continue to live with host families or in displacement camps as a result 
of their lands being occupied. For instance, in households in areas of the 
Vanni but also in Jaffna and Mannar, consisting largely of women with no 
adult male presence, the residents even sleep the night in other houses for 
safety reasons.”81 As such, the issue of land—and secure housing—is also 
intimately tied to women’s security and vulnerability. For example, a re-
cent report by Yasmin Sooka, the executive director of the Foundation 
for Human Rights, argued that abductions, arbitrary detention, torture, 
rape and sexual violence have increased since the end of the war in 2009. 
More damningly, the report argued that “these widespread and system-
atic violations by the Sri Lankan security forces occur in a manner that 
indicates a coordinated, systematic plan approved by the highest levels 
of government.”82
Sinhalization of the Tamil Areas and Tamil Mourning 
When Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, visited 
Sri Lanka in August 2013, she attempted to visit Mullivaikkal and the Nan-
dikadal Lagoon, the tiny spit of land where the civil war came to an end, 
and where the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed. The govern-
ment argued that Pillay was attempting to “pay tribute” to the LTTE, and 
that no more evidence of the UN’s biased stance against the Sri Lankan 
government was needed. While this particular incident made headlines, 
it is certainly not an isolated example of the ways in which the Sri Lankan 
government attempts to dictate how the war should be remembered. For 
the government, the thirty year civil war was not an ethnic conflict but 
a terrorism problem. As such, the government has seen fit to destroy the 
childhood home of the LTTE leader, as well as raze to the ground a series 
of LTTE cemeteries that used to dot the north and east of the country, 
often installing army camps directly on top of them.83 The mothers and 
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fathers of the LTTE combatants who were buried at these cemeteries have 
been traumatized by these actions.
In addition to the destruction and desecration of LTTE cemeteries, 
public acts commemorating the war’s end have been banned by the mil-
itary every year since May 2009. While the celebratory pageantry is well 
planned in Colombo for “Victory Day,” Tamils in the Northern Province 
are not allowed to publicly mourn their dead. As military spokesman 
Ruwan Wanigasuriya said in May 2014, “Any persons trying to hoist black 
flags, distribute leaflets or put up posters will be considered as supporting 
of terrorism and such persons will be taken into custody under the Preven-
tion of Terrorism Act.”84 Any act of public remembrance, in other words, 
will be interpreted and treated as a kind of tribute to the LTTE. Despite 
the ban, however, over two thousand students and faculty at the University 
of Jaffna observed Mullivaikkal Remembrance Day in 2014. Each atten-
dee stood silently holding a candle, while military personnel and police 
kept watch outside. Through such bans and surveillance, the government 
attempts to stifle communal strategies for coping with the immense losses 
suffered over the last three decades, and therefore contributes to feelings 
of isolation and dislocation already rampant in the former war zones. As 
Tissainayagam writes, 
May 18 has come to symbolise different things in different parts 
of Sri Lanka. This precisely is the reason why the restrictions on 
mourning apply only to the Northern Province—the only Tam-
il-dominated province in the country. In areas outside the North, 
the government holds huge victory day celebrations, replete with 
militaristic symbols—marching columns, parading of military 
hardware and speeches reinforcing national unity and victory 
over terrorism and division of the country. These events have 
strong overtones of racism: the triumph of Sinhala nationalism, 
embodied by the government of President Mahinda Rajapakse 
and his family, over the Tamils by crushing their aspiration for 
dignity, rights and equality. … By criminalising northern Tamils 
mourning their dead as an act of terrorism, which can be pun-
ished by arrest and detention under the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act (PTA), Rajapakse hopes he can contain the Tamils’ moves to 
cohere as a community once again.85
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In addition to the attacks on public mourning and the lack of acknow-
ledgement of Tamil lives lost in the war, the Sri Lankan government is 
also engaging in a broad project aimed at “Sinhalizing” Tamil areas of the 
north. As The Social Architects, an anonymous group of activists based 
in Sri Lanka, recently noted, “Since 1958, the names of ancient Tamil vil-
lages and streets have surreptitiously been given Sinhalese names.” Close 
to one hundred important Tamil villages and cities, which continue to 
have deep emotional significance for Tamils all over the world, have 
been “Sinhalized”: Vattukoddai has been changed to Battakote, Manipay 
has been changed to Mampe, and the island of Nainatheevu has been 
changed to Nagatheeba.86 
The government is also redrawing the boundaries of Tamil border 
villages and incorporating them into predominantly Sinhalese districts. 
It is quite obvious that this is being done to reduce Tamil representation 
in various areas, again in an attempt to undermine and eliminate the 
argument that there are “majority” Tamil areas or Tamil “homelands” 
throughout the country.87 What is more hurtful for many Tamils in the 
country, as well as those in the diaspora, has been the continued destruc-
tion of Hindu temples in the former war zones, and the building of Bud-
dhist shrines in their place. One of the clearest examples of this change 
is the hot spring wells in Kanniya, in the eastern district of Trincomalee. 
When Amarasingam visited the site in January 2014, the statue of Hindu 
god Ganesha was being kept under a tin shed, and a giant Buddha shrine 
had been erected close to the springs. 
Conclusion
Our notion of proto-genocide complements and partly overlaps with 
Gregory Stanton’s concept of the ten stages of genocide.88 It differs in that 
Stanton’s work is oriented to physical genocide where ours is oriented to 
cultural genocide. Our notion of proto-genocide also owes much to Tony 
Barta’s concept of “relations of genocide” and a “genocidal society.” As 
Barta has written,
My conception of a genocidal society—as distinct from a genocid-
al state—is one in which the bureaucratic apparatus might offi-
cially be directed to protect innocent people but in which a whole 
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race is nevertheless subject to remorseless pressures of destruction 
inherent in the very nature of the society.89
 
While we do not suggest that the Sri Lankan state is officially directed to 
protect Tamil culture—quite the contrary—Barta’s key point is that cultur-
al extermination can be accomplished through a relatively decentralized 
collection of institutional practices and structural relations. Similarly, Kei-
th Doubt’s discussion of “sociocide”90 shows how even physical genocide 
involves violent attacks on the social institutions through which a group 
maintains its solidarity and shared identity. Furthermore, Sri Lanka’s col-
onial history enables us to situate its proto-genocide on a continuum with 
the subaltern genocides examined by Robins and Jones.91 The concept of 
proto-genocide therefore helps to define a field of inquiry which up to this 
point has been suggested but not focally explored by genocide scholars.
Powell has argued that modern genocides are a systemic by-product 
of the globalizing expansion of Western civilization.92 The imposition 
of the nation-state through colonialism has increased the stakes of lo-
cal struggles over collective identity and created new incentives for mass 
violence. Under these conditions, we can expect to find proto-genocidal 
situations alarmingly common. Many of these might involve tribal or 
Indigenous peoples with small populations,93 but the condition of Tam-
ils in Sri Lanka is nonetheless illustrative of the structural qualities of a 
proto-genocidal situation.
Since independence, and especially during the civil war, Sri Lankan 
Tamils have suffered severe atrocities. While some of these atrocities 
have affected vital Tamil cultural institutions, they have not amounted 
to a coherent program (intended or otherwise) of cultural extermination. 
However, that could change. Sinhala nationalist ideology excludes Tamils 
from the universe of moral obligation; this ideology, along with Sri Lan-
kan policies towards Tamils, and the civil war itself, have contributed to 
what Hinton calls “genocidal priming,”94 pushing Sinhala-Tamil relations 
towards the kind of polarization which enables perpetrators to legitimate 
genocide.95 Economic and political incentives exist for the progressive dis-
enfranchisement of Tamils, potentially up to and including their total ab-
jection. Militarily and otherwise, Tamils have demonstrated the capacity 
to resist abjection and to defend the social institutions which maintain 
their coherence as a people. But the ongoing suppression of Tamil politics 
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and civil society, the colonization and Sinhalization of Tamil areas by Sin-
halese military officers, the loss of economic livelihood by Tamil families, 
and restrictions placed on Tamil mourning have the potential to gradually 
erode Tamil society. If this erosion goes far enough, Tamils could be un-
able to effectively resist more thoroughgoing measures such as the com-
plete prohibition of Tamil language, forced conversion to Buddhism, eco-
nomic expropriation, and forced dispersion—measures that could amount 
to a program of cultural extermination. With the election of Maithripala 
Sirisena in January 2015, many in the country and abroad expressed hope 
that the postwar situation would change. Indeed, there are many positive 
signs that change is afoot: the military governor of the Northern Province 
was replaced with a civilian, and President Sirisena expressed some inter-
est in inviting exiled journalists back to the country. However, Sirisena 
has not yet expressed a commitment to the demilitarization of the former 
war zones. Only time will tell whether a change in leadership will result in 
a change in political culture. In language analogous to that of ecological 
conservation, Sri Lankan Tamils are not yet critically endangered, but they 
are threatened. This is an issue of interest to genocide scholars, and of con-
cern to genocide and human rights activists.
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Finding Global Justice Locally at 
Sites of Atrocity: The Case for the 
Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center 
and Cemetery
Laura Beth Cohen
Introduction
Signed by all parties in November 1995, the General Framework Agree-
ment on Peace (also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement) brought 
an end to the 1992–1995 Bosnian War.1 Trials for accused war criminals 
continue to be heard by courts at the international, national, entity, and 
canton levels for a wide range of war crimes and mass atrocities. Import-
antly, though, while the carnage wrought by armies and militias may have 
ended, the wars over human rights, history, memory, and commemoration 
continue to be waged in the fragile socio-political terrain that now defines 
contemporary Bosnia i Herzegovina (Bosnia). These issues are, in many 
ways, painful reminders that the conflict is still ongoing between Bosnia’s 
three constituent peoples—Bosnian Muslims (Bošniaks), Bosnian Serbs, 
and Bosnian Croats—having shifted from a physical war with guns to a 
political war over memories. 
The battle over the memorialization of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide 
is a potent example of how this process is navigated by local stakehold-
ers. As opposed to trials of high-ranking officers held by the International 
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Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)—the primary global 
justice mechanism for trying those involved in the genocide (in addition to 
other crimes committed in the region during the 1990s)—lower-ranking 
perpetrators may never be indicted. Some still reside alongside survivors 
in their pre-war communities, where they retain positions of political and 
municipal power. This painful contradiction is apparent in the communal 
and national battles over the creation of memorials at former sites of atroc-
ity. Given that many outside-imposed transitional justice mechanisms, es-
pecially criminal prosecutions, have not lived up to victims’ expectations, 
local justice is interpreted differently and contested frequently at these 
locations, such as the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center and Cemetery 
to the Victims of the 1995 Genocide (henceforth Srebrenica Memorial).2 
At their most basic level, the battles about commemoratively marking 
these sites of atrocity showcase how survivors have sought other avenues 
to secure justice locally. 
I contend that sites of atrocity reveal the ways communities with div-
isive wartime memories orient themselves to the past, and in so doing 
shed light on how traumatized post-conflict populations collectively try 
to rebuild their communities and lives. In the case of Srebrenica, I argue 
that there has been a positive translation of global justice at the local level 
in the form of the Srebrenica Memorial. Specifically, I focus upon how 
the Srebrenica Memorial delivers global justice locally in straightforward 
as well uncanny ways to reveal the site’s subtle contradictions, juxtapos-
itions, and ironies. Importantly, the international community approved 
the mandate for the Srebrenica Memorial in response to intense lobbying 
by Srebrenica’s survivors, and it is therefore unique. All other Bosnian me-
morialization initiatives at sites of atrocity are led—and disputed—by the 
communities in which they are located. 
An assessment of the Srebrenica Memorial is therefore rooted in the 
strategic importance of memorial sites as locally symbolic and practical 
locations of global justice. Sites of atrocity are particularly important in 
studying the complexities of nationalized and localized processes of tran-
sitional justice in post-conflict societies where the past remains highly 
contested.3 Traditional transitional justice scholars emphasize the im-
portance of restoring truth and justice to the victims via state institutions, 
legal mechanisms, and reconciliation commissions.4 In contrast, sites of 
atrocity remain embedded in the community where the crimes happened 
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and where the past is temporally omnipresent.5 Sites of atrocity are thus an 
important arena for understanding not only individual but also commun-
al and national memory in the aftermath of war. 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the Srebrenica genocide 
and the ensuing legal responses, including those of the ICTY and the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). In part 2, I analyze the differing ways 
that “justice” itself is defined as well as the challenges that arise when tran-
sitional justice programs, as envisioned by outside actors, are implemented 
at the local level. In part 3, I examine the problematic nature of contested 
memory, including the roles that divisive mnemonic communities play 
during struggles to create memorials at local sites of atrocity. In part 4, I 
theorize how the “transitional justice imaginary” plays out at local sites 
of atrocity, simultaneously keeping these communities stuck in the past 
yet unable to move forward. I conclude with reflections about the ways 
the Srebrenica Memorial contributes both to the positive and negative 
aspects of the genocide’s memorialization. This includes some thoughts 
about the significance and challenges of these kinds of site-specific me-
morialization projects in relationship to other post-conflict transitional 
justice mechanisms.
Methodology
The primary source material for this chapter was gathered during my eth-
nographic fieldwork in Bosnia during 2011 and subsequent visits in 2012 
and 2015. (Subsequent data from fieldwork conducted in 2016 has not been 
included in this chapter.) My qualitative data included site visits, photo-
graphic documentation, and property mapping of the Srebrenica Memo-
rial and other 1992–1995 Bosnian War sites of atrocity located elsewhere 
in the Srebrenica municipality. I also documented and conducted partici-
pant observation at public commemorative events related to the Srebrenica 
genocide (in Bosnia) as well as alternative commemorative events held by 
the Bosnian Serb community. My research encompassed numerous visits 
to the Srebrenica Memorial, including a review of its daily operations as 
well as independent investigations and guided tours with survivors, staff 
members, and former Dutch United Nations (UN) Peacekeepers. 
I interviewed thirty-two individuals across six different groups using 
purposive and snowball sampling. These included meetings with the 
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Srebrenica Memorial’s staff; domestic academics, experts, and represent-
atives of civil society organizations; national staff members and govern-
ment ministers; staff members from national and international non-gov-
ernmental organizations; international staff members of the Bosnian War 
Crimes Chamber; residents of Srebrenica; and members of local victims 
associations. I visited seven of the Srebrenica genocide execution sites on 
13 July 2012 with the three different groups of Mothers of Srebrenica,6 and 
in July 2015 I attended the twentieth anniversary commemoration of the 
Srebrenica genocide, where I was able to investigate renovations currently 
underway at the Srebrenica Memorial. I used a grounded theory approach 
to analyze my findings, having organized them using various qualitative 
coding schemes to identify topics and patterns related to the study.
Part 1: War, Genocide, and Aftermath
The Bosnian War began on 6 April 1992 in Sarajevo. It followed the So-
cialist Republic of Bosnia i Herzegovina’s 1992 referendum to formally 
secede from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—thus becoming 
the Republic of Bosnia i Herzegovina.7 This declaration galvanized Serbia, 
led by then prime minister Slobodan Milosević, to declare war,8 using the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) as Serbia’s proxy along with the Bosnian 
Serb Army (VRS) and independent Serbian and Bosnian Serb militias, led 
by Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić.9 The Drina Valley (Podrinje) is 
the eastern part of Bosnia that borders Serbia, and it is here that the VRS 
and its associated militias first began their campaign of ethnic cleansing 
(etničko čišćenje) upon the war’s outbreak.10 Formerly home to 37,000 res-
idents of various ethnicities with a majority of Bošniak inhabitants, the 
VRS sought to ethnically cleanse the entire Srebrenica municipality (opšti-
na) and other neighbouring areas of all Bošniaks.11 
In 1993 the Srebrenica enclave was declared one of six humanitarian 
“Safe Areas” by UN Security Council Resolutions 819 and 824.12 On 11 
July 1995, the enclave, theoretically under the protection of the Dutch 
UN Peacekeeping Battalion (or “DutchBat”), was overrun by the VRS. 
Between 11 and 22 July 1995, nearly half of the Bošniak men and boys 
who fled through the forest, and nearly all the men and boys gathered in 
the exterior surroundings of the former Yugoslav-era battery factory (the 
UN’s peacekeeping headquarters)—approximately 8,372 in total—were 
2 | FINDING GLOBAL JUSTICE LOCALLY AT SITES OF ATROCITY 53
systematically executed.13 Women and girls were forcibly bused to Tuzla, 
located in the then free territory controlled by the Army of Bosnia i Her-
zegovina (ARBiH). 
These killings became the single largest massacre to take place on the 
European continent since World War Two,14 and the ICTY formally de-
clared them genocide during the Radislav Krstić case.15 A controversial 
debate has long raged about whether the DutchBat leadership knew what 
was happening right in front of their eyes.16 Separately, in 2007, the ICJ 
followed up with its own ruling regarding Serbia’s involvement in the 
Srebrenica genocide. The ICJ held that, while Serbia was not responsible 
for actually committing the genocide, the country did, in fact, violate its 
obligations under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention).17 Most significantly, fol-
lowing the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, the Srebrenica 
opština was assigned to the entity of the Republika Srpska (RS) governed 
by Bosnian Serb authorities.18
 
2.1  Plaque inside the cemetery portion of the Srebrenica Memorial, Laura Beth Cohen, 
July 2012. 
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Part 2: Interpreting Global Justice Locally
In the wake of the unimaginable human slaughter committed by the Nazis 
during World War Two, the quest for justice continues to take centre stage, 
a legacy of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.19 Modern it-
erations of these international criminal tribunals (ICT), such as the Inter-
national Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwan-
da, and the ICTY, as well as hybrid international-national courts (such as 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia), have been created in the aftermath of such wanton 
and intentional brutality. They focus on the identification and prosecu-
tion of war criminals when governments commit massive human rights 
violations and atrocities—such as crimes against humanity, genocide, and 
war crimes—against their own populations (depending upon an individ-
ual ICT’s mandate). Simultaneously, these ICTs can also be interpreted as 
an attempt to assuage the guilt of these same international actors for not 
having prevented the atrocities in the first place.20 As they relate to the 
adjudication of genocide, crimes against humanity, and other crimes of 
war in the international arena, ICTs, according to David Koller, are a blend 
of both legal doctrine (i.e., holding perpetrators legally accountable by the 
standards of international criminal and humanitarian law) and realpolitik 
(i.e., the political decisions, considerations, and negotiations of state actors 
involved in their creation).21 The establishment of these ICTs is premised 
on the twin beliefs that, by bringing accused senior-level criminals to trial, 
this may both act as a deterrent to future crimes and deliver some sort of 
justice to the aggrieved population.22 
Yet what exactly defines justice? The “justice” literature is immense 
in its scope, offering diverse legal and normative interpretations as well as 
alternative conceptions, especially as it relates to transitional justice mech-
anisms.23 For example, Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu explains that justice, in 
its most basic and conceptual form, can be interpreted in two ways. The 
first is through the lens of equality: “The equal distribution and application 
of rights and privileges” among all peoples in a given society.24 The second 
is through the lens of formality: “The specific context of the equality of 
such rights and privileges before the law.”25 Moghalu then describes three 
normative and interconnected levels of justice that also exist within inter-
national society. These include international/interstate justice (i.e., “the 
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rights and duties of sovereign states in international relations on the basis 
of sovereign equality”); individual or human justice (i.e., “the rights and 
duties of individuals as subjects, not just objects, of international law”); 
and cosmopolitan or world justice (i.e., that which “embodies a radical 
transnational extension of individual justice”).26
Jeremy Webber offers another typology—this one on the different 
types of justice in actual practice. He argues there are three kinds of justice 
operating at various times: “retrospective (backward-looking); prospective 
(forward-looking); and the adjustment of contending legal and political 
orders.”27 Retrospective justice is retributive in nature and deals with the 
legal righting of past wrongs, mostly through criminal trials.28 Prospective 
justice (also known as restorative or distributive justice) is community-ori-
ented and seeks to repair post-conflict damage through trials and other 
non-judicial forms, including truth-telling commissions, reparations, 
restitution, and memorialization projects, among others.29 The third form 
of justice, reforming the “legal and political order,” refers to institutional 
reforms as well as other democracy building and rule of law initiatives that 
aim to rebuild the formal structure of the post-conflict society so that both 
retrospective and prospective justice can flourish within the domestic con-
text.30 What is referred to as transitional justice may include a combination 
of initiatives, including criminal prosecutions; memorialization/memory 
projects, memorials and commemorations; truth-telling/truth commis-
sions; monetary reparations; institutional reform and lustration; and resti-
tution.31 However, there are a range of concerns about and issues with the 
ways that transitional justice is envisioned, translated, and administered, 
as I will show. 
Another way of conceiving of justice is how it plays out in the court-
room. Here, too, there are differing interpretations. At one end of the spec-
trum is Hannah Arendt’s belief that justice, as delivered through criminal 
trials, should strictly follow the law to the exclusion of all other consider-
ations, including the background context of the crimes and why things 
unfolded as they did.32 This view, known as legal formalism, is founded 
upon a strict interpretation of the way the law is supposed to function in 
democratic societies: using only primary evidence and concrete facts to 
determine the accused’s guilt or innocence through an established set of 
rules, procedures, and relationships between the defendant, prosecution, 
lawyers, and judges.33 Legal formalists believe that these decisions should 
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be made without reference to social, political, historical, philosophical, or 
moral considerations.34 
For Pierre Bourdieu, however, there is a sociological aspect to the 
practice of law that does, in fact, influence how it is interpreted, com-
municated, and practised. This “juridical field” includes the implicit social 
conventions, values, and traditions followed by those who work within it. 
As Richard Terdiman explains, “[This] internal politics of the profession 
exercises its own specific and pervasive influence on every aspect of the 
law’s functioning outside the professional body itself.”35 Moreover, when 
we take account of the differences between systems of civil and common 
law, as well as the socio-cultural, legal, and political variances in individ-
ual countries, it is little wonder that the definition of justice remains so 
elusive.36
Beyond the emphasis on criminal trials, victims and survivors con-
tinue to call for these investigations to illuminate the truth of what hap-
pened and to increase efforts to locate their still-missing loved ones so they 
are able to bury and commemorate them.37 This dichotomy between, on 
the one hand, the international community’s desire to “help” traumatized 
populations rebuild in the aftermath of war and, on the other hand, the 
need for survivors to reclaim their agency, humanity, and voice, creates 
resistance.38 This struggle reflects the differing priorities and methods of 
outside actors, national governments, and local communities all struggling 
to make sense of what has happened and to provide recourse. It also in-
cludes the challenges of top-down approaches, often led by outsiders, and 
bottom-up initiatives conceived of at the grassroots level. Anna Lowen-
haupt Tsing defines such “friction” as “the awkward, unequal, unstable, 
and creative qualities of interconnection across difference.”39 
The prevailing assumption is that these transitional justice mechan-
isms—specifically ICTs—have a positive influence on survivors by deliv-
ering justice.40 However, according to Miklos Biro et al., “For many surviv-
ors, justice may not mean trials but a much more personal sense of what 
they need in order to move on with their lives.”41 Eric Stover further posits 
that justice is not a monolithic concept; in fact, it must consist of several 
components in order to resonate with survivors. These include consulta-
tions between internal and external actors, including victims; clearly de-
fined aims; a mixture of international and national judicial solutions; im-
plementation of additional transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth 
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commissions and memorials; and social justice considerations to help 
survivors move on with their present-day lives.42 Hugo van der Merwe’s 
postulation about the fuzzy definition of justice is equally illuminating. 
He notes that
a number of factors may feed into a sense that justice has been 
done. At a simplistic level is the issue of whether victims feel that 
perpetrators have been sufficiently punished. But a more inclusive 
approach could also consider the sense of vindication provided 
by the punishment, whether victims have a better understanding 
of how they came to be victimized, their ability to regain a sense 
of power relative to the perpetrator, or the reestablishment of a 
sense of meaning in society, which may have been destroyed by 
the victimization.43 
 
These competing visions of what defines post-conflict transitional justice 
programs complicate the meaning of justice for local survivors.44 Calls for 
reparations, as well as social justice (including economic reforms), and/or 
locally relevant interpretations of justice, can also offer meaningful and 
practical alternatives.45 For example, John Torpey advances the argument 
that “reparation politics” are a more comprehensive way of envisioning 
and achieving transitional justice’s aims. His typology of reparations em-
phasizes “communicative history” (i.e., “memory, memorials, and histor-
ical consciousness”) as the overarching mechanism, followed by apologies, 
reparations, and, finally, transitional justice. He also argues that demands 
for reparations occur in both post-conflict societies as well as those of 
long-established liberal democracies (such as, for example, calls for repar-
ations by indigenous populations).46
Centred in between these disparate perspectives is the oft-ignored 
positive impact of memorialization. Beyond the pro-democratic efforts to 
bring the rule of law and justice to societies in the aftermath of collect-
ive violence, the role of memorialization allows survivors to have a voice 
in the rebuilding of their society, according to Rosalind Shaw and Lars 
Waldorf.47 This is because memorials function on a broader socio-political 
plane, rather than within the “narrow definition of symbolic reparation.”48 
Additionally, because so much of the debate is negotiated at the local level, 
what shall be remembered and what shall be forgotten must be negotiated 
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there since it is the community itself that must find a way to achieve civil 
relations. Outside actors with memorialization expertise must therefore be 
respectful of the community’s needs, regardless of the outcome.49
Localizing Global Justice in Srebrenica
The ICTY is the primary international criminal justice mechanism for 
trying high-level perpetrators of crimes committed during the wars in the 
Balkans during the 1990s, including the Srebrenica genocide.50 While the 
Tribunal’s prosecutors included the count of genocide in several different 
cases concerning massacres committed throughout Bosnia, Krstić was the 
first man to be convicted of the crime of genocide in Srebrenica.51 A large 
discursive body of literature has focused on the myriad issues related to all 
aspects of the ICTY, including its Western-derived emphasis on the rule of 
law and delivery of justice as a form of democracy promotion. Issues have 
been raised about which cases it decided to pursue; its outreach programs 
and treatment of victims before, during, and after the trials; its acquittals, 
convictions, and sentencing of perpetrators; its inability to generate a com-
prehensive factual history of the Bosnian War; its handling of evidence; 
and its often conflicting judicial decisions for similar crimes in different 
cases.52 While the ICTY is set to permanently close down in 2017, its on-
going critical functions will be transferred to the United Nations Mechan-
ism for International Criminal Tribunals.53 
As it relates to the Srebrenica genocide, the case against Mladić is still 
underway. Mladić is currently in custody in The Hague, indicted for both 
his role in masterminding the Srebrenica genocide and “persecutions, 
extermination, murder, deportation, inhumane acts, terror, unlawful at-
tacks, [and the] taking of hostages.” 54 His case is expected to conclude 
before the ICTY closes down. In March 2016, Karadžić was convicted of 
“genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs 
of war committed by Serb forces during the armed conflict in Bosnia … 
from 1992 until 1995” and received a sentence of forty years imprison-
ment.55 Despite all of its issues and controversies, the ICTY still remains 
the single most influential global justice mechanism related to the Srebre-
nica genocide. Yet for the majority of Srebrenica’s survivors, the justice the 
ICTY has delivered remains hollow.56
However, as Sarah Wagner has argued, a second global justice mech-
anism was also created at the behest of the American president Bill Clinton 
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in the form of the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP).57 
Upon discovery of the hundreds of mass graves littered throughout the 
Podrinje, the ICMP eventually took up the role of exhuming these hu-
man remains while simultaneously developing an extensive DNA forensic 
identification process to identify the victims; providing evidentiary docu-
mentation to the ICTY; and eventually returning the mortal remains of 
the victims to their surviving families.58 However, as is the case with the 
ICTY, the ICMP’s work, despite its mandate of neutrality and its emphasis 
on recovering the remains of all persons killed regardless of their ethnicity, 
has also been controversial.59
Ongoing issues relating to the exhumations and DNA analyses not-
withstanding, I argue that the creation of the Srebrenica Memorial is a 
tangible translation of global justice at the local level. The story of how 
the Srebrenica Memorial came into existence is one of devotion, persever-
ance, fearlessness, and, ultimately, hope, etched into a hostile landscape by 
grieving families in honour of their loved ones killed during the genocide. 
Upon the horrifying realization that their male relatives were dead, the 
Mothers became insistent on finding out the truth.60 As the mass graves 
were discovered and the bones of the dead exhumed and identified, the 
Mothers wanted these mortal remains to receive a dignified burial. Nor 
did they want the cemetery to be located in the Federation of Bosnia i Her-
zegovina, far away from their original homes, even though the Federation 
is where many of Srebrenica’s survivors now reside.61 Between 1997 and 
2003, and with the financial support of the ICMP as well as from other in-
dividual countries, over ten thousand petitions from the surviving women 
were collected to pressure the international community and the Office of 
the High Representative (OHR) to designate the land for the Srebrenica 
Memorial in Potočari.62 Potočari is the manufacturing village located 9 
kilometres from Srebrenica (also in the RS) where the battery factory is 
located and, thus, where the fleeing refugees last saw their relatives alive.
Between 1997 and 2000, the families of the victims decided that they 
wanted to commemorate the dead and mark the location of Potočari with 
their presence at least once a year. Between 2001 and 2007, a series of de-
crees and laws took effect to realize the Srebrenica Memorial’s creation.63 
The most significant and high profile event takes place each 11 July to com-
memorate the day the Srebrenica enclave was “cleansed.” These surviving 
women—grandmothers, mothers, wives, daughters, sisters, aunts, and 
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nieces—have become the international face of the genocide’s aftermath. 
They have garnered tremendous political agency, lobbying international 
and national politicians on behalf of their dead, which has aided the com-
munity’s recovery.64
Vernacularization in Practice
The Srebrenica Memorial, as defined by Srebrenica’s surviving female 
population, is a concrete example of how global justice can be translated 
into a locally relevant expression and mechanism of justice. Its success is 
due to what Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry refer to as “vernacularization,” 
which they define as “the process of appropriation and local adoption of 
globally generated ideas and strategies.”65 The Srebrenica Memorial’s dis-
tinctiveness is derived from its synthesis of a cemetery, the battery factory, 
and memorial room (Spomen Soba). It is a site of atrocity, a site for in-
terring, visiting, mourning, remembering, reflecting, and teaching. With 
support from the international community—weighed down by its guilty 
conscience—Srebrenica’s survivors fought and secured the land and build-
ings in Potočari. They struggled to prove that their loved ones existed, to 
ensure they would never be forgotten, and to create a place where memory 
of the genocide would be evoked for generations to come—a place of un-
imaginable sadness, but also of perpetual remembrance.
Driving up the mountain into Srebrenica, you are surrounded by 
forests and rebuilt houses. You see many devastated buildings but also a 
community attempting to come back to life amidst a challenging econom-
ic environment. Srebrenica’s natural beauty aside, the eye is constantly 
drawn to the mixture of rebuilt and bombed-out homes. The tall yellow 
building that used to be Srebrenica’s main hotel is abandoned to its fate of 
crumbling ruins. Many of the houses sit silently unoccupied since their in-
habitants were expelled, moved away, or murdered. The Bosnian War’s leg-
acy continues to cast a shadow over nearly every aspect of the population’s 
lives, regardless of ethnicity. In Srebrenica, the war’s lingering aftermath, 
as well as the ensuing political, economic, and socio-cultural problems, 
are further shrouded by the town’s infamy. Most significantly, the differing 
narratives and interpretations of the Srebrenica genocide hover just below 
the surface, despite the fact that residents get along and cooperate with 
one another on a daily basis.66 While the creation of the Srebrenica Me-
morial represents global justice translated locally, an ethno-nationalized 
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atmosphere, including genocide denial, is very much alive, especially in 
the days and weeks leading up to the annual 11 July commemoration as 
well as during elections, when politicians dredge up the war’s wounds for 
their own personal gain. Seeing the Srebrenica Memorial through a dif-
ferent lens—one that acknowledges the complex political environment in 
which it operates and contributes—is therefore key. 
Part 3: Contested Memories and Memorialization 
at the Srebrenica Memorial
It is important to understand the dynamics underlying contested mem-
ories in post-conflict settings where war pits different groups against each 
other. This kind of catastrophic and life-altering breakdown of commun-
al relations during the conflict can all too easily resurface in the postwar 
environment as complex yet stereotypical categorizations of, for example, 
victims, survivors, perpetrators, and bystanders, become entrenched.67 To 
 
2.2 Contemporary Srebrenica, Laura Beth Cohen, July 2011.
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understand how these polarized interpretations of what transpired take 
hold, we first need to understand how collective memories are formed. 
Our individual memories become fused with those of our wider social cir-
cle throughout the course of our lives. United through shared memories 
and perspectives, a new sort of grouping—what Benedict Anderson calls 
an “imagined community”—is formed.68 “Community”, though, does not 
necessarily have to be based upon members of the same group living in 
the same territory. To Hannah Arendt, for example, the concept of nation
relates not so much, and not primarily, to a piece of land as to the 
space between individuals in a group whose members are bound 
to and at the same time separated and protected from, each other 
by all kinds of relationships, based on common language, religion, 
a common history, customs, and laws. Such relationships become 
spatially manifest insofar as they themselves constitute the space 
wherein the different members of a group relate to and have inter-
course with each other.69 
 
Moreover, as Yael Zerubavel argues, “The power of collective memory does 
not lie in its accurate, systematic, or sophisticated mapping of the past, but 
in establishing basic images that articulate and reinforce a particular ideo-
logical stance.”70 Finding common ground between opposing groups with 
different and highly charged interpretations of the past becomes all the 
more challenging. These manipulated historical narratives are translated 
into invented myths around which ethnic groups organize their identity, 
often becoming replacements for the facts.71 
In other words, when it comes to highly polarized memories about 
mass atrocities, what one mnemonic community (such as victims and 
survivors) believes and/or remembers to be true is refuted or inverted by 
the other mnemonic group (such as the community to which the perpe-
trators belong but who may also be victims and survivors in their own 
right). In this binary, identifying with the victims would mean a nega-
tion of the opposing group’s own methods of self-protection and preser-
vation—denying the crimes committed in their name; their deeply held 
convictions about what took place; and their own mythologized, perceived 
and/or real suffering. As Eviatar Zerubavel observes, “Each of the differ-
ent parties waging such heated mnemonic battles tends to regard its own 
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historical narrative, which is normally based on its own typically one-
sided ‘time maps,’ as the only correct one, which is quite understandable 
given the unmistakably partisan political agenda it is specifically designed 
to promote.”72 These debates over contested memories reinforce the fact 
that memory is personal and subjective. For even when the “facts” have 
been proven, what is considered the “historical truth,” according to Iwona 
Irwin-Zarecka, “is being contested … and the otherwise quiet presence of 
the past is disturbed.”73 
The discourse about the creation of memorial sites at sites of atrocity 
emphasizes their historic, symbolic, forensic, and educational significance. 
Nora fashioned the term lieux de mémoire as the difference between a na-
tion’s historical consciousness (millieux de mémoire) and “objects [that] 
are part of everyday experience: cemeteries, museums, commemora-
tions.”74 In post-conflict countries where history is contested, these lieux 
de mémoire take on a new significance: they act as locations for grieving, 
for remembrance, for closure, for historical memory, for documentation, 
for artistry, for reinterpretation, for communal dialogue, for collective 
identity, for healing, for education, and sadly, for political manipulation.75 
The distortions of ethnic narratives and myths frequently play out where 
the mass atrocities took place, easily becoming a front line of aggression.76 
The singling out of a particular perpetrator group, if they are included, can 
further fuel the creation of a hostile counter-narrative to deflect blame.77 
And yet, as Martha Minow notes, “Public disputes over proposed and ex-
isting memorials may occasion the productive if painful kind of struggle 
for memory as do rights over reparations.”78 The need to memorialize a 
difficult past as well as counteract the vicious denial and contestation it 
elicits is therefore a critical component of transitional justice and memor-
ialization initiatives at both the macro and micro levels.79 
The Srebrenica Memorial through the Looking Glass
Despite the war having ended two decades ago, memorialization remains 
contentious in Bosnia.80 Regardless of ethnicity, the war has exacted a pain-
ful toll upon the population and memories of the conflict are still raw and 
divisive. What stands out about the innumerable local memorials across 
the country is the way they commemorate the dead and missing by em-
phasizing the victimhood of each ethnic group, further reinforcing that 
“they did this to us,” and fortifying the seeds of future discontent, conflict, 
Laura Beth Cohen64
and revenge.81 In this way memory, including whose memory should be 
preserved, is vigorously contested—and this includes battles over whether 
the genocide even took place. These mnemonic battles directly affect the 
climate in which the Srebrenica Memorial exists. This is likely one of the 
reasons that the memorial’s steering committee, in an attempt to avoid 
drawing any further attention to the site, has tried to maintain its primary 
purpose as a cemetery where the dead are buried and whose identities are 
ascertained through DNA analysis each year. Ironically, the Srebrenica Me-
morial’s modus operandi winds up mimicking the silence surrounding the 
crimes and the related taboo of speaking about them that is prevalent in the 
community the other 364 days of the year (the exception being the annual 
11 July commemoration). This is especially true since the site is already a 
metaphorical battlefield of traumatic collective memory.82 Moreover, while 
the Srebrenica Memorial is open to visitors of all religious backgrounds, 
the cemetery’s design showcases that it is first and foremost Muslim in its 
orientation. (The role of religion at the site, including the designation of all 
victims buried there as martyrs (šehidi), has also caused debate among the 
surviving community as well, and is an important issue in its own right.)83 
The site, according to its mandate,84 focuses on the facts of the Sreb-
renica genocide (as “proven” by the ICTY).85 All parts of the Srebrenica 
Memorial reinforce this; only the plight of the Srebrenica enclave’s fleeing 
refugees and their subsequent deportation and execution beginning in 
July 1995 are described. Bosnian Serb citizens are not vilified. The Spomen 
Soba’s installations were updated in advance of the twentieth anniversary 
of the genocide. There are informational placards describing the crimes 
committed by various Bosnian Serb military leaders who were convicted 
by the ICTY; a variety of wartime pictures of fleeing refugees, the exhum-
ations of mass graves, controversial DutchBat graffiti; aerial footage of the 
property during July 1995; and boards explaining the complexities of con-
ducting DNA identifications on the human remains found in primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary mass graves. A documentary film, numerous photo-
graphs of personal artifacts found in the graves, and biographies of twenty 
of the victims underscore the genocide’s scale as well as individual familial 
loss.86 A separate building located in the cemetery includes information on 
how to locate specific graves as well as a small conference room featuring 
photographs of the exhumations of mass graves taken by the Bosnian pho-
tographer Tarik Samarah.87 In addition, in 2014 a new multimedia room, 
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2.3 Green temporary grave markers, Srebrenica, Laura Beth Cohen, July 2011.
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the Documentation Center Srebrenica, was created in partnership with 
the SENSE News Agency. It features interactive displays and computer ter-
minals for students to conduct research about the Srebrenica genocide and 
related ICTY trials.88  
Because of the site’s strict interpretation of its decree, it is difficult for 
a visitor to get a broader picture of life in Srebrenica opština from the start 
of the war onward. Posing this question brings up a larger controversy 
of whether or not it is possible for the Srebrenica Memorial to extend its 
narrative to include the larger story of what happened in the enclave be-
tween 1992 and 1995. This includes the extensive civilian suffering in the 
few hundred Bošniak villages razed to the ground and ethnically cleansed 
during the first months of the war; conflicting interpretations about 
DutchBat’s role before and during the genocide; and attacks against Bos-
nian Serb villages during the ARBiH’s defence of Srebrenica—all of which 
remain vigorously contested.89 
Part 4: The Srebrenica Memorial as Unmistakably 
Uncanny
The same transitional justice mechanisms designed, in part, to help sur-
vivors and victims find closure and justice often exacerbate the societal 
conundrums they profess to resolve and the healing processes they aim 
to foster. Alexander Hinton refers to this as the “transitional justice im-
aginary,” which he defines as “normative (i.e., it is associated with certain 
truth claims and moral-laden assumptions); performative (i.e., through 
its enactment, people constitute an imagined community); and product-
ive (i.e., the imaginary produces certain subject positions and types of 
being).”90 One key aspect of the transitional justice imaginary, according 
to Hinton, is the creation of “transitional justice time” that is “premised 
on a value-laden pre-post state of conflict and teleological movement be-
tween them.”91 In other words, transitional justice mechanisms, such as 
criminal prosecutions and truth commissions, often narrow their scope 
to a particular period of time, excluding everything that happened before 
and after the conflict. As a result, broader historical circumstances leading 
up to the hostilities, ongoing contestations of memory between clashing 
mnemonic communities, and continuing human rights violations in the 
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post-conflict society go unrecognized. Taken together, this impacts the 
aggregate community’s ability to come to terms with what happened while 
ensuring that traumatic memories keep survivors frozen in time, unable to 
move on (to the degree they are able) with their lives.92 
As such, psychic trauma and transitional justice time blur the lines 
between the past and present so that life becomes a state of unending lim-
inality.93 Time in the lives of traumatized populations and individuals can 
therefore take on uncanny characteristics. According to Sigmund Freud, 
“The ‘uncanny’ is that class of the terrifying which leads back to something 
long known to us, once very familiar. … On the other hand, everything 
is uncanny that ought to have remained hidden and secret, yet comes to 
light.”94 Another way of conceiving how the uncanny is omnipresent in 
survivors’ lives is Franz Kafka’s concept of “Odradek” in his short story, 
“The Cares of a Family Man”: 
One is tempted to believe that the creature [Odradek] once had 
some sort of intelligible shape and is now only a broken-down 
remnant. Yet this does not seem to be the case; at least there is 
no sign of it; nowhere is there an unfinished or unbroken surface 
to suggest anything of the kind; the whole thing looks senseless 
enough, but in its own way perfectly finished. In any case, closer 
scrutiny is impossible, since Odradek is extraordinary nimble and 
can never be laid hold of. Often for months on end he is not to 
be seen; then he has presumably moved into other houses; but he 
always comes faithfully back to our house again.95
 
Taken together, the concepts of transitional justice time, the uncanny, and 
“Odradek” are highly relevant to how the Srebrenica genocide’s traumatic 
legacy continues to haunt survivors and perpetrators—thus directly im-
pacting the Srebrenica Memorial. For as John Borneman comments,
Loss that becomes traumatic is characterized by not having been 
experienced at the time of the occurrence. During an ethnic 
cleansing, some central aspect of the loss remains unregistered 
and escapes recognition at the actual time of happening; language 
and the ordering mechanisms of the symbolic order fail to register 
what is often called “the unspeakable.” In other words, the event 
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is only, if at all, experienced later as it returns to the victim, un-
bidden, frequently as a horrifying silence that cannot be spoken.96 
The Uncanny Lurks in Srebrenica
For the survivors still searching for the mortal remains of their family 
members, the annual 11 July commemoration does not provide closure. 
The lack of knowledge about their loved ones—what, specifically, hap-
pened to them—still haunts the survivors. Without a body (or body parts) 
to bury, the person is still considered missing and not yet officially dead.97 
Because community records were also destroyed during the war, there 
is no tangible proof that the missing person ever existed.98 There is not 
a single place that the families can go to mourn for those still missing, 
something acutely felt by those Bošniaks who believe that their dead must 
receive a proper religious burial in accordance with their faith.99 In the 
past several years, Bošniak women continue the commemoration on 13 
July by visiting other Srebrenica genocide massacre sites across the Podri-
nje. Local Bosnian Serb inhabitants and the RS authorities make it difficult 
for the Mothers of Srebrenica to visit these buildings and fields located in 
Branjevo, Orahovac, Kravica, Petkovici, Grbavci, Pilica, Kozluk, and Nova 
Kasaba. Visiting these sites is complicated, made difficult since their loca-
tions are deep within the countryside where many are accessible only by 
dirt roads. 
These sites are located within a two-hour drive from Srebrenica, and 
in the intense heat of July you are eerily reminded of the terror that the 
victims must have experienced while being driven to their deaths—to 
utterly remote locations, far from their homes, in which the silence of the 
landscape belied their very existences. Upon reaching these locations, the 
uncanny takes hold. Residents stare ominously. While a single RS police 
officer has been assigned to escort two tour buses transporting the Moth-
ers, a few other RS police officers are posted in some of the communities 
ostensibly to keep residents from antagonizing the mourners. The presence 
of these officers does not provide a level of comfort judging from the way 
they tend to glare at the mourners; in fact, at the former Petkovici alum-
inum factory dam, the men standing atop the imposing gravel structure 
staring down at the Mothers were local guards who control access to the 
site—and not the police.100 It is as if all this happened once before. But we 
are in the present day. The bus to Kravica is delayed for over an hour by the 
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local authorities, who attempt to prevent this small commemoration from 
taking place (in both 2015 and 2016, the Mothers were allowed inside the 
property). In the case of Grbavci, the school has been renovated and is now 
used, once again, by local schoolchildren. 
Other sites, such as the cultural centre (dom kulture) in Pilica, have 
been left as they were when the massacres were committed. Bullet holes 
still riddle the walls and the building decays while flowers from the Moth-
ers’ previous visit lay rotting on the floor. (In 2016, graffiti glorifying 
Mladić and Milosević as well as other hostile messages were sprayed onto 
the walls.) The field where the Branjevo pig farm used to be is surrounded 
by newly rebuilt homes filled with young, mostly Bosnian Serb, families. 
In the case of the above-mentioned dam, miscellaneous shell casings can 
still be found lying on the ground amidst the growing foliage. Of all these 
sites, only one—Nova Kasaba, a former soccer field—has a small yet some-
what obscure memorial plaque.101 And yet, without the Mothers’ insistence 
upon commemorating these sites every year, they would, in fact, be utterly 
forgotten. As Lara Nettelfield and Sarah Wagner note, “The act of visit-
ing these sites was even more important given that the effort to deny the 
crimes in Srebrenica [has] increased in recent years.”102 
Odradek Skulks at the Srebrenica Memorial
Once a year on 11 July the world remembers the genocide and tens of thou-
sands of people gather at the Srebrenica Memorial to participate in the an-
nual commemoration. But the next day, the masses leave and Srebrenica’s 
residents go back to the quiet routine of life in this small town. Yet, you 
can still sense the silence—that which is not talked about. The uncanny 
blows through the air as “Odradek” makes his presence felt yet again. One 
of the biggest questions hovering over the Srebrenica Memorial concerns 
the dwindling number of remains being identified and laid to rest each 
year; at some point soon there may no longer be anyone left to bury. It is 
a prospect few in Srebrenica’s survivor community are willing to tolerate, 
but nonetheless, it too lingers over the survivors as yet another incarnation 
of the way their traumas and fears keeps them frozen in time. As Isaias 
Rojas-Perez observed during his work among traumatized populations 
in post-conflict villages in Peru, “Perhaps no other figure than the desa-
parecido [the missing] so clearly inhabits the temporality of the finished/
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unfinished past of the post-conflict state.”103 Acute trauma is also a theme 
in Linda Green’s research on Guatemala’s post-conflict female survivors:
Fear, like pain, is overwhelmingly present to the person experienc-
ing it but it may be barely perceptible to anyone else and almost 
defies objectification. Subjectively, the mundane experience of 
chronic fear wears down one’s sensibility to it. … The routinization 
of fear undermines one’s confidence in interpreting the world.104
 
As it relates to the Srebrenica genocide, the liminal aspect of this contested 
memory may actually keep both communities locked into a specific period 
of time: that which is most painful and controversial and less focused on 
the here and now. For those survivors still hoping that their beloved’s mor-
tal remains will be found, the Srebrenica Memorial is first and foremost a 
site of remembrance. Because the property includes both the cemetery and 
the battery factory, the preservation of the genocide’s “material remains” 
works as a powerful method for its survivors to “etch” their memory into 
the landscape.105 In addition, the Srebrenica Memorial’s significance as a 
site of atrocity, combined with the survivors’ need to find closure on their 
pre-war lands, strengthens the site’s importance for future generations.106 
However, the site cannot be depoliticized unless the society finds a way 
to separate out the war’s facts, including the suffering of the entire popu-
lation, from prevailing ethno-political beliefs about what took place and 
who did what to whom.107
Concluding Thoughts
In war’s aftermath, a post-conflict country struggles to find a balance be-
tween sincere attempts to articulate the past and assertions that are found-
ed upon falsities and denial—a balance that must be achieved if a single 
encompassing narrative is to be forged.108 Localized transitional justice 
mechanisms, including non-prosecutorial initiatives led by outside actors, 
are essential, since the process, which can take a long time to accomplish 
(if ever), requires a concerted effort by national politicians, civil-society 
actors, and the general populace.109 The battle over the truth takes centre 
stage because there are many conflicting versions of the past. Two dec-
ades is still a relatively short period of time for Bosnian society to recover 
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politically, economically, and socio-culturally. The acute ethnocentric cli-
mate as well as the numerous destroyed buildings and villages that still 
dot the countryside are painful reminders that the war is still going on—
just in a different expression. Lower-level war criminals still reside within 
some of the villages in the Srebrenica municipality, and in some locations 
Mladić is celebrated as a war hero.110 
The Srebrenica Memorial remains on the front lines of this battle 
between history and memorialization: it is a visceral reminder of the 
1995 genocide and the horrors of the 1992–1995 Bosnian War. Crucially, 
though, the memory it keeps alive can only go so far. For Srebrenica’s sur-
vivors, whose loved ones remain missing, the physical pain and psychic 
limbo continues. Without mortal remains to bury, it is as if these victims 
never existed, except within the hearts and souls of those who loved them 
most. These survivors continue to commemorate their dead and missing 
by visiting remote fields and buildings where executions took place. For 
survivors, the war remains very much alive in their society because jus-
tice, as delivered through the transitional justice framework of criminal 
prosecutions, has not yet been served and may very well never be. None-
theless, the Srebrenica Memorial and the annual 11 July commemoration 
continue to raise awareness and keep the memory of the genocide alive 
as part of Bosnia’s struggle to address the war’s horrific past. So although 
the pursuance of justice through the ICTY remains fraught, the reality is 
that a locally relevant and vernacularized version of global justice has, in 
fact, been delivered in the form of the Srebrenica Memorial despite the 
complexities it embodies. 
Looking at the mnemonic battles waged at the Srebrenica Memorial 
allows us to appreciate the complexities and challenges that both surviv-
ors and perpetrators face in reconciling the war’s traumatic and contested 
legacy. Memorial sites are but one integral transitional justice mechanism 
that post-conflict societies may embrace in order to reconcile the past with 
the present. Memorials at sites of atrocity around the world, including the 
Srebrenica Memorial, are locations where post-conflict countries con-
front the harshest realities of war and tyranny. These symbolic and highly 
charged memorialized sites are locations where past animosities are con-
fronted, including the reasons why the conflict erupted in the first place.111 
Essential, then, is the linkage between memorials and other transitional 
Laura Beth Cohen72
justice endeavours, undertaken by all actors involved, in order to support 
rather than destabilize each other.112 
As one of the original expressions of localized justice within Bos-
nia, the Srebrenica Memorial sits at the forefront of the society’s pain-
ful reckonings as they attempt to clear the past and find their way to a 
more peaceful—or, at the very least, empathetic—future together. The 
site’s foundation remains a constructive, albeit complicated, spot, even 
though its very existence directly challenges those who continue to deny 
that the genocide took place. Unfortunately, until politicians in Bosnia’s 
two entity-level governments as well as that of the Bosnian federal state 
embark upon more concerted and integrated efforts to delve into the war’s 
horrors and to provide some tangible measure of justice and healing for 
the population, the Srebrenica Memorial’s growth in this area will remain 
stilted. And until things change, “Odradek” will continue hovering over 
Srebrenica’s darkest spaces. 
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Troubling History, Troubling Law:  
The Question of Indigenous Genocide  
in Canada
Adam Muller
 
 
I mean, there is no truth on this matter of what is a genocide.
—Samantha Power1
 
Why is there such a sharp contrast in attitudes to the past in dif-
ferent cultures? It is often said that history is written by the victors. 
It might also be said that history is forgotten by the victors. They 
can afford to forget, while the losers are unable to accept what hap-
pened and are condemned to brood over it, relive it, and reflect 
on how different it might have been. Another explanation might 
be given in terms of cultural roots. When you have them you can 
afford to take them for granted but when you lose them you search 
for them.
—Peter Burke2
In July 2014, members of the International Association of Genocide Schol-
ars (IAGS), the world’s largest organization devoted to the interdisciplin-
ary study of historical and contemporary genocide, met in Winnipeg, 
Manitoba, for a conference organized under the broad theme of “Genocide 
Studies and Indigenous Peoples.” Unusually for the IAGS, which typically 
3
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meets every second year, the Winnipeg conference was held in an off year, 
sandwiched between the organization’s 2013 event in Siena, Italy, and a 
meeting scheduled for 2015 in Yerevan, Armenia, in order to coincide with 
ceremonies honouring the centenary of the Armenian genocide. The de-
cision to break with tradition and have the IAGS meet in 2014 was not 
uncontroversial, but it ended up being justified by the IAGS executive for 
three primary and overlapping reasons:3 the opening in Winnipeg of the 
Canadian Museum for Human Rights (CMHR), which was originally 
scheduled to take place in July; the expected conclusion in June of the work 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC), which had 
looked into the abuses occurring in Canada’s Indian Residential School 
(IRS) system;4 and the opening at the University of Manitoba later in 2014 
of the National Research Centre on Indian Residential Schools, whose ar-
chive contains TRC testimony and other key documentation pertaining to 
the history and legacy of Canada’s IRS system.
Converging in Winnipeg in the summer of 2014, then, were four 
distinct but importantly overlapping processes: one nurturing scholarly 
inquiry into genocide and its aftermaths; a second attempting to engage 
the general public in the story of human rights struggles and successes; 
a third collecting testimony pertaining to Canada’s historically atrocious 
treatment of Indigenous peoples; and a fourth working to preserve this 
testimony and develop effective means for sharing it. Responding to this 
convergence, an article entitled “The Genocide Test,” written by veteran 
public policy reporter Mary Agnes Welch, appeared in July in the Winni-
peg Free Press. It was intended to elucidate some of the issues arising in vir-
tue of the IAGS conference’s theme, and in it Welch raised the question of 
whether or not Canadian settler colonialism was genocidal. In exploring 
the implications of this question, Welch solicited statements mainly from 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars and activists who agree that it 
was so. She also noted the resistance of average Canadians to the idea that 
their country was founded on such a heinous crime,5 even as she acknow-
ledged recent advances in genocide scholarship that, over time, continue to 
shift the public’s understanding of Indigenous history and the role played 
by genocide in shaping it. Summarizing the view of Charlene Bearhead, 
currently the education lead at the National Centre for Truth and Rec-
onciliation, Welch concluded that “If nothing else, the next generation, 
armed with a fuller historic picture, will lead the change.”6 Significantly, 
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and not for the first time, Welch singled out the CMHR for failing to em-
brace this change and formally designate Canadian settler colonialism as 
genocidal—a failure that, since at least the summer of 2013, has caused the 
museum to come under sustained fire from scholars, Indigenous peoples, 
and their allies nationwide.
In what follows I propose using Welch’s article as the point of de-
parture for a reflection on the underpinnings and scope of the change to 
which Welch and Bearhead refer, and on behalf of which they advocate. 
Along the way I will be considering specific aspects of the argument that 
there has been genocide committed against Aboriginal peoples in Canada. 
I will begin by considering what “genocide” means, exactly, by focusing 
on the text of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 260, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(henceforth the “Genocide Convention”), which I will work to locate more 
precisely in its historical context. Any account of this context requires ref-
erence to the life and work of the convention’s primary framer, Raphael 
Lemkin, about whom more later. Rereading Lemkin allows us to compre-
hend the extent to which critical concern over the language of the Geno-
cide Convention is justified. It also shows how the convention remains 
weakened by a set of political compromises that in crucial ways caused it to 
depart markedly from Lemkin’s original conception and hopes. By speci-
fying difficulties with the convention’s dependence on an overly stringent 
notion of “special” genocidal intention, I provide substantial reasons for 
adopting a broader view of genocide. Such a view is, I conclude, much 
better suited to accounting for the destructive effects of European settler 
colonialism, in Canada and elsewhere in the world. It is also much more 
responsive to, and reflective of, the perspectives of Indigenous peoples 
themselves.
What is Genocide?
Debate over whether or not genocide occurred in Canada hinges on at least 
two underlying issues: what we understand genocide to be, and whether 
or not the Canadian case—Canada’s historical treatment of Indigenous 
peoples—is special, and therefore unlike other instances of settler coloni-
alism elsewhere in the world that seem more straightforwardly genocidal. 
For many Canadians it seems impossible to reconcile what is generally 
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known of Aboriginal Canadians’ relatively more pacific experience of 
European settlement and governance with the experiences documented, 
say, by Bartolomé de las Casas in his shocking A Short Account of the De-
struction of the Indies (1552), in which the Dominican monk and first-hand 
observer of Spain’s brutally annihilatory conquest of South and Central 
America and the Caribbean is described in all its horror. 
Both of these issues may be seen at work in the responses to Welch’s 
article published subsequently by the Winnipeg Free Press. For example, in 
his opinion piece entitled “Canadian Policies Don’t Meet Genocide Test,” 
Michael Melanson, who has commented frequently on this issue, always in 
the same vein, proffers the view that the conceptual limits of genocide have 
been indisputably established by the United Nations through its adoption 
of the Genocide Convention on 9 December 1948. Melanson views at-
tempts to conceive of genocide outside of the frame of the convention’s 
language and relevant case law as distorting and counterproductive, not 
least since the United Nations is unlikely to revise the text of the agree-
ment any time soon. For Melanson and many others, the Genocide Con-
vention is the decisive authority in matters genocidal; although individual 
countries, including Canada, have laws prohibiting genocidal acts, these 
commentators consider the convention more authoritative since it speaks 
for an international consensus.7 More than this, Melanson contends that 
whatever violence has been directed against Aboriginal Canadians, as 
with the case of missing and murdered Aboriginal women, was under-
taken not by the state acting with genocidal intent, but by those person-
ally acquainted with the victims, and that even the seizing of Aboriginal 
children and their relocation to residential schools and subsequent mis-
treatment was accomplished not by the Canadian state in a coordinated 
effort at group destruction, but by more and less beneficent groups often 
affiliated with Aboriginal communities, and for the most part functioning 
independently. Speaking for many Canadians, Melanson writes that in the 
Canadian case there is no clear evidence of genocidal intent: “The RCMP 
showed most of the murdered aboriginal women were killed by people 
they knew. Southern Chiefs Organization Grand Chief Terry Nelson said 
recently the high number of aboriginal children in CFS care was ‘the defi-
nition of genocide.’ Since devolution, those seizures have been undertaken 
by aboriginal agencies. Groups do not target themselves for genocide and 
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suicides, by definition, are not genocide, but wholesale judgment seems to 
be the point.” 8
In his published reply to Melanson, IAGS vice president Andrew 
Woolford points out that overreliance on the international legal architec-
ture that gives the genocide concept its coherence and institutional force, 
and which remains crucial to our capacity to recognize genocide on the 
ground, has the undesirable effects of actually weakening the concept’s 
integrity and limiting its relevance to contexts wherein groups violently 
clash. In advancing this claim Woolford, a sociologist, acknowledges that 
he is “a genocide scholar working in the tradition of Raphael Lemkin,”9 
and indeed his perspective has in important ways been shaped by (even 
as Woolford has contributed importantly to) a reassessment of Lemkin’s 
work and legacy. This reassessment is currently underway in the field of 
genocide studies and cognate disciplines such as law, history, and politi-
cal science, and I will be referring to it as the “Lemkinian Turn.” Raphael 
Lemkin (1900–1959) was the Polish-Jewish jurist who coined the term 
“genocide” and brought the idea of this singular crime to the broader pub-
lic’s attention, not least through the publication of his influential study of 
Nazi wartime conduct, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944). Following 
the Second World War, Lemkin almost singlehandedly drafted the text of 
the Genocide Convention, and shepherded its passage through the byz-
antine committee structures of the United Nations, driven then as now 
by parochial national interests. Speaking of Lemkin’s struggle to see the 
genocide concept incorporated into international law, Woolford writes 
that “Although Lemkin drafted the United Nations’ Genocide Convention, 
his definition was diluted by the nations of the world, sometimes for what 
were practical reasons, but other times for clearly political reasons.”10
This is not a trivial point. Over the course of its transnational institu-
tionalization, Lemkin’s foundational idea of genocide was shorn of much 
of its breadth and complexity, generally in response to the desire of the vic-
torious postwar powers (most notably the Soviet Union and Great Britain) 
not to leave themselves open to legal challenges to their own occasionally 
genocidal, colonial, and imperial conduct.11 It is therefore striking in this 
regard that chief among the alterations to Lemkin’s original text was the 
removal of any reference to cultural genocide, a key component of Lem-
kin’s original conception of the crime and the idea most directly indebted 
to the jurist’s reading of the history of European colonialism. According 
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to the standard view of the evolution of his ideas, such as that provided by 
Michael Ignatieff in a recent essay in the New Republic,12 Lemkin’s formu-
lation of the genocide concept is held to have been primarily influenced by 
the Holocaust, an extermination event that was particularly conspicuous 
to him given his Polish and Jewish origins, and which still looms large over 
accounts of the evolution of postwar justice and human rights talk of the 
period—notwithstanding the recent appearance of persuasive revisionist 
historiography by Samuel Moyn, Marco Duranti, and others.13
The centrality of the destruction of culture to Lemkin’s original for-
mulation of the genocide concept cannot be denied. For Lemkin, genocide 
was a crime centring on a group’s destruction, an idea retained in article 
2 of the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as “acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group.” According to Peter Balakian, who has recently published 
work arising from research into hitherto unknown documents contained 
in Lemkin’s archive, Lemkin understood groups to be sustained by three 
main attributes or capacities: the physical existence of their members; 
their ability to remain biologically reproductive (i.e., their wherewithal to 
produce new members of the group, and thus to renew themselves); and 
their capacity for “spiritual” or cultural expression. According to Lem-
kin, genocide occurs when one or all three of these capacities is destroyed, 
rendering a group unable to persist and its members unable to recognize 
one another as the same kinds of beings-in-the-world. Balakian argues 
that “Lemkin focuses on how the destruction of religious institutions and 
objects, for example, eliminates the ‘spiritual life’ through which a human 
group finds defining expression; when a group’s culture (schools, treasures 
of art and culture, houses of worship, and the like) is destroyed, he argues, 
‘the forces of spiritual cohesion’ are torn apart and the group ‘starts to 
disintegrate.’ ”14 
As an indication of how far it departs from Lemkin’s original inten-
tions, nowhere in the Genocide Convention is this cohesion that Balakian 
refers to identified as something worth protecting. Instead, the United Na-
tions agreement targets threats to a group’s biological and reproductive in-
tegrity, as may be witnessed by article 2’s itemization of genocidal conduct, 
which entirely concerns physical harms or constraints: 
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a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births with-
in the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to anoth-
er group.15
This list makes no mention of the fact that a group may cease to exist for 
reasons other than the application of massive physical violence; and no-
where in the convention is culture identified as worthy of preservation in 
virtue of its role in sustaining group life. It should be remembered that 
culture serves as the expression (i.e., the outer form) of a group’s inner 
life, and it is thus a mechanism through which group integrity may be 
maintained and renewed, and the identities informed by it sustained. With 
this in mind, Lemkin clearly states that there are two distinct but often 
overlapping modes of genocidal destruction. One of these he labels “bar-
barism,” the other “vandalism.”16 While barbaric acts are those directed 
against human bodies in various ways, vandalism targets culture by seek-
ing to destroy monuments, sites of conscience, works of art, and the like. 
Such destruction is the essence of what Lemkin understands “cultural 
genocide” to be, since in his view culture is the essence of a people. In an 
unpublished 1948 essay on genocide in international law, he writes: 
Cultural genocide can be accomplished predominately in the re-
ligious and cultural fields by destroying institutions and objects 
through which the spiritual life of a human group finds its expres-
sion, such as houses of worship, objects of religious cult, schools, 
treasures of art and culture. By destroying spiritual leadership 
and institutions, forces of spiritual cohesion within a group are 
removed and the group starts to disintegrate.17
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To be clear, what Lemkin terms cultural genocide is criminal as well as 
immoral for precisely the same reason as what he calls “physical” or “bio-
logical” genocide. For all of these forms of destruction have the same ob-
ject in common: the annihilation of a group.18 
This particular object is the defining feature of genocide, and the 
source of its primary harms. What makes genocide different from, say, 
varieties of mass murder, is not its conspicuous production of bodies, but 
rather the attempted destruction of what might be called “human kinds.” 
The signal casualty of genocide is not people, but a people, and thus a high-
ly morally and politically charged form of (and capacity for) belonging. I 
agree with Christopher Powell and Amarnath Amarasingam in their con-
tribution to this volume insofar as, like them, I see genocide as targeting 
“the social institutions and relationships necessary for the perpetuation of 
group life,”19 what I want to call the “groupness” of groups—the corporeal, 
social, ideological, and institutional preconditions of social life, the people 
and structures through and against which our identities are shaped and 
our world comes to make sense. For Lemkin, the loss of cultures should be 
a matter of universal concern, since it results in the reduction of human 
diversity and with it our permanent alienation from distinctive repertoires 
of human achievement from which we might learn a great deal. He writes 
that “When a nation is destroyed, it is not the cargo of the vessel that is lost, 
but a substantial part of humanity with a spiritual heritage in which the 
whole world partakes.”20
Lemkin and Colonialism
In their landmark account of Lemkin’s understanding of colonial history, 
historians Michael A. McDonnell and Dirk Moses show that, contrary 
to the standard view, Lemkin’s conception of genocide was profoundly 
marked by his encounter with colonialism’s destructive excesses, which 
he experienced primarily through his reading of works of history and 
autobiography, though also first-hand while living in pre–World War 
Two Poland. More than this, they argue that “the very notion [of geno-
cide] is colonial in nature because it entails occupation and settlement,”21 
two hallmarks of colonialism. In their analysis, McDonnell and Moses 
scrupulously review Lemkin’s research notes and show how his thinking 
drew heavily from reference works on the European conquest of North 
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and South America, including several by las Casas, whose descriptions of 
the mass murder of Indigenous populations he found harrowing. In addi-
tion to work documenting Spanish crimes, Lemkin also delved deeply into 
texts on the withering effects of European oppression in North America, 
Australasia, East Asia, and Africa. 
For Lemkin, European colonialism’s brutality was in some cases 
clearly genocidal, and his conception of genocide was deeply indebted to 
his attempt to understand the nature of colonialism’s harms. Prominent 
amongst these harms was the destruction of Indigenous cultures. Lem-
kin worked tirelessly to ensure the inclusion of cultural genocide in the 
Genocide Convention, but failed to do so principally owing to resistance 
from world powers fearful that their own colonial pasts might leave them 
vulnerable to indictment, a fear heightened by the postwar intensification 
of liberation struggles in Europe’s remaining colonies. McDonnell and 
Moses are correct to see the displacement of Indigenous peoples and the 
eradication of important (by their lights) features of their traditional lives 
as intrinsic to colonialism.22 Lemkin’s failure to get language on culture 
included in the Genocide Convention severely compromises the inter-
national community’s ability to confront colonial abuses, and to determine 
which of them might or might not be genocidal. It therefore makes some 
sense to view the convention, notwithstanding all the good it has done, as 
in some sense continuing to labour in colonialism’s shadow.
Michael Melanson and others aside, appealing to international law in 
response to the question of whether or not genocide occurred in colonial 
contexts is hardly straightforward. On the contrary, while cases such as 
that of the Herero in Namibia, who had their villages and food supplies de-
stroyed by troops acting in support of German settlers, before being driven 
off into the desert to die, may seem more obviously criminal by the light 
of the Genocide Convention (i.e., because they concern state-sanctioned 
mass murder in the context of an attempted ethnocide), other examples, 
such as that of settler colonialism in Canada, which lacks both the high 
levels of violence and degrees of coordination and state involvement found 
in the German case, are harder to categorize. Not, however, that the ex-
perience of the Herero proved all that easy to formally designate a geno-
cide. It was not until the appearance of the UN’s Whitaker Report in 1985, 
more than eighty years after the fact, that German actions in Southwest 
Africa received their proper label, and not until 2004 that the German 
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government issued a formal apology for earlier crimes, even as it refused 
to provide financial compensation for the descendants of the genocide’s 
original victims.
So then, acknowledgement of the partial and political character of the 
Genocide Convention attunes us to the contingency of international law in 
determinations of whether or not genocide has occurred. Notwithstand-
ing how well it works in some cases where physical violence figures prom-
inently, the convention works less well in others where groups have been 
targeted for destruction through the undermining of their cultural dis-
tinctiveness. While commentators like Stephen Katz limit genocide only 
to intentional acts of physical destruction aimed at a group (Katz believes 
that the Holocaust is the only world-historical event to actually satisfy this 
definition),23 scholars such as Martin Shaw and Paul Boghossian argue that 
“a strong case can be made for saying that that concept [in international 
law] is deeply flawed, flaws that make its application to particular cases 
deeply problematic and that are hard to remedy.”24 These flaws bear on 
the suitability of international legal frameworks to settle the question of 
whether or not genocide has occurred in colonial contexts.
Genocidal Intent
For his part, French historian and editor Jean- Louis Panneé argues that 
reference to Lemkin’s own hopes for the Genocide Convention reveals the 
breadth and fullness of his original conception. Panneé is especially keen 
to note Lemkin’s concern with the systematic character of genocidal an-
nihilation, his recognition of genocide as both a process and a political 
practice, and therefore as something fundamentally ideological. Writing 
of Lemkin’s anticipation of ideas found in the work of Holocaust histo-
rian Raul Hilberg, Panneé argues that “By placing emphasis on genocide 
as a process, Raul Hilberg, just as Lemkin, gave it an eminently political 
dimension, because some individuals ‘authorize themselves to kill’ … in 
keeping with their respective Weltanschauung.”25 What marks genocide 
for Panneé and others is not the power it has to wreak physical destruc-
tion, but rather the qualities of mind and conduct, and along with them 
the structures of power, that contribute to the annihilation of a group’s 
integrity, its capacity to renew itself, and its members’ ability to flourish. 
This view overlaps with that of McDonnell and Moses, who put the matter 
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thus: “Mass killing … is not intrinsic to genocide; it can occur without exe-
cutions or gassings. The proposition that scholars who think that genocide 
is a synonym for the Holocaust need to entertain is that Lemkin regarded 
the latter as a consequence of Nazi imperialism and colonialism in Europe. 
The Holocaust and German imperium between 1939 and 1945 was for him 
a continuation of the genocidal occupations that have characterized colo-
nialism through the ages.”26 If these scholars are right, then a Lemkinian 
view attuned to the dynamics of history and culture might indeed be bet-
ter suited to ascertaining whether or not genocide has occurred in Canada 
as part of Indigenous experiences of settler colonialism. 
However, both in the Genocide Convention and throughout Lemkin’s 
scholarly corpus, the “intent to destroy” is claimed to be an essential fea-
ture of genocidal processes.27 According to Panneé, “Lemkin insisted on 
this dimension of genocide that, in truth, encompasses the two essential 
elements of this tragic story, namely the will to chase off or cause the 
disappearance of a specific population and recourse to extermination.” He 
cites a passage from Lemkin’s essay “What is a Genocide?” in this regard: 
“Would the expression ‘mass murder’ reflect the precise concept of this 
phenomenon? I think it would not, as it does not include the motive of the 
crime, the more so when the final aim of the crime rests on racial, national, 
and religious considerations.”28 For Lemkin, motive matters, and there can 
be no motive without intent.29 But the issue of intent is highly problematic 
in the case of Canadian settler colonialism, since Canadian history offers 
up no evidence comparable to Adolf Hitler’s autobiographical Mein Kampf 
(1924), the transcripts of the Wannsee Conference, or Heinrich Himmler’s 
1943 Posen speech to the SS, all of which testify to the Nazis’ program-
matic intention to destroy European Jews.30 Before any argument can be 
marshalled that settler colonialism in Canada was genocidal, then, it is 
first necessary to take a closer look at what genocidal intent is. For the 
purposes of the analysis here, it is the international legal conception of this 
intent that matters most since Lemkin played a crucial role in shaping it. 
It speaks for his understanding of what it means to intend to destroy. It is 
only in the wake of such an analysis that it becomes possible to reflect more 
generally on the status of intent in accounts of the history of Canadian 
settler colonialism.
The conception of intent embodied in the Genocide Convention is rel-
atively straightforward. It revolves around the idea of there being a “special 
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intent” (dolus specialis) at work in genocides, which may be contrasted with 
the general intent (dolus) to do harm. According to criminal law professor 
and German judge Kai Ambos, the special and general intents comprise 
the two legally relevant mental elements operative during a genocide. That 
is, for the genocidaire to be legally guilty of the crime, it must be shown 
that he intended to do harm and understood his actions as likely to bring 
this harm about (the general intention); and he must be shown to intend to 
do harm to a particular group or groups (the special intention). Without 
the addition of this dolus specialis, even the most hideous atrocities com-
mitted as the result of only a general intention to harm would not qualify 
legally as genocide. For Ambos this demonstrates that genocide viewed le-
gally is marked by a kind of surplus of intent, what he calls a “transcending 
internal tendency” (überschießende Innentendenz).31 This surplus reflects 
the fact that genocides are about more than mere violence; they are acts 
of violence with a special purpose, namely the destruction of groups. This 
surplus helps to distinguish acts of genocide from those of persecution, 
which by definition requires the persistence of groups, albeit in states of 
ongoing misery.
It should be noted that the intention being privileged in this conception 
of the dolus specialis is reserved for those directing and sponsoring geno-
cides, and not to the foot soldiers carrying genocide out on the ground. 
What international law cares about, and criminalizes, are the actions of 
those in charge of these atrocities, the “architects of doom.” Abuses ar-
ranged or committed by those further down the ladder, such as mid- and 
lower-level bureaucrats, soldiers in the field, vigilante mobs, and so on, are 
considered evidence of a higher-level intent to destroy, an intention that 
subordinates are held to lack. Accordingly, garden-variety functionaries, 
militants, and bigots, those whom Daniel Goldhagen famously termed 
Hitler’s “willing executioners,” though potentially guilty of other crimes, 
cannot themselves be held legally responsible for genocide. This fact has 
the rather odd consequence of at least conceptually severing actors from 
their actions, since while contributing materially to the commission of a 
genocide (i.e., performing acts of genocide), a person would not be con-
sidered responsible for furthering genocide, either morally or in the eyes 
of the law. Looking at matters this way fails to take into account how the 
desire to eliminate a group may be present more and less explicitly in the 
minds and dispositions of genocidal functionaries, shaping their conduct 
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and the institutions through which their animus is felt and operational-
ized. It doesn’t look closely enough at who knew what and how.
Following a comprehensive survey of the relevant legal cases, Ambos 
argues that “the case-law approach is predicated on the understanding … 
that ‘intent to destroy’ means a special or specific intent which, in essence, 
expresses the volitional element in its most intensive form and is pur-
pose-based.”32 Dissenting from this tradition, Ambos follows Alicia Gil Gil 
and Otto Triffterer in exploring the possibility of reconceptualizing geno-
cidal intention to include the dolus eventualis, or conditional intent. Con-
ditional intent is what Ambos describes as “a transcending subjective ele-
ment (elemento subjetivo trascendente) with regard to the constituent acts 
of the offence and the criminal result.”33 It is what philosophers of action 
sometimes call a “global” intention out of and against which specific “lo-
cal” intentions form and become salient. It does not attach itself to specific 
acts, but rather coordinates them by, amongst other things, providing a 
conduit for rationalizations and easy access to justificatory schemes. Am-
bos writes that “As to these constituent acts, e.g. the killing of a member 
of the group in the case of genocide, dolus eventualis would be sufficient, 
combined however with intention in the sense of the unconditional will 
with regard to the remaining acts—i.e., the killing of other members of the 
group—necessary to bring about the final result of the crime, or at least 
knowledge of the co-perpetrators’ intention to that effect, and at the same 
time the presumption that the realization of these acts is possible.”34 In his 
view it is enough to show evidence of genocidal intent when an accused is 
clearly responsible for acts the outcome of which might have reasonably 
been expected to contribute to the destruction of a group. In Alexander 
Greenwalt’s words, “principal culpability should extend to those who may 
lack a specific genocidal purpose, but who commit genocidal acts while 
understanding the destructive consequences of their actions.”35 Since this 
understanding comprises the conceptual background against which the 
perpetrator forms intentions and acts, Ambos calls Greenwalt’s a “know-
ledge-based approach” to the problem of genocidal intention. 
Again, context matters since it is always within contexts that actions 
take place and intentions form; one never acts in a vacuum, or without 
some kind of bigger-picture understanding of one’s place in the world, 
however broadly or narrowly conceived. Even as we want to acknowledge 
that genocide’s foot soldiers frequently fail to act in the moment specifically 
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with the intent to destroy, we need at the same time to recognize the 
ways that they understand the meaning of their actions. Accordingly it is 
perhaps easier to understand why sociologists, historians, and genocide 
scholars have expressed so much dissatisfaction with the appeal to the 
Genocide Convention and related international law when making deter-
minations concerning whether or not a genocide has occurred, and also 
why the legal and related political establishments have been reluctant to 
do so. For the former, trained to prefer thick to thin descriptions and with 
an eye (post-Foucault) to the vagaries of Power, international law is simply 
far too conservative as well as reluctant to examine closely the events on 
which it seeks to pass judgment. For the latter, constrained by case law, a 
narrower conception of intent, and an inability to look beyond physical 
harms, genocide is only ever committed by the few who plan and clearly 
organize it, not by the many who carry it out.
Intent in the Canadian Case 
As noted above, evidence of the intent to destroy is not totally clear-cut 
when it comes to making the case for Canadian settler-colonial genocide. 
This is not to say it is wholly absent. In one of the mostly widely quoted ex-
pressions of the Canadian government’s official hostility toward Canadian 
Indigenous peoples, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs 
Duncan Campbell Scott (1862–1947), speaking for his office as well as for 
attitudes prevailing in Canada more generally, wrote in 1920 that “I want 
to get rid of the Indian problem. I do not think as a matter of fact, that 
the country ought to continuously protect a class of people who are able 
to stand alone. … Our objective is to continue until there is not a single 
Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and 
there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department, that is the whole 
object of this Bill.”36 It is difficult to think of a more direct statement of 
genocidal intent, at least if one accepts the view that genocide is criminal to 
the extent that it results in the destruction of groups, not simply the deaths 
of human beings. 
Andrew Woolford and other scholars of settler-colonial genocide re-
mind us that we should not be too quick to think that Canadian Aborig-
inals weren’t physically harmed owing to colonial policies and practices. 
In an important essay on genocide as “ontological destruction,” Woolford 
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observes that “while all Aboriginal groups experienced at least some 
degree of attempted assimilation, some also experienced high levels of 
physical destruction through settler violence, disease, and deadly residen-
tial-school conditions, as well as biological interference with reproductive 
processes.”37 His view is seconded by political scientists David MacDon-
ald and Graham Hudson, who point out that “Many acts that constitute 
serious bodily and mental harm are known to have been performed by 
school officials and private parties during the operation of these schools. 
These include sexual assault, threats of death, severe beatings and assault, 
inhuman and degrading treatment—including systematic assaults on Ab-
original self-identity, and disfigurement and serious injuries to health as a 
result of the forced cohabitation of healthy children with children infected 
with communicable diseases.”38 Nevertheless, Woolford cautions against 
too easily assuming Canadian settler colonialism was genocidal. In his 
view there are two main difficulties confronting anyone levelling such a 
charge: the lack of any coordinated plan for the destruction of Canada’s 
Indigenous peoples, and the awkward truth that many of the policies and 
institutions responsible for the destruction of Aboriginal life were created 
not to destroy Indigenous peoples but, explicitly at least, for reasons of 
benevolence.39  Discussion of both of these difficulties dovetails with the 
preceding account of legal intent. This is because for genocide to be distin-
guishable from other forms of atrocious action, some kind of a distinctive 
intention to destroy a group must be present, whatever we understand by 
“intention.” Benevolent intentions do not seem to qualify as genocidal in 
this regard, although they are certainly paternalistic, and additionally 
there must be evidence of coordinated action. One cannot, after all, cause 
a genocide either inadvertently or by oneself. Instead, one must will geno-
cide into being and carry it out with the aid of others. 
Woolford responds to these concerns by suggesting that Canadian 
settler colonialism gave rise to what he terms a “colonial network of de-
struction.”40 In explaining what this means he relies on nodal governance 
theory, which is concerned with charting the workings of the “outcome 
governing system” (OGS), or complex network of systems and structures 
through which a society organizes and governs itself. The OGS not only 
rationalizes social action, it justifies it by assigning meaning to the struc-
tures and patterns of action comprising everyday life. Woolford explains 
that the OGS is “a term which refers to how collective actors through 
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both conscious and habituated actions generate collective outcomes that 
are perceived as ‘goods’ (e.g. peace, happiness, and economic well-being) 
or else defined as problems when things go wrong (e.g. violence, famine, 
and suffering).”41
The OGS is comprised of many “nodes,” different sites “within an OGS 
where knowledge, capacity and resources are mobilized to manage a course 
of events or, in other words, to put governance into action.”42 In Canada, 
one such node would be the country’s IRS system. Regardless of the more 
or less benign local intentions informing the processes and mechanisms 
of Aboriginal education within a specific IRS, Woolford contends that all 
IRSs must be seen as contributing to Canada’s network of destruction. This 
is because all of these schools understood Aboriginal life and identity to 
be something in need of correction, traces of an obsolete and redundant 
existence out of which the country’s Indigenous peoples needed to be edu-
cated. From the perspective of the IRS system and its benefactors in church 
and government, Indigeneity was a problem that needed to be solved. And 
yet, “one must acknowledge that it is only possible to claim to be provid-
ing civilizing uplift to Indigenous peoples if one misrecognizes them and 
treats them first as barbarous peoples. Such misrecognition allows one to 
bury or bracket one’s intent—to act without actively admitting to the ends 
one seeks to achieve.”43
Obscured in the history of Canadian settler colonialism, then, are 
both a prevailing conception of Indigenous life as somehow not worth 
living, and a corresponding global intention to eradicate it. Conception 
and intention echo loudly in discussions of historical genocide since 
they bear a striking resemblance to the Nazis’ notion of “life unworthy 
of life,” the view originally advanced by German jurist Karl Binding and 
psychologist Alfred Hoche in 1920, and later taken up by Hitler in Mein 
Kampf, that certain groups of people (i.e., those with mental or physical 
disabilities) were little more than “human ballast” in need of sterilization 
or euthanasia.44 We find the idea of Indigenous non-viability and expend-
ability historically present throughout Canada’s OGS, where it can be seen 
underlying all of the decisions made by individuals and (governmental 
and non-governmental) organizations responsible for managing the coun-
try’s Aboriginal affairs. That is, at its core Canadian settler colonialism 
developed and evolved in ways continually informed by the idea of In-
digenous life as something to be overcome. Hence Woolford’s observation 
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that “Within the settler-Canadian worldview, there was little room for the 
continuance of Indigenous societies.”45 We can find further evidence of 
the eliminationist character of this worldview once again in the words of 
Duncan Campbell Scott, who expresses his hope for the beneficent elim-
ination of Indigenous life thus: “The happiest future for the Indian race is 
absorption into the general population, and this is the object of the policy 
of our government. The great forces of intermarriage and education will 
finally overcome the lingering traces of native custom and tradition.”46
What work by Woolford and others on Canadian settler-colonial geno-
cide reveals is how the intent to destroy is present but unevenly distributed 
throughout Canada’s OGS. This uneven distribution, along with the pro-
foundly and often subtly networked character of the mechanisms and sites 
of colonial destruction, obliges us to rethink certain features of a geno-
cide’s causal history. Most obviously, rather than viewing genocides as co-
herent events organized around an overarching set of intentions to destroy 
a particular group—intentions held by a privileged few in power who then 
direct the actions of subordinates accordingly—we should instead think of 
them as occurring through the simultaneous operations of multiple nodes 
conjoined in a (dominant) cultural network seeking a group’s annihila-
tion. This network may be more or less formally justified, and insofar as 
its structure is concerned, it may be more or less tightly woven given the 
specifics of its material and historical circumstances. Any such network is 
genocidal to the extent that it is animated by a dolus specialis. This special 
intention has as its object the elimination of a group, but it is revealed only 
occasionally in the formal justifications offered to authorize specific acts. 
Most of the time it may be found implicit in the ideologies underpinning 
the logic responsible for narrowing the available choices for those making 
decisions about the welfare of people belonging to other groups, individ-
uals with all levels of authority embedded in and shaped by institutions, 
and social structures richly permeated by eliminationism. 
At least for the scholars whose work I have discussed here, this special 
intention more closely resembles what I have explained earlier as a dolus 
eventualis, the recognition of which requires a judgment about what a rea-
sonable person should have known about the annihilatory consequences 
of his or her actions. But at times even this seems too narrow a constraint. 
As Woolford notes, “What this attack on ontology amounted to was an at-
tack on habitus—a full assault upon the learned dispositions of Indigenous 
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life that were the storehouse of the embodied practices of Indigeneity.”47 
That is, the primary casualty of settler colonialism in Canada were the 
individuals, conditions, and structures required for a people to make sense 
of themselves as such. Their destruction is attributable to a diverse range 
of actors working in concert, not always knowingly, to achieve the end of 
traditional ways of being and thinking, the practice of living and not just 
mere physical persistence. No doubt prominent amongst these actors is 
Canada’s IRS system, about which we are really just beginning to learn in 
the wake of the activities of Canada’s TRC. Woolford cites Hayter Reed, a 
senior bureaucrat in the government department responsible for oversee-
ing Indian affairs, who in the 1890s “instructed teachers and staff of the 
residential schools to employ ‘every effort … against anything calculat-
ed to keep fresh in the memories of the children habits and associations 
which it is one of the main objects of industrial education to obliterate.’ ”48 
Such clear statements of intent must, however, be read alongside less 
explicit expressions of moral disregard such as the dietary experiments 
uncovered by Ian Mosby that were conducted by the Canadian govern-
ment on Aboriginal communities and residential schools between 1942 
and 1952.49 Along with Christianization, the theft of Indigenous land, the 
introduction of diseases, and the forcible removal and adoption of Ab-
original children (the so-called “Sixties Scoop”), these experiments may 
be located within a complex and evolving nodal network of destruction 
rationalized by the intention to destroy a form of life deemed not worth 
living. On this broader conception of genocidal intentionality (broader 
since it is a corporate intention not reducible to individual mental states), 
even acts of apparent benevolence may be seen as complicit in genocide to 
the extent that they were understood by their actors as likely to result in a 
group’s inability to persist on its own terms. Indeed disregard of a group’s 
eidos, or sense of itself—of what it regards as its history, values, and pros-
pects—constitutes one of genocide’s enduring moral harms.
Settler-Colonial Genocide in Canada: Final 
Thoughts
It is notable how few published works are available that specifically deny 
there having been a genocide committed in Canada. Denial does not seem 
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to be an intellectually respectable position, suggesting that it is perhaps 
instead just a manifestation of vulgar prejudice. Certainly insofar as the 
community of genocide scholars is concerned, there is no real question 
anymore that Canadian settler colonialism was genocidal. What remains 
unknown is exactly how such settler colonialism functioned as a nodal net-
work to yield ontological destruction. Unlike the Holocaust, whose history 
and posterity have been extensively documented and commented upon, 
giving it (an increasingly contested) paragonicity, the story of colonialism 
in Canada has not yet been comprehensively told. More importantly, per-
haps, it is only just starting to be told from the perspective of Indigenous 
peoples themselves. To pick only two such examples, the recent production 
of memoirs by IRS survivors,50 along with the testimony given before the 
TRC, are both in the process of revising our picture of residential schools 
and their workings as sites of genocide. Likewise, recent additions to the 
repertoire of international legal instruments such as the Declaration of the 
Rights of Indigenous People, which codifies “Indigenous historical griev-
ances, contemporary challenges and socio-economic, political and cultur-
al aspirations,”51 have done much to introduce Indigenous perspectives on 
matters of history and justice, especially concerning the colonial past.
Complicating matters even more is the instability of the term “geno-
cide” itself. As I have tried to show here, the concept has been criticized 
by a wide variety of scholars and activists dissatisfied with its narrow 
construal in international law. The “Lemkinian Turn” in genocide studies 
seeks to redress these perceived legal shortcomings. By reminding us of the 
ideological and institutional contexts within which the Genocide Conven-
tion emerged, as well as Lemkin’s privileging of group destruction in his 
account of genocide’s harms, by offering a less restrictive account of geno-
cidal intention, and by highlighting the fact that groups may be destroyed 
using means other than mass murder, means often directed towards the 
annihilation or radical and unwanted transformation of a people’s identity 
and culture, Lemkinian scholars are providing ample reasons to reassess 
judgments concerning European colonialism’s legacies and history. Early 
results of this reassessment have thus far contributed to further cementing 
the conclusion that settler colonialism was generally, and in the Canadian 
context specifically, genocidal. 
In sum, evidence continues to mount that the Genocide Convention 
is inadequate to the task of reliably determining when a genocide has been 
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committed, and therefore of deciding whom to punish in its wake. Restor-
ing the destruction of culture to the centre of our understanding of geno-
cidal criminality is both overdue and likely to have a significant effect on 
how Indigenous experiences and history are generally understood. In light 
of this reappraisal, which requires us above all to take Indigenous perspec-
tives seriously, it may become possible to explore new pathways towards 
genuine reconciliation. In MacDonald’s and Hudson’s words, “Changes in 
the UNGC to ‘restore’ cultural genocide, while reducing the impact of dol-
ens specialis [sic], would have a marked impact on how Aboriginal history 
in Canada would be reinterpreted, both legally and morally. These changes 
would provide wider legal scope for reassessing the IRS system and the 
nature of truth and reconciliation.”52
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The Benefits and Challenges of 
Genocide Education: A Case Study  
of the Armenian Genocide
Raffi Sarkissian
Genocide education has been evolving for the past several decades. It was 
once commonly referred to as Holocaust education, as it primarily con-
centrated on the Jewish Holocaust. However, with the Armenian geno-
cide entering our collective consciousness and the shock of contemporary 
genocides such as those in Cambodia, Serbia, Rwanda, and Darfur, edu-
cators have acknowledged the importance of a comparative approach to 
teaching about genocide. The importance of teaching from a variety of 
case studies, all of which carry unique qualities, has become an import-
ant component of genocide education. Thus, genocide education has now 
become an umbrella term that refers to the use of historical and contem-
porary cases of genocide to teach about social justice and human rights. 
The potential and urgency of genocide education has long been underesti-
mated, as it has faced many challenges to date—for instance, the resist-
ance displayed by some communities who deny a particular genocide and 
prefer the issue remain silent. For example, it was not until the 1970s that 
Holocaust curricula started to develop in North America, and today we 
see educational institutions at all levels adopting courses fully dedicated 
to the topic of genocide.1
The goal of genocide education is not solely to educate students about 
historical accounts of genocide, but also, I argue, to help pave the way for 
one of the most effective avenues to anti-racist education. Genocide is a 
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consequence of deeply rooted societal discrimination, and it results from a 
series of human rights violations that render a people vulnerable to further 
exploitation. Racism and its dangers are therefore seen in their most visible 
and terrible form in genocide, making it a unique opportunity to teach 
and learn about these complex events. A combination of geopolitical cir-
cumstances and the manipulation of human behaviour often lead to active 
or indirect participation in genocide and similar crimes associated with 
human rights violations. Thus, genocide and human rights education cre-
ates an invaluable opportunity to explore the various choices available to 
all those affected by genocide, and the decisions that could have a positive 
impact on society even in the most difficult of times. The deep connections 
between individuals, the decisions we make, and the social conditions in 
which we live are embodied in genocide education. Genocide education 
also opens possibilities for empathetic forms of education to shift the bar-
riers between societies where the concept of the Other is frequently raised 
and reinforced in harmful and destructive ways.  
Genocide education remains a strong medium for educating students 
in the importance of safeguarding and understanding not just their indi-
vidual human rights but also those that we share universally. According to 
research conducted by genocide scholar Samuel Totten, teachers strongly 
believe that genocide education provides opportunities for teaching about 
identity, moral theories, and character education.2
In “Holocaust Education in Ontario Schools: An Antidote to Racism?” 
Geoffrey Short showed that in many instances genocide education does 
not lead to anti-racist education unless teachers truly grasp the purpose 
and goals of the former. Thus, in order for genocide education to be deliv-
ered effectively, teachers require adequate professional development and 
continuous support. Without these conditions, it is easy for genocide edu-
cation to become a survey course on genocides in history. Short goes on 
to cite the denial of genocide as an important concern requiring attention 
in the classroom: “Clearly, if the Holocaust is to function as an effective 
antidote to racism it is essential to counteract Holocaust denial.”3
In The Emergence of Holocaust Education in American Schools, Thom-
as Fallace discusses the “New York Times debate” of the 1970s in light of the 
emergence of Holocaust education curricula and the New York City Board 
of Education’s recommendation that its study be made mandatory in all 
its schools. Among the letters published in this debate were some denying 
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the Holocaust and thus challenging Holocaust education. For instance, 
George Pape, president of the German-American Committee of Greater 
New York, claimed that there was no proof the Holocaust had really taken 
place; he also wrote that the curriculum would target innocent German 
Americans. Dr. M. T. Mehdi, president of an Arab-American organiza-
tion, claimed the curriculum was Zionist propaganda that was going to 
be promulgated at the city’s expense. While many non-partisan spectators 
also believe that teaching this curricula would disrupt the peace amongst 
ethnic groups and incite hatred, this view is misleading. The goals of geno-
cide education are quite the opposite of this, and in fact are intended to 
dispel feelings of resentment, hatred, and discrimination that may exist 
between ethnic groups. This kind of false and misleading reasoning resur-
faced over three decades later in the case of the Turkish government’s de-
nial of the Armenian genocide during the Toronto District School Board’s 
implementation of genocide education.
On 13 July 2005, the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) put for-
ward a motion that eventually led to the development of the grade eleven 
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity course and, on 14 December 
2005, it decided to integrate the Armenian genocide into the high school–
level history curriculum. Once the inclusion of the curriculum was settled 
upon, and after the course had been written in 2007, the government of 
Turkey began an offensive to prevent proper acknowledgement and educa-
tion on the issue of the Armenian genocide. 
On 27 August 2008, Ottawa’s Embassy Magazine reported on the 
issue in an article titled “Turkey Decries Toronto School Board Genocide 
Course.” The author, Michelle Collins, reported that the Turkish embassy, 
together with the Council of Turkish Canadians (CTC), had begun lobby-
ing against the course. Both argued, as George Pape had of the Holocaust 
in the 1970s, that no such thing as an Armenian genocide had ever taken 
place and that the TDSB’s new course would expose students to racism 
and discrimination.
Despite the fact that a growing number of Turkish intellectuals, both 
in and out of Turkey, have questioned the Turkish government’s position 
on the Armenian genocide—albeit amidst protest and death threats—
the CTC aggressively denies and actively works against any effort to ac-
knowledge, commemorate, recognize, or teach the Armenian genocide 
in Canada. Their website houses material denying the genocide, ranging 
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from archived petitions to position papers in line with the Turkish gov-
ernment’s views.4
One such petition is titled “Content Change for TDSB’s Grade 11 
Course Genocide: Historical and Contemporary Implications,” published 
by Lale Eskicoglu on 23 November 2007. The petition claims that the course 
would expose Turkish-Canadian students to more racism and discrimina-
tion without presenting any documented incidents or facts to support the 
claim of genocide. It used multiculturalism as a pretext to exclude the Ar-
menian genocide from the course, since it is claimed that it is unfair and 
unjust to impose perpetrator status on an entire nationality. The petition 
also includes a mention of two instances of terrorist acts against Turkish 
government officials in Canada, claiming these are examples of racism 
that could be supported by the course. It concludes by stating that many 
“respected historians” dispute the Armenian genocide, and it cites the sup-
posed lack of consensus amongst historians as grounds for disqualifying 
the Armenian genocide from being included in the course.5
The TDSB provided an opportunity for individuals to present depu-
tations to the Program and School Services Committee on 16 January 
2008. Individuals were given the opportunity to either raise concerns for 
or express their support of the course. Deputations were made in support 
of the course by Leo Adler, a Toronto Criminal Lawyer, Professor Frank 
Chalk, Director of the Montreal Institute of Genocide Studies at Concordia 
University, Jim Karygiannis, MP for Scarborough-Agincourt, and David 
Warner, former speaker of the Ontario Assembly. Two individuals pre-
sented deputations against the course—Lale Eskicioglu, representing the 
CTC, and Professor Ozay Mehmet, a Turkish-Canadian academic from 
Carleton University. A review of the deputations provides insight into the 
barriers posed by genocide denial. 
Lale Eskicioglu’s oral deputation was a replica of the contents of the 
aforementioned petition, of which she was the author. She started off by 
targeting Barbara Coloroso’s 2007 book Extraordinary Evil: A Brief Hist-
ory of Genocide, which was included in the curriculum. Eskicioglu claimed 
the book was used as a basis for the genocide curriculum and discredited 
Coloroso’s work since she is not a historian. She claimed the history of the 
Armenian genocide is “disputed” and that the works of certain historians 
who held the view supported by the Turkish government were not con-
sulted, in particular that of Justin McCarthy and Guenter Lewy. Books by 
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McCarthy and Lewy, known genocide deniers, were handed out to those 
present. She concluded by claiming that the decision for the course was 
one-sided and that “the claims of an Armenian Genocide are being used to 
justify [the] racism, hatred and prejudice our children are experiencing.”6
The second speaker, Professor Ozay Mehmet, demanded that the 
TDSB re-examine the curriculum “and remove all Armenian references 
in this course” for the following reasons: “The Armenian component, text 
references and bibliographic sources are one-sided, ethnically biased, and 
reflecting only Armenian input and promotes ethnic hate”; the use of the 
term “Armenian genocide” in the course amounts to accepting forged 
documents as valid; the Armenian part of the course will expose Turkish 
children to harassment and bullying in our schools; and finally, the Can-
adian government’s position on this matter is unclear.7
While the speakers opposing the course were of Turkish origin, the 
deputations supporting the course came from a variety of backgrounds 
and displayed the diverse support the inclusion of the Armenian geno-
cide module had received. These refuted many of the concerns raised by 
the CTC. For example, they stressed that the course in no way equates 
present-day Turkish citizens with the perpetrators of genocide (i.e., the 
Committee of Union and Progress). Professor Frank Chalk stressed that 
the international scholarly consensus supports the fact that the Armen-
ian case is rightfully classified as genocide according to the UN’s genocide 
convention. He also suggested that the CTC would be applauded as hon-
est and courageous if they finally confronted the history of the Armenian 
genocide rather than supporting the Turkish government’s policy of de-
nial. He also stressed that the Canadian government is clear on the issue of 
the Armenian genocide and has officially recognized it as fact. 
It was apparent from the beginning that those opposed to the inclusion 
of the Armenian genocide had used concerns of discrimination, bullying, 
and terrorism, as stated in the CTC petition, merely as a guise.8 Their pos-
ition was first and foremost a defence rooted in the Turkish government’s 
denial of the Armenian genocide. 
A close look at the contents of the course would immediately dispel the 
CTC’s fears of discrimination and racism. The course provides a thorough 
exploration of morals, values, prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, and 
similar themes that lay the groundwork for the case studies that follow. 
The curriculum does not allow for any form of discriminatory sentiment 
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or animosity between ethnic groups. It is clear in the course that geno-
cidaires from Nazi Germany and the Ottoman Empire in no way represent 
the German or Turkish citizens of today—rather, the curriculum supports 
a movement to collectively acknowledge the wrongs of the past and build a 
positive future. The TDSB also addressed the concept of multiculturalism, 
stating that the very notion of multiculturalism supports the need for such 
a course:
Given the specific multi-cultural and multi-ethnic diversity with-
in Toronto, we feel it is essential that students born within and 
outside Canada have the opportunity to explore in depth the 
causes and consequences of genocide and the lived realities of the 
aggressors, targets, bystanders, and resisters to these horrific acts 
of violence. A study of these experiences will help foster a sense 
of empathy for the targets of these violent acts and hopefully en-
courage students to understand the connections they have to their 
fellow human beings.9
 
In the New York Times debate described above, German interest groups 
had presented many concerns about Holocaust education that were sim-
ilar to Turkish concerns over the TDSB course. If we as a society had not 
disregarded these concerns as attempts at denying genocide, we might 
never have achieved the successes in genocide education of the past few 
decades. As Germany worked to come to terms with the Holocaust and 
use its lessons to promote positive change, this led to an inspirational and 
exemplary social transformation from a nation that perpetrated genocide 
to a pluralist society. Unfortunately, this acknowledgement of guilt, and 
the resulting social transformation, did not occur in Turkey, where pol-
itical leaders have insisted on denying the truth and forcing a fabricated 
history onto its people. The CTC’s defense is ultimately the product of the 
systematic denial of the Armenian genocide. Organizations such as the 
CTC and the “respected” historians mentioned in their petition ultimately 
perpetuate the cycle of genocide rather than one of positive social trans-
formation. Their insistence that any mention of the Armenian genocide is 
a universal attack on Turks has kept generations in the dark, thus leading 
to the outrageous behaviour experienced by the TDSB when trying to im-
plement curricula that is beneficial and healthy for society.
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The International Association of Genocide Scholars, in a 24 January 
2008 letter of support to the TDSB, addresses this claim of a “universal 
attack” on Turks by stating that the
assertion that teaching the truth about the Armenian past will be 
demeaning to Turkish students or Turkish people in general deni-
grates the intelligence of Canadians of Turkish descent and strikes 
us as disingenuous. Education in a democracy is built on historical 
critique and critical evaluation. When the history of US slavery, 
British colonialism, German genocide of Jews and Roma, Mus-
solini’s fascism, Stalin’s purges, or Mao’s human rights crimes, is 
taught, the descendants of the perpetrators’ nationalities (Amer-
icans, British, Germans, Italians, Russians, or Chinese) are not 
demeaned or persecuted by anyone. On the contrary, they emerge 
from learning those histories better educated, with a stronger sense 
of how important critical analysis of the past is; and they achieve 
an ethical capacity crucial to good education. In dealing with the 
truth about their nations’ histories, they develop the moral hon-
esty crucial to the progress of human rights in a democracy. The 
study of genocide is not designed to impose collective guilt. It is 
meant to seek to understand a common human problem. Turks as 
a people did not commit the Armenian genocide, any more than 
Canadians or Americans in general committed genocide against 
native American populations. But some of our ancestors did com-
mit these crimes, and it is our present responsibility to study and 
acknowledge them in order to prevent genocides in the future.10
 
Although German-American organizations have realized the importance 
and benefits of understanding and acknowledging the past as a means of 
creating a peaceful society, the government of Turkey has yet to do so; in the 
meantime, it encourages Turkish communities abroad to parrot its position.
The TDSB was not the first or only target of genocide denial on the 
part of the Turkish government and its affiliates. What we saw in the TDSB 
case study has been a common occurrence throughout North America. 
An earlier episode is discussed by Roger Smith, who shows how, amongst 
many other means of denial, the Turkish government targeted secondary 
schools in the United States as it grew fearful that the Armenian genocide 
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would be discussed in classrooms. Smith notes how “a letter from the 
Turkish embassy in Washington was sent to secondary schools through-
out the United States to dissuade them from using histories that mention 
the Armenian Genocide. Stronger efforts still have been made to prevent 
any discussion of the 1915 genocide being formally included in the social 
studies curriculum as part of Holocaust/genocide studies.”11 
Mark Fleming also discusses difficulties faced by the state of Massa-
chusetts in implementing genocide education. In 1999, a guide for teach-
ing genocide and human rights, including the Armenian genocide, was 
issued by the Massachusetts Board of Education. In October 2005, a group 
of Turkish Americans, led by the Assembly of Turkish-American Associ-
ations (ATAA), filed a lawsuit against the Board of Education claiming that 
the guide violated the First Amendment because it cited the Armenian 
case as genocide. This was a failed attempt to jeopardize the teaching of 
the Armenian genocide.12 
In Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide, 
scholar Richard Hovanissian describes the significance of genocide denial: 
It has been said that denial is the final phase of genocide. Follow-
ing the physical destruction of a people and their material culture, 
memory is all that is left and is targeted as the last victim. Com-
plete annihilation of a people requires the banishment of recollec-
tion and the suffocation of remembrance. Falsification, deception 
and half-truths reduce what was to what may have been or perhaps 
what was not at all. … By altering or erasing the past, a present is 
produced and a future is projected without concern about histor-
ical integrity. The process of annihilation is thus advanced and 
completed by denial.13
 
This effectively characterizes the CTC’s intentions, which is part of a larger 
denial apparatus belonging to the Turkish government. The policies set 
forth by the Turkish government have had a tremendous effect on how 
the Armenians are viewed by those raised and educated in Turkey. The 
establishment of a legal framework restricting certain thoughts and en-
couraging others, the vilifying of the Armenian population, and genocide 
denial have all led to viewing Armenians as the Other, and behaviour 
toward them has been fashioned accordingly. Article 301 of the Turkish 
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penal code, which criminalizes defending the existence of the Armenian 
genocide, has already vilified many intellectuals for their views. The as-
sassination of the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, in January 
2007, by an ultra-nationalist Turkish citizen in Istanbul, was a by-product 
of such a law. The law made Dink a criminal in the eyes of the public and 
thus a target for hatred and death. 
Denial is an attack on the memories of survivors and their descend-
ants. According to genocide scholar Gregory Stanton, “It is a continuing 
attempt to destroy the victim group psychologically and culturally, to deny 
its members even the memory of the murders of their relatives. That is 
what the Turkish government today is doing to Armenians around the 
world.”14 In other words, it is an attack on the collective memory of a 
people and their right to commemorate. Those who deny history, such as 
the Armenian genocide or the Holocaust, are attempting to conceal the 
truth. Genocide scholar Israel Charney describes deniers as individuals 
who “are attempting to write a final chapter to the original genocide—now 
by ‘mass murder’ of the recorded memories of human history. If being alive 
as human beings means some basic sense of knowing the record of history, 
the ‘killing’ of objective history is also the killing of human consciousness 
and evolution.”15 Denialists’ motives for destroying memory are exactly 
the reason why we value the stories told by those who survive such mass 
atrocities as the Holocaust, given that a great deal of education is centred 
on the sharing of testimonies. If that very memory were to be denied, and 
the suffering trivialized, this would leave society with lessons unlearned. 
While teaching about denial in the grade eleven Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity course at the ARS Armenian Private School, I shared 
with the class a poem written by Canadian-Armenian author and academ-
ic Alan Whitehorn. This poem, titled “How Do We Remember the Dead?” 
deals with the denial of the Armenian genocide. I asked the students to 
reflect and record their thoughts on the poem. The responses I received 
were expressive of the extent to which the crime of genocide had affected 
their lives through its denial. I saw the student responses as calls to the 
government of Turkey to break the cycle of genocide and, by doing so, end 
its assault on the conscience of the Turkish people and the memory of the 
Armenians who were victimized in 1915. It was a call to also set subse-
quent generations free from being victims in the present. 
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There is a parallel between the wounds caused by physical violence 
during the Armenian genocide, as discussed in survivor testimony, and 
the wounds students have on occasion described, and which are caused 
by denial. These are wounds inflicted in different ways, leaving different 
marks but caused by the same crime. Therefore, the Armenian genocide 
is an event, the physical and mental consequences of which are felt across 
generations. Moreover, its denial has had a profound effect on the identi-
ties of Armenian communities in the diaspora.
The experience of three generations of victims and survivors is com-
monly shared by many members of the Armenian community and is a 
concept worth examining. There is an absence of research on the effects 
of the denial of the Armenian genocide on subsequent generations. Such 
research would bring to light the harmful consequences of denial that are 
often sanctioned under the guise of freedom of speech.  
2013–2014 marked the sixth academic year the TDSB’s Genocide and 
Crimes Against Humanity course was offered. Since its implementation, 
the school board has also declared April Genocide Awareness Month. 
Over the years, the course has become popular among students, teachers, 
and administrators alike. Registration numbers alone show this, as they 
demonstrate a consistent increase in enrolment from year to year. Facing 
History and Ourselves, an organization involved in developing the course, 
provides ongoing professional development and teacher support, ensuring 
teachers are confident and effective, and are meeting the goals and pur-
pose of genocide education.
In 2014, the Federation of Turkish Canadian Associations (FTCA)—
an organization similar to the CTC—released a petition to request the 
removal of the Armenian genocide module. It also asked that a section 
reading “genocide of Armenians, Assyrians and Pontian Greeks” in the 
school board’s 2013 Genocide Awareness Month statement be removed.16 
At the start of 2014, the ATAA pursued genocide denial as the California 
State Assembly passed a resolution on teaching the Armenian genocide. 
In light of such denial campaigns, a TDSB course proposal released in 
2008 rings true: 
Given the specific multi-cultural and multi-ethnic diversity with-
in Toronto, we feel it is essential that students born within and 
outside Canada have the opportunity to explore in depth the 
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causes and consequences of genocide and the lived realities of the 
aggressors, targets, bystanders, and resisters to these horrific acts 
of violence. A study of these experiences will help foster a sense 
of empathy for the targets of these violent acts and hopefully en-
courage students to understand the connections they have to their 
fellow human beings.17 
 
Here, the TDSB provides a unique opportunity for promoting multicul-
turalism and diversity through genocide education; conversely, the legal 
and educational structure of the Turkish government—the very same gov-
ernment attempting to negatively influence the domestic affairs of another 
country—has suppressed free discussion of and research into the Armen-
ian genocide.
The inclusion of the Armenian genocide in Canadian curricula is im-
perative. Canada has been engaged with Armenian communities in the 
Ottoman Empire since 1878. Canadian fieldworkers and missionaries 
were present in the empire and witnessed the destruction of the Armen-
ian population. They often communicated their experiences and concerns 
through letters and news reports, thus allowing Canadians to become well 
aware of the plight of the Armenians. A significant increase in Canadian 
media coverage triggered large scale and popular support for fundraising 
and relief efforts as early as the Hamidian Massacres of 1895–1896, during 
which time three hundred thousand Armenians were murdered.18 The Ar-
menian Relief Fund Association of Canada was formed in 1916, to better 
coordinate such fundraising. 
Over 15 years, it collected an impressive $1,000,000 in donations 
and had among its patrons Toronto’s Roman Catholic archbishop 
and Anglican archdeacon, an Ontario Supreme Court justice, and 
two governors general. Its officers were mostly businessmen and 
clergymen. It had more than 25 chapters and worked in conjunc-
tion with the British Lord Mayor’s Fund and the American Near 
East Relief.19
 
The teaching of the Armenian genocide, especially in the context of Can-
adian history, creates opportunities to learn about the positive outcome of 
humanitarianism, collective action, and global citizenship. It also sheds 
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light on the positive role government officials, religious institutions, civil 
society, and the media can play in effecting change. 
In its revised 2013 Canada and World Studies curriculum, the Ontario 
Ministry of Education included the topic of the Armenian genocide as a 
specific expectation in the mandatory grade ten Canadian History Since 
World War I course. Teachers can address the Armenian genocide when 
studying the importance of public commemoration and the acknowledge-
ment of past human rights violations and genocide. The students are also 
asked to address the importance of these actions for identity and heritage 
in Canada. This is an important step towards incorporating this important 
page in Canadian history into mandatory curricula.20 
Genocide denial is one of the biggest challenges to the implementa-
tion of genocide education. Stanton identifies denial as the last stage of the 
genocide process. It is a by-product of impunity and, if left unaddressed, 
can fuel future instances of mass violence. For this reason, genocide deni-
al at the state level—as it is being practised by the government of Turkey 
today—can be dangerous. Since the establishment of the Turkish republic 
in 1923, successive governments have created an atmosphere of amnesia 
concerning Armenia and Armenians through the manipulation of geogra-
phy, culture, and official history. These exercises in memory politics have 
then been pursued in all possible political, legal, and socio-cultural arenas 
and by a variety of government ministries, from education to culture. The 
infamous Article 301 of the Turkish penal code stands as just one example 
that is often cited as problematic. 
Although organizations such as the CTC and the ATAA publicly deny 
the Armenian genocide abroad, a growing number of Turkish intellectuals 
in Turkey and the diaspora have called for Turkish recognition of the Ar-
menian genocide. These include Taner Akcam, Fatma Muge Gocek, Halil 
Berktay, Cengiz Aktar, and Baskin Oran. In December 2008, thousands of 
Turks signed a petition apologizing for the Armenian genocide and calling 
on the Turkish government to acknowledge this history. The authors of 
the petition were threatened with trial under Article 301. In April 2010, on 
the ninety-fifth anniversary of the Armenian genocide, an unprecedented 
number of Turkish intellectuals signed a petition, which in part read “We 
call upon all peoples of Turkey who share this heartfelt pain to commemor-
ate and pay tribute to the victims of 1915. In black, in silence. With candles 
and flowers.”21 A group of intellectuals also held a vigil at the prison where 
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hundreds of Armenian intellectuals were detained prior to being executed 
on 24 April 1915. The following year, the number of intellectuals reached 
five hundred, and it has been growing ever since, despite government in-
timidation and the imposing fear of imprisonment and threats. Indeed, 
these actions were met with thousands of protesters chanting death threats 
and such discriminatory slogans as “Death to the Armenian Diaspora.”22 
The Turkish government’s unwillingness to acknowledge the Ar-
menian genocide and its disallowing of any mention of it under laws re-
stricting freedom of speech have prevented Turkish society from having 
an opportunity to take responsibility. By maintaining the taboo on the 
Armenian genocide, the Turkish government has glorified the lives of the 
perpetrators of genocide while maintaining silence on the history of those 
who should have become the heroes of Turkish society, those who saved 
Armenian lives in 1915. Imagine a Germany where Schindler’s story was 
silenced by the state and Hitler’s was praised. Raffi Bedrosyan gives us an 
idea of how the glorifying of genocide perpetrators plays out in Turkey in 
his article “The Real Turkish Heroes of 1915”: 
And yet, it is true in Turkey, where it is acceptable to name several 
neighborhoods, streets, and schools after Talat Pasha and other It-
tihat ve Terakki (Committee of Union and Progress) “heroes” who 
not only planned and carried out the Armenian Genocide, but 
were responsible for the loss of the Ottoman Empire itself.
At last count, there were officially 8 “Talat Pasha” neighbor-
hoods or districts, 38 “Talat Pasha” streets or boulevards, 7 “Talat 
Pasha” public schools, 6 “Talat Pasha” buildings, and 2 “Talat Pasha” 
mosques scattered around Istanbul, Ankara, and other cities. After 
his assassination in 1922, Talat was originally interred in Berlin, 
Germany, but his remains were transferred to Istanbul in 1943 by the 
Nazis in an attempt to appease the Turks. He was re-buried with full 
military honors at the Infinite Freedom Hill Cemetery in Istanbul. 
The remains of the other notorious Ittihat ve Terakki leader, Enver 
Pasha, were also transferred in 1996 from Tajikistan and re-buried 
beside Talat, with full military honors; the ceremony was attended 
by Turkish President Suleyman Demirel and other dignitaries.23 
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The power of education, and genocide education specifically, resonates clear-
ly here. Genocide denial presents itself as a great obstacle to this important 
form of education, a roadblock above and beyond the borders of perpetra-
tor governments as we have seen in the case of the Turkish government. 
In the absence of justice, reconciliation, and social reform, denial fuels 
the cycle of genocide by leading the perpetrator state from a post-genocidal 
society back to a pre-genocidal stage outlined in Stanton’s “Ten Stages of 
Genocide” (i.e., classification, symbolization, discrimination, dehumaniz-
ation, organization, polarization, preparation, persecution, extermination, 
and denial).24 Denial allows genocide to transcend time and space, follow-
ing victims and their offspring. Thus, genocide does not begin and end 
with physical destruction, nor do its effects remain constrained to particu-
lar borders. As mentioned above, people in California, Massachusetts, and 
Ontario have found themselves affected by campaigns being pursued far 
from the time and place of the physical violence.
The transgenerational effects of genocide fuelled by denial were com-
mon themes among the Canadian-Armenian youth interviewed by the 
Sara Corning Centre for Genocide Education throughout the course of the 
Armenian genocide’s one hundredth anniversary commemorative period. 
Titled “100 Voices: Survival, Memory and Justice,” this set of interviews 
was conducted with secondary-level students from grade nine to twelve at 
the ARS Armenian Private School in Toronto. A common concern shared 
by the interviewees is the fact that the Turkish republic continues to deny 
the Armenian genocide and this continues to cause trauma for generations 
subsequent to those who survived. 25
Denial is a common issue that continues to affect victim groups of all 
genocides, and the need to educate about the effects of genocide denial 
is therefore a necessity. A letter supporting the TDSB course written by 
Rwandan genocide survivor Leo Kabalisa on 22 January 2008 identifies 
how denial continues to affect all victims of genocide, irrespective of time 
and place, and becomes a barrier to education and prevention. A part of 
his letter reads: 
Your program [the TDSB course] is being implemented  at the 
right time because we are facing the phase of denial of the geno-
cides.  Ninety-two years after the Armenian genocide, instead of 
learning from the past, the current leadership of Turkey is spending 
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time and energy to deny the sad history of their past. In the case of 
the genocide of Tutsis, conferences and forums of discussion have 
been organized throughout Europe by Hutu extremists and their 
supporters to revise and deny the history of the genocide of the 
Tutsis. For the Holocaust, we all remember last year’s conference 
in Teheran in which the reality of the Holocaust was questioned by 
scholars invited by the president of Iran. … Those who complain 
about the teaching of genocide too often are simply genocide de-
niers. Do not yield to their attempts to influence valid curriculum.26
By responding to and overcoming such challenges, societies demonstrate 
their dedication to creating safe spaces where new generations can learn 
and become the change. The TDSB expressed this well in its proposal to 
the Ontario Ministry of Education: “Democracy, justice, and the rule of law 
must be understood, claimed, and defended by each generation of citizens 
if we are to confront this demonstration of human evil. We believe that a 
full-credit course will engage students and allow them to study genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in a systematic and thoughtful 
way.”27 The Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity course remains true 
to this rationale.
Moral philosopher Annette Baier states: “The reasons for recognizing 
obligations to future persons are closely connected with reasons for recog-
nizing the rights of past persons.”28 If we cannot address the past and draw 
lessons from it, starting with respecting the rights of past persons, then we 
cannot ensure the rights of persons in the future. 
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“We Charge Genocide”: A Historical 
Petition All but Forgotten and Unknown1
Steven Leonard Jacobs
In 1951, three years after the United Nations ratified its Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (December 1948), 
but almost four decades before the United States affirmed its own partici-
pation in 1988, the (American) Civil Rights Congress (CRC), under the 
direction of its founder William L. Patterson, presented and later pub-
lished a petition to the UN under the title We Charge Genocide: The Crime 
of the Government Against the Negro People.2 Patterson would later publish 
his autobiography detailing the events leading up to this all but forgot-
ten moment in history under the title The Man Who Cried Genocide: An 
Autobiography.3
This chapter is an examination of the petition itself, the charges in-
cluded (in a country where many, even in 2016, argue that the so-called ra-
cial divide is growing wider), Patterson’s own story and understanding of 
the petition and its historical context, the larger socio-economic and legal 
questions of reparations for all victims of genocide, and what this portends 
in light of the recent genocides in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sudan, 
and those yet to occur.
A Most Peculiar Introduction
Towards the end of The Man Who Cried Genocide, Patterson, the primary 
author of We Charge Genocide: The Crime of the Government Against 
5
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the Negro People, criticized and severely chastised Raphael Lemkin—the 
motivating presence behind the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, as it has 
come to be known, and now increasingly acknowledged as the “father” of 
the academic discipline of “genocide studies” (an offshoot of the field of 
“Holocaust studies”)—for his failure to support the petition.4  He writes:
A letter was also sent to a select list of prominent men and women 
and to a number of the country’s leading law schools over my signa-
ture. The letter inquired of the addressee whether he or she believed 
that the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide would apply to the situation of the Negro in 
the United States. One letter was sent to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, as 
head of the U.S. delegation of the UN Human Rights Commission.
Replies came from all sides. Interestingly enough, they were, in 
the main, along the color line. A majority of the Negroes polled be-
lieved that the Genocide Convention should be invoked; a majority 
of the white liberals and personalities were of a contrary view. …
Without exception, faculty members at law schools were ad-
amantly opposed to the genocide charges. Most of them were in 
favor of the Genocide Convention as an abstract statement of law 
but rejected any attempt to apply it, declaring that such an attack 
impeached the integrity of our nation.5 And this was the consen-
sus of the replies we received from white liberals in general.
Among those who replied was Professor Lemkin, “ father” of the 
Genocide Convention. … How an honest person viewing the Amer-
ican scene impartially could come to any conclusion other than that 
forms of genocide were being practiced in the United States was dif-
ficult for us to see.
Professor Lemkin experienced no such difficulty. In a consid-
erable correspondence with me,6 he argued vehemently that the 
provisions of the Genocide Convention bore no relationship to the 
U.S. Government or its position vis-à-vis Black citizens.7 Lemkin 
and other law professors and practicing attorneys were evidently 
fearful of criticizing a government in relation to its Black citizens 
was a disgrace to civilized mankind.8
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Several pages later, he continued his critique:
Across the Atlantic, Paul Robeson and other members of the CRC 
who accompanied him had presented copies of the petition to the 
officers of the UN Secretariat. The event was reported in the New 
York Times of December 18, 1951.
The Times had also taken the trouble to elicit the view of Dr. 
Lemkin at Yale. His anti-Soviet opinions proved of more signifi-
cance to the Times than the words he had written into the Geno-
cide Convention. Dr. Lemkin, according to the Times, said: “The 
accusations were a maneuver to divert attention from the crimes 
of genocide committed against Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, 
Poles, and other Soviet-subjugated peoples.” Lemkin branded Paul 
Robeson and me as “un-American elements serving a foreign pow-
er.” This was a procedure that was to be repeated many times. Dr. 
Lemkin was attempting to put the shoe he held on the wrong foot.9
 
However, after carefully examining my own extensive cataloguing of more 
than twenty thousand pages of Lemkin’s papers, including vast numbers 
of copies of letters to persons all over the world, neither William L. Pat-
terson nor the Civil Rights Congress—nor the petition We Charge Geno-
cide—have yet to surface, raising serious doubts, not only about Mr. Pat-
terson’s critique of Lemkin’s position, but also about his use of the phrase 
“considerable correspondence” with someone who literally saved copies of 
every letter written or received as well as numerous other documents.10
If, however, his comments are accurate with regard to his undiscov-
ered correspondence with Lemkin, what are we to conclude? As noted 
below, Lemkin’s reluctance to criticize his adopted country was of a piece 
with his desire to do everything within his power to ensure the passage 
and later adoption/ratification of the UN Genocide Convention by the 
United States. That orientation, coupled with the increasing rift between 
the United States and the Soviet Russia after the Second World War and 
the beginning of the Cold War, more than likely factored into that re-
luctance as well. Adding to that negativity must have been the common 
understanding in the American press and other venues that identified Pat-
terson, Paul Robeson, and the CRC itself as Communists all, resulting in 
Lemkin’s New York Times comments.
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More germane to the topic at hand, however, four questions present 
themselves: who was William L. Patterson? What was contained within 
the We Charge Genocide petition directed at the United Nations? What be-
came of the petition? And what about reparations for African-Americans?
William L. Patterson
William L. Patterson was born on 27 August 1891,11 in San Francisco, and 
died on 5 March 1980 in New York City. Graduating from high school in 
Mill Valley, California, at age twenty, the first African-American to do so, 
he went on to study at the University of California Hastings College of Law 
in 1915, where he received his law degree in 1919, and afterwards joined the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).12 
It was during this period that he read the writings of W. E. B. Du Bois, 
American sociologist, historian, civil rights activist, Pan-Africanist, auth-
or, and editor, and A. Philip Randolph, a leader in the African-American 
civil rights movement, the American labour movement, and Socialist pol-
itical parties. Though he flirted with Socialism, the result of a trip to Lon-
don, he ultimately became a committed member of the Communist Party 
USA, largely the result of the notorious Sacco-Vanzetti case. It should also 
be noted that his mother, Mary Galt Patterson, born in 1850, had been 
a slave and spent her childhood on a plantation in Virginia, as had her 
mother and her grandmother. His father was James Edward Patterson, 
born in the British West Indies, in Kingstown (the capital of St. Vincent), 
who initially earned his living smuggling Chinese into the United States, 
and who later became a Seventh Day Adventist missionary to the island of 
Tahiti, abandoning his family for long periods of time. There were three 
additional brothers and a sister by his mother’s previous marriage. It was, 
however, his maternal grandfather, William Galt, whose influence upon 
him was evident, as he writes:
William Galt took part in other great liberation battles, prepared 
anti-racist conferences and conventions, helped fight civil rights 
cases through the state and federal courts in valiant efforts to 
make the Emancipation Proclamation and post-Civil War con-
stitutional amendments instruments for freedom. It was of great 
political importance that California come into the Union as a free 
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state, and Negroes, both escaped slaves and freed Black men, par-
ticipated in that fight. There was a victory but not a complete one. 
The democracy preached to Black men, Mexican Americans and 
Indians did not come with statehood, and few white Americans 
who fought for statehood were concerned with a fight for democ-
racy for all the people.13
Moving to Harlem after returning to the United States, he opened a law of-
fice in 1923 with two friends with a primary legal focus on those who were 
wrongfully accused of criminal acts. It was during this period that he met 
and became lifelong friends with Paul Robeson, African-American singer 
and actor who became involved with the civil rights movement. Two of the 
more famous cases in which he was involved were those of the anarchists 
Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti who were unjustly executed in 1927 
for the supposed murders of two men, and for whom, in support, Patterson 
was himself arrested on the picket line; as well as the infamous case of 
the “Scottsboro (Alabama) Boys,” in which nine young African-American 
men were falsely charged and convicted of the rape of two white women on 
a train in 1931 (as of 2013, all had had their convictions overturned or were 
granted pardons by the Alabama legislature). In the 1960s, he was also 
involved in the defence of black Communist activist Angela Davis, today 
a professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and the Black Pan-
thers, a radical Socialist liberation organization founded by Huey Newton 
and Bobby Seale, and whose original title was the Black Panther Party for 
Self-Defense.
After the deaths of Sacco and Vanzetti, Patterson travelled to Soviet 
Russia on more than one occasion, initially enrolling in the Far East 
University and participating in the Sixth Comintern Congress in Mos-
cow during his time there (1928), experiencing, according to him, no dis-
crimination whatsoever on account of his black skin. In 1930, he also at-
tended the World Conference against Racism and Anti-Semitism in Paris, 
where he again met his third wife, Louise Thompson (to whom he was first 
introduced in 1919 in Oakland), friend and collaborator of famed black 
poet Langston Hughes.
Returning to the United States, he initially resumed his law practice 
in New York, after a brief sojourn in Pittsburgh, before moving to Chicago 
in 1938 and actively working with the Communist Party USA, and later 
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becoming the executive secretary of the International Labor Defense (ILD) 
and founder of the CRC, which merged the ILD and the National Federa-
tion for Constitutional Liberties in 1946, becoming its national executive 
secretary in 1949, and putting his legal training to good use in a number of 
cases, successful and unsuccessful, involving innocent black defendants. 
In 1951, he and ninety-two other petitioners, along with his wife Louise, 
presented “A Petition to the United Nations” both at the UN Secretariat in 
New York and the General Assembly in Paris entitled We Charge Geno-
cide: The Crime of the Government against the Negro People, and in Patter-
son’s own words “becoming the first organization in history to charge the 
Government of the United States with the crime of genocide.”14 In 1952, he 
received an award from the International Fur and Leather Workers Union 
“In recognition of [his] devotion to the cause of Constitutional rights and 
for outstanding contributions in the struggle against genocide.”
In 1971, he published his autobiography, The Man Who Cried Geno-
cide, with the left-leaning New York publishing house International Pub-
lishing Company, whose website today (www.intpubnyc.com) advertises 
“Books to Help You Understand and Change the World!” and notes espe-
cially titles by “[Karl] Marx and [Friedrich] Engels, and selected books by 
[Nicolai] Lenin and other Marxist scholars and activists.”
Patterson remained active in civil rights causes throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s. He died in 1980 at age eighty-nine.
“We Charge Genocide”
In printed form (239 pages plus 5 appendices15), We Charge Genocide: 
The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the 
United States Government Against the Negro People, opens with an un-
dated photograph of “two young Negro men”—Dooley Morton and Bert 
Moore—“murdered in a brutal double lynching” in Columbus, Mississip-
pi, and captioned on the obverse “The Face of Genocide,” and with the 
further explanation, “Such horrifying violence is only one of the many 
crimes against the Negro people of the United States which together form 
the major crime of genocide.”16 Prior to Patterson’s introduction, articles 
2 and 3 of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide are included, as well as the names and states of the 
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more than ninety petitioners,17 and a page entitled “New Acts of Genocide” 
summarizing ten additional cases. 
The petition is itself divided into four parts: “The Opening Statement,” 
“The Law and the Indictment,” “The Evidence,” and, obviously, the centre-
piece of the Petition itself, and “Summary and Prayer.”18
In his introduction, Patterson decries a “record of mass slayings on the 
basis of race,” and correctly notes that the crime of genocide, as defined 
by the UN convention, includes a racial group as one of its four victim 
groups, and that the destruction in part of such a group constitutes geno-
cide. He further argues that “the oppressed Negro citizens of the United 
States, segregated, discriminated against and long the target of violence, 
suffer from genocide as a result of the consistent, conscious, unified policies 
of every branch of government.”19 Thus was the petition submitted to the 
UN against the United States in an attempt to charge the latter with vio-
lating both the UN Charter and the convention itself. (It should also be 
stressed that, at the time of the petition’s submission, the United States was 
not a signatory to the Genocide Convention. That would not occur until 
1988, under the presidency of Ronald Reagan.)
In defending this action, Patterson states that the CRC is “rendering a 
service of inestimable value to progressive mankind,” a leftist phrase of the 
1950s and one fully associated with the American Communist Party, of 
which he was an active member. Waxing somewhat eloquently, Patterson 
further writes that the petition “will speak with a tongue of fire loosing an 
unquenchable moral crusade, the universal response to which will sound 
the death knell of all racist theories.”20
And thus, Patterson and the CRC “call upon the United Nations to act 
and to call the Government of the United States to account.”21 Going even 
further, and perhaps too ambitiously, he states:
We [the CRC] believe that this program [i.e., petition] can go far 
toward ending the threat of a third world war. We believe it can 
contribute to the establishment of a people’s democracy22 on a uni-
versal scale.23
Part 1, “The Opening Statement,” includes “a Review of the Case and an 
Offer of Proof, giving something of the scope and historical background 
of the genocide being committed against the Negro people of the United 
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States.” What then follows is a description of the situation of blacks in 
the American South during the 1940s, including “Klan Terror,” “Mental 
Harm,” “Denial of the Right to Vote,” “Typical Cases” resulting in death, 
and “Other Race Matters.”
Part 2, “The Law and the Indictment,” is a review of the history of 
the Genocide Convention, the legitimacy and applicability of the plain-
tiffs’ petition (being neither a nation-state nor a government),24 and the 
indictment itself, further detailing how the various parts of the Genocide 
Convention apply in the case of African-Americans.
Part 3, “The Evidence,” is a 137-page record of 
Various acts of genocide against the Negro people of the United 
States from January 1, 1945 to June 1951, chronologically arranged 
under those articles and provisions of the Genocide Convention 
which they violate.25
It ends with a listing of those persons, organizations, and institutions guilty 
of complicity under article 3 (e) of the Genocide Convention, and includes 
the president, Congress, Supreme Court, attorney general, Department 
of Justice, eleven southern states, the KKK, “the Morgan, Rockefeller, Du 
Pont, and Mellon interests” (as spelled out in appendix 3), and the follow-
ing individuals: James Byrnes and J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina; 
Fielding L. Wright, John Rankin, and James O. Eastland of Mississippi; 
Herman Talmadge of Georgia; and Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana—all ac-
cused of racist white supremacist statements and incitements to violence.
For the petitioners, as expressed in the summary, there was no doubt 
that genocide was being practiced against fifteen million African-Amer-
icans and that this was a criminal act. Though today’s scholarly commun-
ity appears to be of two minds—i.e., that while cultural genocide was very 
much in evidence in the story of the Africans brought to the United States 
as slaves, there was little to no intention of physical genocide as economic 
interests, especially in the American South, took precedence. And while 
the disagreements continue, the “African-American story” does not appear 
in the contemporary literature on genocide as a central focus.26 As regards 
Lemkin himself, in his (incomplete) three volume History of Genocide, the 
plight of blacks was to be as follows: part 1, “Antiquity”; part 2, “Middle 
Ages,” chapter 8, “Genocide Against the Moors and Moriscos”; part 3, 
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“Modern Times,” chapter 1, “Genocide against the Native Africans”; chap-
ter 3, “Belgian Congo”; chapter 11, “Hereros”; chapter 12, “Hati”; and chap-
ter 13, “Hottentos.”27 Unfortunately, only part 2, chapter 8, on the Moors 
and Moriscos, part 3, chapter 1 on the native Africans, and chapter 11 on 
the Hereros were completed and now published in Lemkin on Genocide 
(2012).28 Significantly, and returning to Patterson’s negative comments in 
the introduction, no chapter on the plight of African-Americans was part 
of Lemkin’s outline.29
At the heart of We Charge Genocide, as presented in the summary, was 
the following:
We ask that the General Assembly of the United Nations find and 
declare by resolution that the Government of the United States is 
guilty of the crime of Genocide against the Negro people of the 
United States and that it further demand that the government of 
the United States stop and prevent the crime of Genocide.
We further ask that the General Assembly by resolution con-
demn the Government of the United States for failing to implement 
and observe its solemn international obligations under the Char-
ter of the United Nations and the Genocide Convention and that 
the General Assembly also demand that the United States imme-
diately take effective steps to carry out and fulfill its international 
obligations under the Charter and the Genocide Convention. 
In Part II of this petition we asked, and now ask again, for 
action under Article VIII of the Genocide Convention which 
provides that a contracting party can “call upon the competent 
organs of the United Nations to take action under the Charter for 
the prevention and suppression of acts of Genocide.”30 
 
Significantly—and one would think by design—no appeal was made to 
the UN Security Council, where the United States remains one of the five 
permanent members with veto power.
Further, an appeal is made that “a contracting party (i.e., a nation-state) 
now make our case its own,” and “call upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations to take action.”31 None did so given the post–Second World 
War and Cold War realities of the time.32
Two additional appeals conclude the text:
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In addition we asked in Part II of this petition, and now ask again, 
that any dispute as to the applicability of the Genocide Conven-
tion to the crime here alleged be submitted to the International 
Court of Justice in accordance with Article IX of the Genocide 
Convention. …
We ask now, therefore, that the General Assembly take steps 
to assure that prevention. And we ask, finally, for whatever other 
measures shall be deemed proper by the General Assembly, under 
the Charter of the United Nations and the Genocide Convention, 
to assure the safety of the Negro people of the United States. In so 
doing it will contribute to the peace of the world.33
As Gerald Horne, author of Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 
1946–1956, writes:
The genocide petition whipped up the kind of necessary pressure 
that led to the final cracking of the spine of Old Jim Crow.
What was this book that stirred so much contention? There 
were two elements that made it important and attention-getting. 
First of all presented in the form of an “Opening Statement,” 
“The Law and Indictment,” “The Evidence,” and a “Summary and 
Prayer,” Patterson and his colleagues presented a devastating ar-
gument on the impact of U.S. policies toward Blacks.
Secondly, this argument reached an international audience in 
that it was presented to the United Nations. At a time when Wash-
ington was charging the USSR and its allies with all manner of hu-
man rights deprivations, Patterson’s indictment hit with the force 
of a rifle shot between the eyes and set U.S. foreign policy back 
on its heels. No wonder that Patterson’s passport was confiscated 
upon his return from Paris after having presented the petition.34
What Became of the Petition?
As Patterson said, the petition was presented both in New York at the UN 
Secretariat by a delegation headed by Paul Robeson, and, at the same time, 
by Patterson himself at the General Assembly meeting in Paris. Ultim-
ately, it was scuttled, largely due to the efforts of US emissaries and none 
5 | “WE CHARGE GENOCIDE” 135
other than Eleanor Roosevelt, head of the UN Human Rights Commission 
who, three years earlier, had scored a major coup with the passage of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948.35 Though 
very much in favour of the petition, at least initially, Mrs. Roosevelt would 
come to reject its going forward. One can thus only conclude that her 
international prestige and seeming political ability to “work the system” 
at the UN led to its going nowhere, and its relegation to the dustbin of 
history. Whatever advances the United States has made in the area of race 
relations in the aftermath of the turbulent 1960s, and the passage of the US 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was signed into law by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson on 2 July of that year, have been accomplished independent of We 
Charge Genocide. Presented a decade before the violence of the civil rights 
struggle, one would be hard-pressed today to find persons who suffered 
and endured those horrors who were even familiar with the petition.
Patterson, in his autobiography, does, however, include an excerpt 
from a lengthy interview given by Mrs. Roosevelt to William Rutherford36 
of the New York Amsterdam News and the Associated Negro Press on 12 
January 1951:
When questioned about the petition charging the United States 
with genocide, which the Civil Rights Congress headed by Wil-
liam L. Patterson has been trying to present to the United Nations, 
Mrs. Roosevelt commented that it was “well done as a petition … 
(and was) based on sound and good documentation. (It) was not 
presented with spurious reasoning.
She went on to add: “The charge of genocide against the col-
ored people in America is ridiculous [sic] in terms of the Unit-
ed Nations definition.” Her reasons were (1) although the Negro 
death rate is high in America, so is the birth rate; (2) although 
sickness and diseases carry off more colored people than in other 
groups, a real effort is being made to overcome this.
Mrs. Roosevelt thought that in spite of these objections, the 
petition would do some good in focusing world attention on the 
bad situation in America. She also expressed the fear that the pe-
tition would play into the hands of some Southerners who would 
like nothing better than to institute genocide against the Negro 
people.37
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It is sadly ironic that the very document which she championed—the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights—contains within it the following 
articles:
2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration, without discrimination of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth, or other status.38
4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave 
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
5: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.
16.1: Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to 
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found 
a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution.39
26.2: Education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understand-
ing, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious 
groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for 
the maintenance of peace.40
What about Reparations? 
Nowhere in Patterson’s autobiography or the petition itself does the word 
“reparation” appear. Nor does it appear in the index to The Man Who Cried 
Genocide. Nor does it appear in Laurence Mordecai Thomas’s comparative 
text Vessels of Evil: American Slavery and the Holocaust.41 Substituting 
the word “restitution” for “reparation,” however, it does appear in Randall 
Robinson’s at times controversial book The Debt: What America Owes to 
Blacks, specifically chapter 9, “Thoughts about Restitution.”42 (Robinson is 
an African-American lawyer, author, activist, and founder of TransAfrica, 
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a think tank addressing American foreign policy as it relates to Africa and 
the African diaspora, which he founded in 1977, and today serves as dis-
tinguished scholar-in-residence at the Pennsylvania State University Dick-
inson School of Law, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.)
Robinson begins by reminding his readers that Representative John 
Conyers (D-MI), himself an African-American, annually introduces 
legislation for a “Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for Afri-
can-Americans” which, for more than a decade, continues to die within 
committee, never making it onto the floor of the US House of Representa-
tives. Robinson then cites other failed instances of the case for reparations 
in recent American history, largely attributing it to an “out of sight, out of 
mind” attitude, and strenuously arguing that it remains an unpaid debt 
to the children and grandchildren of those brought to the United States 
as slaves and enslaved for almost three hundred years. But nowhere in his 
book does he cite either William Patterson or We Charge Genocide.
He does, however, cite the two most well-known examples of suc-
cessful reparations: the case of Jews after the Holocaust and the case of 
Japanese-Americans after the Second World War, and he references a 1993 
document of the Organization of African Unity which acknowledges both.
Canadian scholar Rhoda Howard-Hassmann, in an important arti-
cle entitled “Getting to Reparations: Japanese Americans and Africans,” 
reminds us that “framing claims for reparations requires decisions about 
who is the perpetrator of a wrong, who is the victim, what exactly is the 
wrong to be compensated, and what are the reparations desired.”43 And 
while acknowledging the efforts led by Robinson, weak as they are, she 
says, in the case of African-Americans, the situation is even more compli-
cated than that of Japanese-Americans, and suggests that there is not one 
phase being addressed but three: slavery, Jim Crow (post–Civil War to the 
Second World War), and the post–Second World War period. Going even 
further, she states:
The African American claim faces two major difficulties. First, it 
is difficult to frame the call for reparations in a convincing man-
ner because many of the victims are long since dead, there are too 
many of them, and they cannot easily be identified. Second, the 
causal chain between past harms and present victims is too long 
and too complex, with too many actors and events implicated.44
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Returning, however, to Patterson and his petition, we do not have any in-
sight whatsoever as to whether or not reparations was on his agenda or 
that of the CRC, only that the United Nations was asked to find the United 
States guilty for its failures to implement and observe its obligations under 
both the UN Charter and the Genocide Convention (again acknowledging 
that, at the time, the United States was not a signatory to the convention); 
to further stop and prevent genocide of its African-American people; and 
to ensure that the appropriate “organs of the UN” (which we assume to 
mean its various agencies and commissions) were to take action (again 
not defined) to stop the ongoing genocide. Reparations do not appear to 
be part of this mandate, and there is simply no evidence that Patterson the 
attorney was thinking in these terms
To be sure, with the “success” of the State of Israel and individual Jews 
and Jewish organizations (e.g. the Claims Conference) and Japanese-Amer-
icans, other victims of genocide—Armenians, Bosnians, Darfuris, Native 
Americans, Hereros, Rwandans— and their allies have begun to raise sim-
ilar claims, but their voices are still somewhat muted and their plaints have 
not yet entered the international court system. 
Whether or not the racist practices of the United States in bringing un-
willing and captive Africans to these shores in the 1600s, enslaving them 
for nearly three hundred years, and continuing to disadvantage them from 
the Emancipation Proclamation of 1865 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is 
a clear-cut case of genocide is still open to debate, even if that debate does 
not occupy centre stage in the emerging field of genocide studies. What 
is not open to debate, however, is that, given the political climate of the 
1950s, the failure of the UN to allow the petition We Charge Genocide to 
go forward accords it no honour. Just as the failure of the United States to 
fully address its own past in the case of both its African-American and 
Native American population carries with it a historical stain worthy of 
seeing the light of day if remedies, solutions, future preventions—and rep-
arations—are to have any meaning whatsoever.
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“A Tragedy to be Sure”: Heteropatriarchy, 
Historical Amnesia, and Housing Crises 
in Northern Ontario
Travis Hay, Kristin Burnett, and Lori Chambers
Introduction 
In October of 2012, the Grand Chief of the Mushkegowuk Council (a 
regional chief ’s council representing seven First Nations located in the 
western James Bay and Hudson Bay region) signed an official Declara-
tion of Emergency in response to housing crises in the communities of 
Kashechewan, Attawapiskat, and Fort Albany. During the ensuing media 
frenzy, conservative news outlets such as the National Post and Sun Media 
focused almost exclusively on Attawapiskat and its Chief, Theresa Spen-
ce.1 Among Canadian settler society, Kashechewan and Fort Albany dis-
appeared from the public view, and what was going on (or not going on) 
at Attawapiskat took centre stage. This chapter interrogates the complex 
social and political meanings ascribed to the housing crisis in Attawapis-
kat in the dominant Canadian media; specifically, we situate the structural 
history of the housing crises on northern First Nations reserves alongside 
an ideological or discursive history of settler-colonial disavowal.2 
Our examination of media coverage in this chapter does not represent 
the breadth and the heterogeneity of news reporting across Canada during 
this period; rather, it focuses on the backlash to Theresa Spence’s protest as 
a means of illuminating certain structures of feeling and logic that inform 
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settler colonialism at its worst.3 Thus, while we briefly critique the institu-
tional policies and material conditions that produced the housing crises 
in northern First Nations communities, we think it is equally important 
to understand the ideological conditions that made the state of emergency 
possible. As Taiaike Alfred writes, “colonialism is, more than anything 
else … a way of thinking about something fundamental to who we are as 
a society: the relationship between the past and the present, between the 
newcomers and the original people of this land.”4 On that basis, we argue 
that the sexist and racist discourse that framed these events emerged from 
a particular constellation of masculinist and settler-colonialist hetero-
patriarchal thought that has been well theorized by Indigenous feminists 
such as Lee Maracle, Paula Gunn Allen, and Janice Acoose.5 
The scope of our conversation is limited to the realm of representation 
and the meaning-making processes that depoliticized the genocidal vio-
lence experienced by these three northern First Nations. As settlers we are 
deeply embedded in the systems of violence and discourses of disavowal 
that we are critiquing in this chapter. Indeed, we are the system’s intended 
beneficiaries. Accordingly, we cannot communicate how the people of the 
Attawapiskat First Nation or other northern Cree communities experi-
enced or felt about these events. We acknowledge that Indigenous peoples’ 
perspectives and reactions to Chief Spence were diverse—many people 
supported her, some did not, and many others fell somewhere in between. 
For the majority of the Canadian population removed from the reality of 
Attawapiskat both literally and conceptually, media representations—in-
formed by settler discourse and white supremacy—fashioned the colonial 
grammars through which Canadians came to know and understand cur-
rent events and the history of the community.6 
As the housing crisis began to loom large in national and international 
media coverage, we saw in action how media discourses were “critical in 
determining who exercise[d] authority and who accept[ed] it.”7 In this 
instance, the state transformed the “raw historical event” into a “com-
municative event,”8 and created a story that was palatable for the dominant 
society and which resonated with pre-existing narratives about poverty 
in First Nations communities. Media discourses with regard to Attawap-
iskat placed the “problem” of Indigenous governance and corruption on 
the public agenda, thereby erasing the long colonial history that had cre-
ated the poverty and housing crisis by offering an image of Chief Spence 
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that embodied many of the most pernicious and colonialist stereotypes 
of Indigenous women and political leaders. In so doing, many Canadian 
media outlets failed to situate the housing crisis within the larger geno-
cidal history of settler colonialism in Canada; they preferred instead to 
blame Indigenous peoples for this historical and deeply political violence. 
Thus, when the media drew on historical examples, they did so in a man-
ner that reiterated the myth that Canada is a benevolent nation that has 
always treated Indigenous peoples in a just and righteous manner. Such 
a myth disguises the fact that as settler Canadians we live on lands stolen 
from Indigenous peoples and we continue to benefit from settler-colonial 
systems of apartheid, marginalization, and genocide. In denaturalizing 
the dominant narrative, then, we seek to outline the contours, nature, 
and structure of Canadian settler-colonial ideologies, and critically dis-
cuss how the media not only denied the deeper historical meanings and 
particularities behind Spence’s hunger strike, but also obscured how her 
actions were symbolic of a larger Indigenous struggle against Canadian 
settler colonialism.
The scorn that was directed at Chief Spence revealed the deep 
pathological denial of colonialism and genocide that has prevented and 
continues to prevent a more accurate representation and deeper under-
standing of Canada’s national history. The words of one journalist reveal 
the utter failure of Canadian settler society to see how the past shapes 
and informs the present. According to Lorne Gunter of the National 
Post, although the situation in Attawapiskat was “a tragedy to be sure … 
political correctness is the root cause. It has paralyzed our political and 
bureaucratic establishments against taking the bold action necessary to 
give aboriginal-Canadians a fresh start.”9 Thus, instead of genocidal rela-
tions and colonial violence, what settlers saw, and indeed expected, were 
clichéd racist and gendered stereotypes that confirmed the innocence of 
settler Canadians.10 As our discursive analysis of Canadian news media 
reveals, the constructions of Chief Spence and her actions can be read 
contrapuntally to show the deep connections between colonialism and 
patriarchy. Representations of the protest followed a deeply racialized and 
gendered logic that constructed Chief Spence as the stereotypically cor-
rupt band council chief as well as the stereotypical “Indian” woman. As 
Audra Simpson notes, “when you are an Indigenous woman, your flesh is 
received differently.”11 
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Canadian-settler exercises of governance have as their condition of 
historical emergence a long intellectual history of understanding Indigen-
ous peoples as less than human (or at least as less than white settlers). 
These ways of knowing are destructive of what Sherene Razack called “sup-
pressed knowledges,” which is based on an “experience of the world that 
is not admitted into dominant knowledge paradigms.” However, they are 
also constructive of ideas about Indigenous difference.12 As Joyce Green 
writes, settler colonialism is “legitimized not only through racist con-
struction but through creation of language celebrating colonial identities 
while constructing the colonized as the antithesis of human decency and 
development.”13 Such rhetorical strategies—what Emma LaRocque calls 
“discourses of dehumanization”14—are as central to the maintenance of 
the Canadian settler-colonial project as the more physical and institu-
tional manifestations of Indian policy. Thus, while we review the material 
history of colonialism and the structures of band funding in Canada to 
dispel some of the more popular myths and rumours circulated about 
Chief Spence, we also seek to make visible those colonial grammars that 
efface, obscure, elide, and disregard the genocidal policies that have cre-
ated repeated crises and emergencies in Attawapiskat and other northern 
Indigenous communities. As we shall see (and as numerous Indigenous 
feminist scholars have explained at length), the racial grammars and logics 
of settler-colonial genocide reveal themselves as profoundly gendered, 
masculinist, and heteropatriarchal. 
A Note on the Conceptual Limits of “Hunger Strike”
The term “hunger strike,” widely used by the media to describe Chief 
Spence’s protest, operates as a sign or placeholder in a semiotic system of 
the Canadian media. In our schema, the term refers not to the reality of 
Spence’s protest, but to the representation of that event within the settler 
imaginary. In this respect, we draw on the knowledge and words of Anish-
naabeg scholar, writer, and storyteller Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, 
who reminded readers in the midst of Chief Spence’s protest of the deep 
symbolic importance that fish broth holds for many Indigenous peoples 
living in the geographical area now called Canada. Chief Spence’s decision 
to subsist mainly on fish broth prompted more journalists than can be 
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counted to claim confidently that this was not a “real” or “true” hunger 
strike. However, as Simpson explains,
[fish broth] symbolizes hardship and sacrifice. It symbolizes the 
strength of our ancestors. It means survival. Fish broth sustained 
us through the hardest of circumstances, with the parallel under-
standing that it can’t sustain one forever. We exist today because 
of fish broth. It connects us to the water and to the fish who gave 
up its life so we could sustain ourselves.15
 
Thus, “Chief Spence [ate] fish broth because, metaphorically, colonialism 
has kept Indigenous Peoples on a fish broth diet for generations upon gen-
erations.”16 A “hunger strike” is a conceptual category deeply embedded 
within a Western historicity that is productive of the same power relations 
challenged by Chief Spence’s protest; it is an outside predicate foisted onto 
the event that carries with it a kind of discursive baggage or historical ex-
cess that has done more to cover up the reality of Chief Spence’s leadership 
than to illuminate it.17 Acknowledging the historical specificity of Chief 
Spence’s protest, we use the term “hunger strike” only when it is employed 
by journalists or when making direct reference to their comments and 
constructions of the events in question. Our usage of the term is meant to 
mark the difference between representation and reality.
Defining Genocide and Atrocity in the Canadian 
Context
In this chapter, we treat the housing crises in Cree communities in north-
ern Ontario as a manifestation of the continued genocidal project of Can-
adian settler colonialism. However, we want to begin by suggesting that 
the persistence of definitional debates surrounding the concept of “geno-
cide” is counterproductive and indeed destructive to the formulation of 
an effective resistance to the ongoing colonial violence against Indigenous 
peoples on Turtle Island. Such debates serve only to reify and legitimize 
the profound denial in which non-Indigenous settlers live. Admitting and 
owning the benefits accrued from centuries of colonialism and genocidal 
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policies would destroy the comfort zone of many settlers. To better illus-
trate our perspective we employ storytelling. 
The genesis of this volume was a conference held at Mount Royal Uni-
versity in February of 2014 entitled “Understanding Atrocities.” During 
the conference, attendees were privileged to have the opportunity to hear 
from a Residential School Survivor about his experiences. Speaking on 
a panel with genocide scholars, the Elder shared his story of survivance 
and resistance that, while ultimately life-affirming and triumphant, also 
spoke of trauma and brutality. During the question period that followed, 
an individual, whom we will not identify, raised his hand to caution the 
room against the naming of the Indian Residential School system as an 
act of genocide. According to this individual, residential schools were not 
real “death camps” like those that existed in Nazi-occupied Europe during 
World War Two because, he argued, it was not the primary purpose of 
residential schools to bring about the physical or biological destruction 
of Indigenous peoples. Putting aside for the moment how offensive and 
inappropriate it is for someone to advise a Residential School Survivor 
how they should know and feel about their experiences, this incident also 
spoke to the frequent and insidious ways in which exclusive definitional 
debates characterize the professional and popular discourses of settler-col-
onial genocide in the Canadian context. These comments compelled us to 
wonder: What motivated this person to tell a Residential School Survivor 
how he should understand his experiences? In thinking through these and 
other questions, we found resonance in the following words from Israel 
Charney: 
For me, the passion to exclude this or that mass killing from the 
universe of genocide, as well as the intense competition to establish 
the exclusive “superiority” or unique form of any one genocide, 
ends up creating a fetishistic atmosphere in which the masses of 
bodies that are not to be qualified for the definition of genocide are 
dumped into a conceptual black hole, where they are forgotten.18
 
In a later conversation, the individual mentioned in the story above ac-
knowledged his exclusivist tendencies, questioned his own motivations for 
evicting residential schooling from what Charney called “the universe of 
genocide,” and admitted that the Elder’s experience was certainly a story 
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of having survived a genocide. While such an admission has no bearing 
on the ongoing nature of Canadian settler-colonial projects of Indigenous 
elimination (some of which we discuss in this chapter), the point we are 
trying to make is that participating in such debates regarding the defin-
itional difficulties of the crime of genocide are the privileged practices of a 
scholarly community far removed from such realities and experiences. As 
academics, we need to acknowledge the privilege of being able to partici-
pate in such debates at a safe distance, as well as recognize the epistemo-
logical violence that we risk creating and perpetuating in doing so. 
The Historical Context of the Housing Crises
The Attawapiskat First Nation is located at the mouth of the Attawapiskat 
River in northern Ontario, on the western shores of James Bay.19 It is a 
signatory of Treaty 9. The First Nation’s traditional territory extends out 
from the present-day reserve up the coast of Hudson Bay and stretches 
hundreds of kilometres inland.20 Year-round settlement did not take place 
until the late 1960s, and many families delayed settling permanently on 
the reserve because they did not want to send their children to the infam-
ous St. Anne’s Residential School (located in Fort Albany).21 A school—the 
J. R. Nakogee Elementary School—was finally built in Attawapiskat in 
1976.22 The history of the J. R. Nakogee Elementary School embodies the 
long history of neglect and indifference the First Nation has received from 
the federal government. In 1979, an industrial oil pipeline malfunctioned, 
leaking over 30,000 tons of diesel fuel directly under the school.23 Neither 
the federal and provincial governments nor the pipeline’s owners under-
took cleanup or restorative measures, although Health Canada ordered 
residences provided for the teachers to be torn down due to contamina-
tion.24 The school was not closed until May 2001, despite growing evidence 
of health concerns (many parents had long stopped sending their children 
to the school due to the prevalence of noxious fumes).25 Currently, classes 
are held in seven portables, which reside on top of the former school’s play-
ground. The portables are in deplorable condition: the doors do not close 
and the heating systems are broken, forcing students to wear their coats in 
the classrooms. 
A similar situation in Attawapiskat exists in regards to housing, and 
has unfortunately existed for so long that it has become normalized.26 
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Conditions of substandard housing, overcrowding, and homelessness are 
allowed to persist in northern First Nations because of commonly held, 
but patently false, beliefs that First Nations people get free housing on 
reserves.27 This assumption holds that market-based housing and home 
ownership is non-existent on reserves and that Indigenous peoples get 
special treatment from the government that amounts to “free housing.” 
While home ownership is certainly lower on reserve than off, it is still 
common (31 percent on reserve versus 69 percent off).28 Still further, the 
federal funding that subsidizes poor and under-housed peoples on reserve 
comes from the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation, which is 
the same institution that funds low-income housing off reserve. Thus, the 
state does not offer different or special treatment to Indigenous peoples on 
reserve, but enacts social welfare measures that attempt (so far extreme-
ly unsuccessfully) to mediate the severe poverty that characterizes life in 
many remote reserves. For example, the average on-reserve annual income 
is $16,160, and the cost of living in the North is substantively higher than 
in southern Canada.29 This information is key to understanding the rea-
sons why recent studies found that 41 percent of on-reserve housing stock 
in Ontario was inadequate or in need of major repair, with a further 5 
percent needing to be replaced entirely, or that 12 percent of on-reserve 
housing is not “serviced by any type of sewage disposal system, roughly 
eight percent have no electrical servicing, and about half of the on-reserve 
communities have either no solid waste disposal services or those servi-
ces that are provided are inadequate.”30 These are examples of what Adam 
Barker calls “the contemporary reality of Canadian imperialism.”31  
We also need to consider the discrepancies that exist in regards to how 
much federal and provincial money is spent on ensuring the well-being 
of settler Canadians and the existence of effective infrastructure in urban 
and reserve spaces. For example, federal, provincial, and municipal bud-
gets allocated $24,000 per citizen to provide programs and infrastructure 
to Torontonians. In contrast, Attawapiskat First Nation received money 
from just one source—Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
Canada (AANDC)—that amounted to $11,355 per person.32 Moreover, 
AANDC has also placed a cap on all core program expenditure increases 
at 2 percent a year.33 When combined with low annual incomes, high rates 
of poverty and unemployment, extraordinarily high costs of living, and 
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long-term government neglect, it is not surprising that the Attawapiskat 
First Nation declared a crisis in housing conditions in 2011. 
Seven years earlier, in 2004, the United Nations special rapporteur, 
Radolfo Staghaven, visited Attawapiskat and expressed his concerns over 
the housing crisis in the community; he noted a prevalence of poverty, 
toxic living conditions, and government underfunding.34 This was fol-
lowed in November 2007 by Miloon Kothari, United Nations special 
rapporteur on adequate housing, who also commented on the conditions 
of overcrowding, inadequate housing, and the lack of basic services like 
water and sanitation.35 These two reports were not the first time the federal 
government had been made aware of inadequate housing in First Nations 
communities, and northern First Nations especially. Reports by academ-
ics, health-care professionals, and non-governmental organizations have 
repeatedly called on the federal government to address First Nation’s 
housing needs and by extension Indigenous poverty.36 In 1996 the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples described on-reserve housing as “in a 
bad state,” and other studies have drawn clear connections between health, 
well-being, and housing.37 For instance, poor housing contributes to the 
spread of contagious diseases such as measles, intestinal, skin, and middle 
ear infections, as well as respiratory diseases such as tuberculosis, to name 
but a few.38 
In October 2009, Chief Theresa Hall made public her concerns over 
the lack of federal support for the recent sewage flood in Attawapiskat, and 
in November, an Elder from the community embarked upon a protest walk 
of over 100 kilometres to raise awareness for the housing crisis (with two 
artificial knees, no less).39 Taking office as Chief in August 2010, Theresa 
Spence was from the outset very vocal about her concerns regarding the 
lack of federal response to the previous two states of emergency. However, 
it was her decision on 28 October 2012 to declare a third state of emergency 
that brought her to the attention of the national media. 
Initially, this state of emergency garnered almost no media attention, 
and Ottawa, the provincial government, and aid agencies did not step 
forward to offer any assistance to the communities in crisis. It was not 
until 21 November 2012, when Charles Angus, member of Parliament for 
Timmins-James Bay, published an article and posted a video on YouTube 
showing a mother and her small children living in a shed in frigid tem-
peratures, that housing conditions in Attawapiskat made headline news. 
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Otherwise, it was business as usual in Canada. On 23 November 2012, 
the Red Cross announced that it would be sending a team to conduct a 
needs assessment in the community. The federal government responded 
by placing Attawapiskat under third-party management on 1 December 
2013. John Duncan, minister of aboriginal affairs, explained that Ottawa 
was taking this step to “ensure the funding provided to [the] community 
[was] being spent effectively,” suggesting that the community’s problems 
stemmed from mismanagement instead of underfunding.40 Later that Au-
gust, a federal court ruled that the decision to place the First Nation under 
third-party management “did not respond in a reasonable way to the root 
of the problems at Attawapiskat.” 41 The court ordered Ottawa to repay At-
tawapiskat for all costs accrued by the third-party manager.
From the very beginning, the federal government maintained that 
they were totally ignorant of living conditions in Attawapiskat. Duncan 
claimed to have been unaware of the extent of the housing crisis—even 
after two United Nations reports, two states of emergency, and the efforts 
of Shannen Koostachin, who had met with Duncan just that summer in 
regards to the need for a new school building in her community. Such as-
sertions of ignorance are difficult to believe, given that pursuant to section 
61 of the Indian Act, the minister of aboriginal affairs is responsible for 
approving all funding allocations. The media, however, accepted such dis-
avowals of responsibility and its coverage of Chief Spence’s efforts blamed 
her administration and its alleged mismanagement of funds for the com-
munity-housing crisis.42 On 12 December 2012, Spence announced her in-
tention to stop eating solid food until Prime Minister Stephen Harper and 
the governor general, the representative of the British Crown in Canada, 
agreed to a nation-to-nation meeting. 
The Corrupt Chief, or “The Crooked Indian”
Despite the very real problems faced by the community of Attawapiskat, 
journalistic responses were on the whole racist, dismissive, and stained 
by the well-worn assumptions that characterize settler discourses of de-
humanization. Of course, none of the stereotypes trotted out and perpetu-
ated by the mainstream media were new. The first and perhaps most com-
mon trope used by the media and promoted enthusiastically by the federal 
government to discredit Spence and distract non-Indigenous people from 
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the real problem was the stereotype of the corrupt band council, which 
suggests that all First Nations leaders are dishonest, nepotistic, and unable 
to manage themselves.43 Pam Palmater recently described this cliché in a 
piece titled “Stephen Harper and the Myth of the Crooked Indian”:
This racist stereotype is recycled again and again when Harper 
is pressed to account for the fourth world conditions in some 
First Nations. The response always seems to be: “Well, we gave 
them x million dollars, where did all the money go?” What Harp-
er never tells Canadians is that in giving First Nations x million 
dollars, he has given them half of what is needed to provide the 
specific program or service. Without all the facts, this propaganda 
serves to distance Canadians from First Nations.44
 
Essentially, the “crooked Indian” or “corrupt band council” stereotype im-
plies that Indigenous leaders steal money from honest white taxpayers to 
purchase luxury vehicles or million-dollar homes while their communities 
suffer.45 This stereotype suggests that Indigenous people are exclusively 
responsible for the poverty in their communities and that they lack real 
political leadership. 
Operating in concert with this stereotype are discussions of account-
ability and the lack thereof amongst First Nations politicians. This stereo-
type flourishes in mainstream Canadian discourse despite the fact that 
First Nations are overburdened by federal regulations that require con-
stant reporting. Indeed, Sheila Fraser, Canada’s auditor general, criticized 
the federal government for this excessive requirement, which amounted to 
ninety-five reports per First Nation every year, or one report every three 
days.46 Even so, journalists eagerly recited an orthodox racism that called 
Indigenous leaders irresponsible, unaccountable, and always asking for 
more than their fair share. Instead of government negligence, indifference, 
and settler colonialism being discussed as the root causes of poverty in the 
Canadian North, Chief Spence came to embody and signify all Indigen-
ous politicians: she was constructed as solely responsible for conditions 
in Attawapiskat (conditions that were almost a century in the making). 
A piece published in early January 2013 by Lorne Gunter of the National 
Post was emblematic of this oft-repeated falsehood when it described Chief 
Spence as failing to take ownership of her actions and accept responsibility 
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for living conditions in Attawapiskat. Gunter, who also gave the present 
chapter its titular quotation, suggested that “there [was] no recognition 
that much of the plight of Canada’s aboriginals is self-inflicted. In [Spen-
ce’s] mind and Idle minds, everything is the fault of government and 
non-aboriginals.”47 According to this journalist, childlike avoidance is a 
central feature of Indigenous peoples who have failed to take responsibility 
for the last five hundred years of colonialism and genocide. Or, as Kelly 
McParland of the National Post ignorantly penned, the reasons behind 
First Nations’ grievances are “difficult to comprehend, the origins lost in 
time.”48 McParland’s comments operate on several levels: they suggest that 
Indigenous peoples are unreasonable in their continued efforts to achieve 
justice and equality. The comments also draw on the oft-repeated notion 
that Indigenous peoples should just “get over it.” In this manner, settlers 
are rewriting and retelling history so that the dispossession of Indigen-
ous peoples is erased and can therefore go comfortably unacknowledged 
and conveniently forgotten.49 The tacit approval of a false history serves 
to strengthen the state of white supremacy in North America. To borrow 
from Thomas King’s recent work, The Inconvenient Indian, which stressed 
the importance of historical meaning-making, it is essential to remember 
that while “most of us think that history is the past. It’s not. History is 
the stories we tell about our past … [and] they’re not chosen by chance.”50 
Thus, when other people get to tell your stories, in “effect what they’re do-
ing is defining to the world who you are, what you are, and what they think 
you are and what they think you should be.”51 
The Gendered and Sexualized Logics of Settler-
Colonial Genocide
The construct of the corrupt and irresponsible band chief is also a highly 
gendered one and was employed together with the well-worn constructions 
of Indigenous womanhood as that which is licentious, dusky, and deviant. 
Numerous historians have shown that such racist and sexist representa-
tions of Indigenous women have been central to the socio-economic for-
mation of a settler society that “has no place for Indigenous women.”52 Sig-
nificantly, these scholars highlight how Indigenous women’s bodies are of-
ten used as the “mechanisms of oppression against whole communities.”53 
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Journalists focused on Chief Spence’s personal relationships, physical ap-
pearance, and the insistence that she was not undertaking a “real” hunger 
strike. In this last respect, she was routinely and unfavourably compared 
to famous male political figures such as Gandhi and Bobby Sands. Lar-
ry Miller—the Conservative MP who tastelessly compared the long gun 
registry in Canada to the legal regime of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party—of-
fers us one example of how the corrupt band council stereotype operates 
in the settler-colonial imaginary.54 Miller told the Toronto Sun that Chief 
Spence’s hunger strike was “nothing but another project of hers to divert 
attention away from what she and maybe some other officials in her band 
have done”; Miller claimed that Spence’s “people suffered because of some 
of the things she did. It isn’t from a lack of money from the federal govern-
ment, the provincial government or even the mine that’s in that part of the 
country.”55 Echoing Miller, Iain Hunter of the aptly named Times-Colonist 
(Victoria, BC) argued that the media’s coverage of Attawapiskat served as 
a useful reminder for Canadians because it drew “our attention to the fact 
that Spence lives in a ‘well-heated’ house on her reserve, drives a substan-
tial vehicle, has stayed in a hotel, not a tent, while in Ottawa, and her ‘boy-
friend’ has been making $850 a day as band manager.”56 This quotation 
neatly reproduces not only the stereotype of the corrupt band council chief 
who starves her own people at the expense of Canadian taxpayers, but 
also  the gendered logic of settler-colonial racism and its complicity with 
patriarchy. The special emphasis Hunter places on the word “boyfriend” 
signifies a symbolic order of North American colonial racism wherein the 
Indigenous woman is a degenerate figure who is sexualized, corruptible, 
and corrupting.
Christie Blatchford, well known for her anti-Indigenous op-ed pieces, 
went so far as to call Chief Spence a terrorist.57 Highly critical of the fact 
that Chief Spence’s partner, Clayton Kennedy, was allowed to hold an ad-
ministrative position with the band, Blatchford reported that, at the begin-
ning of Chief Spence’s administration, the two “were already common-law 
partners, or life partners as they prefer, and presumably sleeping together. 
But no one was aware that could be thought to be a conflict of interest?”58 
Originally published in the Regina Leader-Post, Blatchford’s article was so 
well received that it was republished in the Edmonton Journal, the Mont-
real Gazette, the Vancouver Sun, and the Star-Phoenix in Saskatoon (a 
good example of how one author’s work gets picked up and published by 
Travis Hay, Kristin Burnett, and Lori Chambers158
numerous Canadian newspapers). In her opinion piece (we refuse to call it 
journalism), Blatchford made connections between what she characterized 
as the inevitable and sneaky underhandedness of Indigenous womanhood 
and the failure of band governance. She wrote that “the revelation that 
the purportedly professional financial co-manager who was appointed 
by the  Attawapiskat  council … is none other than Chief Theresa  Spen-
ce’s boyfriend is a revelation of the order that the sun will rise in the east 
tomorrow.”59 Apparently, according to Blatchford and her audience, the 
“fact” that Indigenous female leaders are political and sexual deviants is as 
certain as the existence of gravity. 
Underscoring the gendered and sexually violent ideology of Can-
adian settler colonialism were the oft-repeated comments of conservative 
politicians and media commentators regarding Chief Spence’s body. For 
example, Ezra Levant of the Sun News Network (easily the most inflam-
matory and unapologetically racist media source during Spence’s protest) 
felt the need to comment sarcastically that “there is a lot of her to love,” and 
he also referred to her as having a “trademark double chin.”60 More fam-
ously, Senator Patrick Brazeau and Conservative MP Royal Galipeau made 
what can only under the most generous of interpretations be described as 
“fat jokes” at a fundraiser for the Conservative Party.61 As feminist scholar 
Susie Orbach writes, the identification of a woman as fat serves to immedi-
ately isolate and invalidate her: “almost inevitably, the explanations offered 
for fatness point a finger at the failure of women to control their weight, 
control their appetite, and control their impulses.”62 These comments on 
Chief Spence’s body thus revealed a blatant misogyny, but also a specific 
kind of settler-colonial masculinity that saw Chief Spence’s body as open 
to public censure and as a physical manifestation of the alleged weakness 
of her moral character or propensity to self-destructive indulgence. What 
is interesting outside the immediate context of our discussion here is the 
way in which fatphobia revealed itself in Brazeau’s comments to be a com-
plex component of a broader ideological structure that upholds settler-col-
onial regimes of racialized, gendered, sexualized, and body-based forms 
of oppression. Brazeau—an Indigenous man—recruited misogyny as a 
means of establishing an internal solidarity within the larger, white-dom-
inated Conservative Party of which, at the time, he was a member. In call-
ing attention to her body as a site of poor self-control, these politicians and 
media figures enacted an implicit denial of Chief Spence’s leadership and 
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legitimacy that was both colonial and patriarchal, and she was invalidat-
ed to the extent that masculinism, fatphobia, and lateral violence (read: 
Brazeau’s comments) constituted a settler-colonial configuration that 
sought to destroy and discredit the image of Chief Spence by any means 
necessary. This is why coverage during the end of her protest also claimed 
that, “prior to going on her fast on Dec. 11, Spence didn’t look like she’d 
missed many meals in her life.”63 Borrowing Sherene Razack’s words, these 
fatphobic and misogynist statements served to construct the Indigenous 
body “as the space of the greatest disorder” and thus reaffirmed the set-
tler-colonial desire for further control of Indigenous peoples by construct-
ing Chief Spence in particular—and Indigenous peoples in general—as 
unhealthy, out of control, and in need of outside help (which arrived in the 
form of third-party management). Of course, these continual comments 
about the physical body of Chief Spence also served the purpose of deny-
ing the authenticity of her protest. 
The objectification of Chief Spence’s body went hand-in-hand with the 
purported failure of Chief Spence to carry out what the media saw as a 
legitimate “hunger strike.” The media latched onto the information that 
Chief Spence would continue to ingest liquids and fish broth with shock-
ing vigour. For example, Ezra Levant wrote that
Gandhi never lasted more than 21 days on his hunger strikes. The 
IRA hunger strikers looked like skeletons by 26 days, and started 
dying weeks later. Not Spence—she’s still positively Rubenesque.64 
Not to be outdone, the Toronto Sun claimed that there was an obvious 
“irony in Spence’s hunger strike … hers is not an ideological gesture like 
those IRA hunger strikers who died for their cause, but a blackmail at-
tempt to force Harper to pay attention to her.”65 The important issue to note 
in these passages is the accusation of mimicry and the construction of a 
“real” hunger strike in relation to Chief Spence’s protest. In this misogyn-
ist representation, Chief Spence is said to desire attention from the male 
gaze. What is more, constant comparisons to men such as Gandhi or Sands 
deny Chief Spence’s political actions any rational, critical, or independ-
ent thought. Simultaneously, her protest is effectively removed from the 
broader historical context of Indigenous traditions. What is accomplished 
in these passages, then, is the complete removal of a sign from its cultural 
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context, and an elision of the historical specificity of Indigenous fasting as 
a mode of embodied resistance (as discussed by Simpson above). By sug-
gesting Chief Spence’s actions are a “failed diet,” the symbolic importance 
and historical context of drinking fish broth is made invisible under the 
settler-colonial gaze, and the image of Chief Spence on a hunger strike 
became nothing more than a sign that reinforces the original structural 
relationships and common-sense racisms of the settler-colonial project. 
Levant continually linked Chief Spence with the sexual and the in-
dulgent. Not only did he refer to her body as sexually provocative and vo-
luptuous when he described her as “Rubenesque”; in a tirade aired on Sun 
News Levant argued that “Idle No More is just an Aboriginal reboot of 
Occupy Wall Street. It has the same vague demands, summarized as ‘give 
us more free stuff.’ It has the same low-level criminality—Occupy illegal-
ly squatted in parks and was heavy into drug use and public sex.”66 This 
passage not only collapses Chief Spence’s protest into the Idle No More 
and Occupy movements, but also enacts an erasure of all non-conserva-
tive, contrapuntal politics. To Levant, all of these social rights movements 
signify the same fundamental alterity to law, order, progress, civilization, 
bodily integrity, and respectability. 
Together these specious opinion pieces construct Chief Spence as 
a lewd and licentious terrorist; they also reveal that there was a broad 
cross-section of the Canadian media that depicted Chief Spence as a kind 
of ultimate Other precisely because she was a political leader who was both 
Indigenous and a woman. The strength, determination, and righteousness 
with which she pursued her protest was, in the settler-colonial imaginary, 
an unsettling symbolic provocation that had to be reconstructed. In order 
to make these events understandable and palatable to settlers, deeply racist 
and sexist stereotypes had to be employed in order to avoid the events in 
Attawapiskat being seen for what they really are: genocide. 
Conclusion
As we see through reviewing these various passages, well-worn and deeply 
racist stereotypes and colonial constructions of corrupt band councils, In-
digenous womanhood, and inauthenticity worked to produce a network of 
meaning that Canadian settler society could attach to the protest in order 
to understand Indigenous peoples as plagued by selfishness, indulgence, 
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corruption, and bodily irresponsibility rather than as survivors of an on-
going genocide wherein the resilience of Indigeneity threatens the legitim-
acy of Canadian settler society. The Canadian media served as the vehicle 
through which settler Canadians conveniently rewrote the public record 
of the housing crises in the Canadian North. Indeed, the rewriting that 
took place in this instance was part of the larger pattern of conscious his-
torical reimagining that has enabled settlers to avoid the uncomfortable 
admission that land theft, broken treaties, the Indian Act, and other feder-
al policies have been primarily responsible for impoverishing Indigenous 
communities, destroying matrilineal systems of governance, and replacing 
them with so-called democratic band council systems that are always set 
up to fail. What we see in this recycling of unoriginal colonial stereotypes 
is an attempt to protect the image of Canada as a neoliberal, multicultur-
al paradise by dehumanizing Indigenous peoples. The fact that this de-
humanizing discourse was obviously articulated through the language of 
patriarchy and women-hating reveals the connections between patriarchy 
and colonialism theorized by Indigenous feminists who articulate sexual 
violence as the very logic of genocide. 
Indigenous feminist frameworks help to explain the otherwise curi-
ous conflation of band council stereotypes, constructions of Indigenous 
womanhood, and accusations of inauthenticity or mimicry in the domin-
ant discourse of the hunger strike. In this event specifically, we can also see 
how discourses about women’s bodies and access to nutrition continue to 
be bound up within colonial power relations. This example of fatphobia’s 
intersection with settler colonialism—along with the fact that Spence 
was also routinely infantilized and called “childish”—orients us towards 
critiquing different discourses of domination (such as body shaming) as 
situated within the settler-colonial social order. As readers will see in this 
collection’s final chapter, the signification of racial violence “between the 
spectacular and the embodied” may play a deeper role in the interpretative 
frameworks of genocides far outside a Canadian context.67 The coverage 
of Chief Spence’s protest, then, was not only the destruction of any public 
discourse about Kashechewan and Fort Albany, but also a construction of 
a new discourse or way of understanding the housing crisis in a single 
community as representing all First Nations communities. Media cover-
age consistently denied the fact that the source of the problem lies not with 
Indigenous peoples, but rather with the gendered racism of social and 
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structural white supremacy that remains foundational to the Canadian 
settler state and society. This coverage remakes and elides the history of 
genocidal policies towards Indigenous peoples in Canada and “whitewash-
es” the colonial stains from our national history.68
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Remembering Them All: Including and 
Excluding Atrocity Crime Victims
Andrew R. Basso
This chapter offers a critical genocide studies perspective on the construc-
tion of narratives and memories of victimization in atrocities.1 It decon-
structs exclusive memory constructions and offers critiques that challenge 
prevalent narratives regarding the Ottoman destruction of Christian 
minorities (Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians) from 1912 to 1925 and the 
victimization of Tutsis, Hutus, and Twa in the Rwandan genocide of 1994.2 
Traditional studies of these two crimes have focused on the two main vic-
tim groups involved—Armenians and Tutsis—and have typically failed to 
consider and analyze the experiences of all other victim groups involved, 
as well as the implications of these exclusions. Exclusionary memory cam-
paigns, as will be demonstrated, can lead to incomplete, inaccurate, and 
isolated histories that are devoid of their larger contexts. Exclusionary 
memory campaigns can also contribute to current and future exploitations 
of isolated histories to undermine democratic governance. 
Future scholarship must be critically aware of the problems with ex-
clusionary histories and remedy them by utilizing a comparative-inclusive 
approach to atrocity studies on “other” victim groups. Inclusive approach-
es are a moral imperative, a necessity for holistic historical accuracy, and 
a tool for combatting attempts to politicize remembrance.3 By identifying 
and remembering all victims of atrocity, it is possible to create rich histor-
ical narratives that recognize all victimization and give some semblance of 
equal justice to victims. 
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The comparative-inclusive approach presented in this chapter will 
demonstrate that privileging one victim group over others excludes im-
portant historical memories that can otherwise be used to construct in-
sightful narratives, and allows for deliberate distortions of memories for 
personal political gain. In short, inclusive approaches avoid relegating 
lesser-known victim groups to oblivion, where they remain forever in 
the shadow of larger victim groups that can “claim a monopoly on public 
attention, ensuring that others will remain shrouded in obscurity.”4
The Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities: 
Victim Memory Exclusion
During the last great caliph, the Ottoman Empire undertook a devastating 
project of social restructuring and almost rid itself of its Christian minor-
ity populations in toto. Three main victim groups—Armenians, Greeks, 
and Assyrians—were killed in succession by two different regimes in two 
different time periods: the Young Turks (1912–1918) and the Kemalists 
(1919–1925),5 led by the first president of modern-day Turkey, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk. When analyzed together, the campaigns of destruction 
against Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians are connected in that the geno-
cides represent a concerted effort to rid the Ottoman Empire of its Chris-
tian populations, thereby eliminating Christian influence from the Holy 
Land. While these crimes were framed as a battle of religions, there were 
many other factors that caused the Young Turks to conclude that genocide 
was the appropriate response for solving the empire’s problems.
Victimization of Christian Minorities: Shared Pathways to 
Destruction
Christians’ socio-economic and political roles in the empire have been 
emphasized as key exacerbating factors contributing to their destruction.6 
Due to the intersection of international and domestic politics, as well as 
religious and ethnic differences over centuries, the imperial, authoritar-
ian, and democratic leaders of the Ottoman Empire (later Turkey) blamed 
the empire’s problems on Christian minorities, who were framed as fifth 
columnists and separatists who could be scapegoated for all that was 
wrong with the declining empire.7 But while religious difference can offer 
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face-value reasoning for why Christians were killed, this was at most an 
underlying factor, and as such is an insufficient explanation of the type of 
destruction Christian minorities faced. Christian minorities were collect-
ively persecuted in large part due to the multitude of perceived injustices 
that Christians had inflicted upon the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Exist-
ing literatures offer varying contextual justifications for the destruction 
of the Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians by the Ottoman/Turkish perpe-
trators, but macro anti-Christian sentiments that link these individual 
accounts can offer more powerful explanations for why Christians were 
targeted for similar reasons and exterminated using similar methods. Ger-
man historian Tessa Hofmann argues that the genocide of Aegean, Thra-
cian, Pontic, and other Anatolian Greeks should be considered a “cumu-
lative” genocide. Cumulative is utilized here in the sense that the genocide 
was perpetrated over the course of a decade and victims were killed in 
varying geographical locations depending on exogenous and endogenous 
socio-political factors.8 The notion of a cumulative genocide offers a rich 
conceptual starting point for analyses of this genocide and is a propitious 
label to apply to the shared pathways of destruction Christian minorities 
experienced as a whole.
Before the genocide, Christians were marginalized as slaves or semi-
freed peoples in the period leading up to the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908. Christian women were sold into harems, men and women forced 
into labour, and, for comparison’s sake, sometimes treated worse than 
Russian serfs. The non-slave, “freer” Christians were ostracized from 
many facets of the Ottoman socio-economic system, most notably the 
traditional agrarian sector. Christians did, however, find some affluence 
and capitalized on trade, small-business ownership, and banking, areas 
that were ultimately perceived by other Ottomans as contributing to the 
demise of the once-great empire.9 
The empire’s economic decline had everything to do with previous 
poor planning choices, and the sultan’s answers to these problems. The 
Ottoman Empire was the “sick man of Europe” and the sultan knew that 
in order to compete with other European economies, the empire had to 
modernize and westernize its economy.10 However, the modernization ef-
fort had unintended consequences, most notably the creation of tensions 
between the traditional Ottoman ways of life and the “modern” ways of 
Western Europe. The sultan called upon Western advisers to instruct the 
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Ottoman state on how to construct its new economy around the sectors 
that, coincidentally, Christians were forced into and dominated. This was 
wrongly interpreted by Ottoman citizens as Christians helping Christians, 
and intentionally excluding Muslims, in order to bring about the empire’s 
downfall and its colonization by European powers.11 This misinterpret-
ation simultaneously ostracized the majority of Ottoman Muslims who 
held chauvinistic beliefs in the traditional Ottoman economy—the very 
policies that brought the empire to crisis—and led to widespread distrust 
in the modernization process.12 Ironically, some Christian minorities 
prospered in the socio-economic roles to which they had been segregated 
with the new modern, Western economy.13 
To fund these modernization projects, the Ottoman state went into 
debt with the very nations that sent advisors—Western Christian nations. 
This debt resulted in Western countries, most notably Britain and France, 
controlling over 90 percent of the Ottoman banking system, handicap-
ping the Ottoman state’s ability to spend on social institutions that could 
ease the negative repercussions of economic decline, and address problems 
with individual citizens’ financial endeavours.14 The high level of economic 
control and the resulting stagnation of the Ottoman economy, and specif-
ically Christian control over the crumbling empire, eventually became an 
emphasis of the Young Turks in creating the discriminatory and toxic con-
ditions necessary for the blanket victimization of Christian minorities.15
 Christian wars of independence in the Balkans reinforced and so-
lidified the Ottoman belief that Christians were the underlying cause of 
the empire’s demise. Four Balkan states—Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, 
and Serbia—achieved independence from the empire between 1912 and 
1913. The loss of these territories was not only detrimental to Ottoman 
prestige, but also meant that the empire had effectively lost all of its Eu-
ropean holdings in the span of just two years. This fuelled the belief that 
Christian minorities within the empire could not be trusted as these sub-
versive elements would seek independence from within.16 The Ottoman 
fear that the great European powers desired to carve up the empire came 
true after the Great War (1914–1918), meaning that once again Christians 
were perceived as responsible for the dissolution of the empire.17
Compounding these issues was Christian minorities’ protracted strug-
gle for equal rights in the empire. As a caliphate, the empire systematically 
repressed non-Muslim minorities, and the Tanzimat, or reforms, of 1839 
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and 1876 were intended to overhaul Ottoman society so it could mod-
ernize and establish at least a semi-equality. The reforms, on paper, gave 
Christians rights and freedoms equal to Muslim citizens in an attempt to 
shift the empire away from an officially discriminatory religious state to a 
secular one that allowed free religious expression and practice. However, 
Christian rights were never fully realized, nor were the modern visions of 
the sultanate’s and empire’s advisers. The lack of policy implementation, 
enforcement, and societal acceptance ultimately doomed the Tanzimat 
and caused great social strife, again leading to a scapegoating of Chris-
tians as a problem group. Russia’s involvement in securing the Tanzimat 
was particularly troubling for increasingly disaffected Ottoman citizens.18
These issues, coupled with the overall decline of the empire, gave 
Ottomans a feeling of helplessness and loss, and they sought a scapegoat 
that could be blamed for initiating these disastrous programs. The Young 
Turks’ successful revolution of 1908 ushered in four years of relative peace, 
but an internal coup d’état spearheaded by Mehmed Talaat, Ismail En-
ver, and Ahmed Djemal led to a new ruling regime that embraced the 
anti-Christian dogmas of the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of 
Union and Progress—henceforth referred to as the Young Turks regime).19 
Rather than solely blaming the sultan for the empire’s problems, the Young 
Turks then shifted all blame towards Christian minorities and turned 
their back on their own cosmopolitan ideals. Christians were then perse-
cuted along religious lines due to devolving political and socio-economic 
circumstances.20 Religious and ethnic difference alone, it should be noted, 
are insufficient variables for explaining this destruction; there has to be 
more than simple religious and ethnic difference in order to make war and 
atrocity possible.21
Even though Christians had participated in the Young Turks revolu-
tion from its inception to its end, when the Young Turks regime took pow-
er, Christians were targeted when the “Three Pashas” (Talaat, Enver, and 
Djemal) began ruling the empire with genocidal aims. The three men con-
solidated power amongst themselves and turned their backs on the cos-
mopolitan ideals of the previous Young Turks ideology.22 They exploited 
religious difference and the socio-economic and political factors outlined 
above to collectively target and punish Christians in the empire as a whole 
for the demise of the once-great Ottoman Empire. The majority of Chris-
tian victims had absolutely no connection to the ostensible causes of their 
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persecution by the power-consolidating and scapegoating Young Turks 
regime. Rather, Christians were targeted because of historical and contem-
porary political and cultural anti-Christianism that exploited and skewed 
existing religious divisions based on the scapegoating of Christians as the 
primary cause of the decline of the empire. These actions culminated in 
an empire-wide jihad against Christians in November 1914.23 Perception 
dominates and is the element most revealed when examining the shared 
victimization of Christians in the empire against the vitriolic and destruc-
tive Turkish nationalism of the Young Turks and Kemalist regimes.
The ideals of Pan-Ottomanism were transformed into Pan-Turkism, 
specifically the exclusion of Christians from this new vision for the empire, 
and the Young Turks’ new propaganda machine organized itself around 
the discriminatory and dehumanizing anti-Christian messages of Ziya 
Gökalp and other ultra-nationalists and provocateurs.24 Genocidal goals 
were developed and called for the expulsion or killing of Christians in the 
empire’s borders to make the Ottoman Empire a region for Turks only. The 
Young Turks, and later Kemalists, worked according to a 5-to-10-percent 
principle which dictated that non-Muslims could only comprise between 5 
and 10 percent of a locality’s population; all non-Muslim groups exceeding 
this number had to either be destroyed or transferred to a different part 
of the empire.25 This resulted in the killing of approximately 2.5 million 
Christians (1.5 million Armenians; 750,000 Greeks; and 250,000 Assyr-
ians).26 Christians were collectively punished for exogenous and endog-
enous political, economic, and socio-cultural pressures felt by Ottoman 
citizens. Despite the allure of blaming the killing on mere religious differ-
ence, this narrative is false. 
Linking Narratives: Towards Macro Perspectives on Memories 
of Genocide
A problematic element of the memories of genocide against Christian 
minorities is that studies of the Armenian genocide have almost exclu-
sively claimed the history of persecution and genocide. While these stud-
ies are certainly correct in arguing that Armenians were victimized on a 
wide scale, a focus on Armenian victimization excludes the larger context 
which saw anti-Christian sentiments and actions directed against all of 
the empire’s Christians, not one group specifically. Little attention is paid 
to Greek and Assyrian victims in these literatures and these groups have 
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not had penetrating studies of their experiences conducted on a systematic 
scale comparable to English-language scholarship on the Armenian geno-
cide.27 Perhaps most important is the recognition that the victimization 
process applies to all of these persecuted groups, and that isolated individ-
ualized pathologies of destruction fall short of cumulative understandings 
of genocide and memory. A cumulative comparative-inclusive perspective 
offers holistic and macro understandings of victimization processes bet-
ter than isolated narratives. The dominant political and cultural shifts to 
targeting Christian minorities for extermination were the main driving 
factors in the genocidal efforts of the Young Turks regime. These shifts 
were later carried on by the Kemalist regime, which once again initiated 
and expanded anti-Christian violence.28
Comparative-inclusive, macro analyses of the victim groups provide 
insight into geopolitical effects on shared victimization and genocidal 
processes. Generally (when all Christian minority groups are included), 
the genocide can be said to have taken place from 1912 to 1925. The pecu-
liarities of perpetration as a whole, however, reveal that the Young Turks 
and Kemalist regimes were cognizant of and calculating towards potential 
and real national enemies in both the Great War and the Turkish War of 
Independence (1919–1923), and this deeply affected the time periods and 
areas in which Christians were killed. More Assyrians were killed in 1925 
by the Turks and Kurds following Kurdish independence revolts and sub-
sequent Turkish repression and control.29 
Kurds were treated with Janus-faced Ottoman policies during this 
time. Predominantly Muslim, Kurds were simultaneously perpetrators of 
genocide against Christian minorities and victims of displacements and 
massacres at the hands of the Young Turks and Kemalists. Over 700,000 
Kurds were forcibly displaced during the Great War, and approximately 
350,000 were killed via direct and indirect methods that were also utilized 
against Christian minorities.30 Kurds as victims and perpetrators at the 
same time is an important historical challenge to be examined in future 
scholarship and may have profound implications for understanding the 
roles of individuals and groups in atrocities as a whole.
A cumulative look at the genocide of Christian minorities, though, 
reveals that Aegean Greeks, residing along the littoral western coast of the 
empire, were the first victims of genocidal processes between 1912 and 
1916, and again from 1919 to 1923. Assyrians, living in the heartland of the 
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empire, were victimized from 1914 to 1918 and 1919 to 1925; Armenians, 
living primarily in major cities and heartland areas, from 1915 to 1923; 
and the Pontic Greeks, residing along the Black Sea coastline, from 1916 
to 1918 and 1919 to1923.31 One of the striking elements of the genocide of 
Christian minorities is that there was no continuous killing of individual 
victim groups throughout the years 1912 and 1925. Instead, the killing 
occurred in waves, a genocide progressing from the Aegean coastline to 
the interior and back again with different groups killed at different times 
in different places by many types of perpetrators—be they special death 
squads, brigands, or military personnel.32 When the Young Turks and 
Kemalist regimes’ policies and victims are analyzed cumulatively, two 
things become clear: the intended extermination and displacement of all 
Christian minorities, and the fact that these groups were killed in distinct 
intervals and not all at the same time.
By the time genocidal policies were fully implemented in the Ottoman 
Empire, the genocidaires had considerable experience in implementing ex-
treme solutions against Christians and other minority populations, fuel-
ling their campaign of destruction.33 The genocide against Christians did 
not fully start until approximately 1912, when Greeks along the Aegean 
littoral areas were deported either to Greece and Southern Europe, or were 
sent to the interior of the empire, where they were killed by indirect meth-
ods. Indirect killing methods included, but were not limited to, starvation, 
dehydration, death by exhaustion, disease, and exposure.34 These are high-
ly cost-effective forms of killing and require few resources to perpetrate, 
and constitute elements of what Helen Fein has called “genocide by at-
trition.”35 The destruction of Christian populations by displacement and 
indirect killing methods would constitute a “displacement atrocity.”36 
One geopolitical factor concerning the Greeks as a whole was the 
varying intensity of violence utilized by perpetrators. The political pres-
sures that the forced displacement of Aegean Greeks placed on Greece was 
no doubt the impetus for German encouragement of the Turks to stop the 
displacements, with which the Turks complied.37 The political and military 
ties between Germany and the Ottomans during the Great War certainly 
necessitated keeping Greece neutral. If Greece entered the war against the 
Central Powers, a new battlefront would have opened up and would have 
undermined the efforts of the alliance on the western and eastern fronts, 
as well as destabilize the Ottoman Empire’s relative security from attack 
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due to its geographic location. It was because of the war that the genocid-
al policies of the Young Turks and later Kemalist regimes were tailored 
to distinct geopolitical situations and implemented cumulatively.38 In the 
early genocidal period, the military position of the Central Powers was far 
from consolidated and the war was far from decided.39 It was only later 
in the war and during the postwar period that the Aegean Greeks suf-
fered massive casualties, far beyond the displacement of the early years, 
perhaps as it became more viable, militarily and politically, to kill them. In 
this way, stopping the violence against Aegean Greeks can be considered 
a military decision, demonstrating that genocidal policies often have mil-
itary strategy intertwined with perpetration beyond the use of soldiers as 
killers. That said, the later Kemalist regime reinitiated the violence to the 
same degree as the Armenian and Pontic Greek deportations.
The Assyrian genocide began in 1914 and lasted until 1925, after 
which survivors of the death marches languished in refugee camps, a 
stateless people whose plight was internationally known.40 Approximately 
50 percent of the population was killed by indirect and direct means. Like 
other Christian groups, the final intent of Ottoman/Turkish policies was 
death or assimilation into primarily Turkic habitations.41 The years and 
geographic location of persecution coincided with war. While this cor-
relation does not prove causation, the unique varying regional presence 
or threat of war in all cases of destruction of Christian minorities does 
signal a link between war and the presence of genocide in geographical 
regions within the empire. Assyrians were targeted during the Great War, 
the British Mesopotamian campaign, and the Russian incursion into Tur-
key, presumably in part to clear potential combat zones of Christians who 
might sympathize with the British or Russian causes.42 After the war, As-
syrians were left to die in refugee camps or were killed by Turkish forces, 
both regular and irregular, into the 1920s, when the Turks began focusing 
on the eastern and western fronts against Greece.43 While the Assyrians 
did offer military resistance, their geographical location, like that of the 
Armenians, meant that no outside force could aid them, save for the Brit-
ish and Russians. The correlation between Ottoman killing campaigns 
and the British in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli and the Russians in Pon-
tus and the Caucuses may have been more significant factors in deciding 
when to kill the Assyrians at the local and national levels than has been 
recognized previously.
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After halting campaigns against the Aegean Greeks, the Ottomans 
shifted the machinery of death towards the Anatolian Armenians who 
could not be saved by foreign powers due to their physical isolation. The 
official Armenian commemoration of the beginning of the genocide is 24 
April 1915, when leading Armenian intellectuals and community leaders 
were arrested and killed in Constantinople. However, as early as 25 Febru-
ary 1915, Armenian men were being drafted into the amele taburları, the 
brutal Ottoman forced-labour battalions where death rates were typically 
over 90 percent.44 Even in 1914, Aegean and Pontic Greeks were drafted 
into the amele taburları and were being killed using various indirect meth-
ods: exposure, exhaustion, starvation, dehydration, and disease.45 The re-
cruitment of Armenians was the next step for the genocidaires and, in addi-
tion to indirect deaths, the members of the amele taburları were subjected 
to torture, mutilations, and murder. The genocidaires again tailored their 
plans to geopolitics, utilizing forced labour to carry supplies for the mil-
itary, freeing Muslim Ottomans to fight.46 This simultaneously allowed the 
perpetrating regimes to continue to situate and justify the killing and poor 
treatment of Christians in terms of an “us” versus “them” mentality (i.e., 
Muslims versus Christians). War, therefore, galvanized internal Ottoman 
beliefs about Christians attempting to impose themselves on the empire.
The amele taburları were but one element of the genocide. The primary 
means of perpetration were the deportation caravans of Christian victims 
from all over the empire. The caravans were comprised of Christians 
who were forced to march while being systematically deprived of water, 
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care by the perpetrators. Deportation 
was utilized to facilitate faster deaths among victims with little cost to 
the perpetrators, either in terms of bullets or the psychological strain of 
directly killing individuals.47 The remaining populations were sent from 
their place of residence to Der Zor in the Syrian Desert, and the death rate 
for these columns typically ranged from 80 to 90 percent.48 The columns 
were escorted by the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization) and Çetes 
(mostly organized brigands), and individual victims were often assaulted 
during deportation, including physical mutilation, psychological torture, 
and rape.49 Women and girls were sometimes sold into harems, used as 
personal sexual slaves, or assimilated into Muslim households. Some of the 
most outrageous and degrading actions were inflicted upon Armenians 
during these deportations.50 
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The majority of the killing of Armenians occurred between 1915 and 
1916, while violence and forced assimilations continued until 1923.51 In 
1916, however, the perpetrators turned their focus to the Pontic Greeks. 
Former American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgent-
hau, noted that any documented cases of violence against the Armenians 
could just as easily have been written about what was done to the Pontic 
Greeks.52 The Pontic Greeks were forced to march over 800 kilometres 
from the Black Sea to Der Zor, and were subjected to the same kinds of 
brutality as the Armenians, which is one of the lost stories of this geno-
cide. Pontians, and other groups, were sometimes taken onto the Black 
Sea in maritime craft and drowned en masse.53 Pontians were killed from 
1916 until 1918, the end of the Great War, and again from 1919 to 1923, 
during the Kemalist regime and the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922). The 
second phase of killing can be understood as a structural legacy of the 
Young Turks regime; it was carried on by Kemal’s uniquely Turkic and 
anti-Christian nationalism, which ignited genocide once again in Pontus. 
Pontic Greek collaboration with Russian forces during the Great War was 
used as a justification to collectively punish the group, as was the case with 
other Christian collaborators.54 The initial deportations were stopped by 
the end of the First World War, at which point all states wanted to avoid 
future conflicts with others, but were again initiated when the empire’s 
improved politico-military situation made it possible (i.e., the Greco-Turk-
ish War). Perhaps this is one reason why the killing of Greeks stopped in 
1918–1919, but Armenians, who did not have a nation-state of their own to 
threaten the Ottoman Empire (and with diminished Russian political and 
military support after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917), continued to be 
killed along with Assyrians.
While Kemal denounced the crimes of the Young Turks regime, 
and the empire participated in the Turkish courts-martial (1919–1920) 
to punish leading perpetrators, the underlying hatred of Christian min-
orities was fanned again under Kemal.55 The courts-martial turned into 
a political and legal blunder, and perpetrators avoided facing justice 
for their actions.56 Ironically, Kemal, who denounced the Young Turks’ 
crimes, instituted the exact same policies against Christian minorities, 
such as labour battalions, forced marches, violent brutality, and sexual 
slavery, all of which climaxed with the Great Fire of Smyrna (1922). The 
Turkish-Greek population transfers of 1923 rid the empire of most of its 
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Christians while the continued violence against Assyrians completed over 
fourteen years of genocide.57
Beyond Isolated Victimization; Towards Collective Narratives
Alexander Hinton notes that the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, 
and the Rwandan genocide form the initial triad and first generation of 
genocide studies, while the Greek and Assyrian cases lay on the periphery 
as a fourth generation.58 One contribution of this chapter is to link these 
generations of genocide studies to form more holistic accounts of similar 
cases. Beyond these links, three key historical patterns are striking when 
all groups are analyzed together. First, Christians were targeted when ex-
ogenous factors like war made it either necessary or more politically feas-
ible to commit atrocities against them, most notably coinciding with the 
Great War as well as the Turkish War of Independence (specifically the 
Greco-Turkish War). Second, despite the realpolitik of Kemal’s regime, 
which paid lip service to liberal cosmopolitan values, the regime had 
every intention of finishing the killing that the Young Turks had begun. 
Endogenous political forces also affected the genocidal policy of both the 
Young Turks and Kemal regimes. Finally, the cumulative character of the 
Ottoman’s genocide of Christian minorities demonstrates once again that 
genocide can at times be an ever-unfolding process, rather than a single 
cataclysmic event in one designated year.59 
While all the decisions for the killing practices may not have been 
planned from the beginning, the perpetrators followed a methodical and 
systematic blueprint for the destruction of Christian communities. Vic-
tims were starved to death in the desert, killed via exhaustion in labour 
battalions, and some were sold into slavery—tactics that are clear evidence 
of genocide against Christian minorities. The genocide took years to 
decimate the Ottoman Christian population but the results were cumula-
tive—fourteen years of displacement and death leading to a near complete 
extermination of Christians and their influence in the empire. The cor-
relation of genocidal processes with war in the Ottoman Empire is also an 
important research question that requires further scholarship to establish 
a solid link. A comparative-inclusive, macro lens cannot replace memories 
of the individual victim groups. It can, however, augment current know-
ledge and offer a more comprehensive collection of narratives of the geno-
cidal processes involved. A macro lens can both reveal the complexities 
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involved in genocides that target multiple victim groups and also create 
holistic narratives that take all experiences into account for the linking 
of memories so victims do not experience a second genocide—that of the 
memory of their victimization. 
The Rwandan Genocide: Omitting Victims for 
Political Gains
The story of the Rwandan genocide represents a move from an inclusive to 
an exclusive memory construction. Rwandan president Paul Kagame is an 
enigma: a democratic leader, yet with shades of authoritarianism in his pol-
itical repertoire. He saved hundreds of thousands of lives when the Rwan-
dan Patriotic Front (RPF) swept into Rwanda in mid-1994 and stopped 
the Hutu extremist–perpetrated Rwandan genocide—one hundred days 
of slaughter of primarily Tutsis. Approximately 800,000 Rwandans were 
killed by thousands of their fellow citizens, while another 250,000 were 
raped; 4 million were left internally displaced, and 2.3 million became 
refugees.60 However, more than twenty years after the genocide, the 
Rwandan government is in the process of shifting the memory from the 
“Rwandan genocide” to the “Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi,” which 
excludes other victim groups and suggests that the memory of atrocity is 
being obfuscated for contemporary political purposes.
One Hundred Days
The genocide began on the night of 6 April 1994, when President Juvénal 
Habyarimana’s aircraft was shot down while on the final approach to Ki-
gali. This triggered a frenzied and patterned response from the Presidential 
Guard and Hutu extremists, who established roadblocks and checkpoints 
around the capital to search for Tutsis, assassinated critical moderate pol-
itical and civic actors and voices in Rwanda, and began an orgy of vio-
lence that eventually killed approximately 30 percent of the Rwandan Twa 
population, between ten and one hundred thousand Hutus, and the vast 
majority of Rwandan Tutsis.61 The variation in the number of Hutu victims 
ranges so greatly because of a lack of credible and unbiased accounts. Stud-
ies of this sort are politically untenable in Rwanda at present. The variation 
is also indicative of the limited state of research on Hutu and Twa genocide 
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victims. Tutsis were immediately either killed, raped, or tortured in the 
most barbaric ways. Hutus who had the physical appearance of a stereo-
typical Tutsi, a contrived caricature spread by Hutu hate propaganda, were 
also killed, as were moderate Hutus who worked with or were allies of the 
so-called inyenzi (“cockroaches,” an extremist slur for Tutsis).62
The violence spread from Kigali to the countryside, and the Hutu ex-
tremist Interahamwe (“those who fight together”) and Impuzamugambi 
(“those who have the same goal”) paramilitaries incited and perpetrated 
genocide nationwide.63 The extremists’ vulgarisms were spread by radio 
organizations and graphic cartoons in order to dehumanize their victim 
groups.64 There are scores of massacre sites in Rwanda, but some of the 
most disturbing are in churches, where Tutsis and others sought refuge 
from their Hutu extremist killers but found only destruction.65 Tutsis were 
hunted down in papyrus marshes and cities by roving bands of predomin-
antly Hutu killers. Many Tutsis were raped, mutilated, and tortured before 
being killed or left to bleed out on the emerald green hills of Rwanda.66 The 
victims of this genocide were primarily Tutsis—but Hutu moderates and 
Twa were murdered en masse using similarly ferocious and brutally direct 
killing methods.67
The killing was eventually stopped by the RPF, led by Kagame, who is 
sometimes referred to as the “Napoleon of Africa” for his tactical and stra-
tegic prowess as a military and political commander.68 There is no doubt 
that Kagame ended the genocide with his invasion from Uganda. However, 
while the RPF’s victory in Rwanda stopped the genocide, it also simultan-
eously compelled many Hutus to flee over the border to Zaire (now the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC), which further destabilized 
that already unstable country, renewing the brutal civil war and leading 
to international armed conflict. Kagame’s orders and actions in the 1996–
1997 Rwandan invasion of the DRC are the subject of particularly pointed 
criticism, especially the mass murder of approximately two hundred thou-
sand Hutu refugees. While the Rwandan government claims those killed 
were only Hutu extremists and genocidaires, less biased sources argue that 
many were civilians—a serious breach of the laws of armed conflict.69 In 
Rwanda, a new democratic government was installed with Pasteur Bizi-
mungu serving as president from 1994 to 2000, a period in which Kagame 
was nonetheless the de facto ruler. In 2000, Kagame was elected president 
and has twice been re-elected due to his unrivalled popularity.70 
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Rwanda engaged in a sweeping program of transitional justice, em-
ploying traditional Gacaca courts to place over a million alleged perpetra-
tors on trial; it has also readily participated in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), allowing for some sixty prominent leaders 
of the genocide to be tried in Arusha, Tanzania. Beyond this, a nation-
al Rwandan ethnic unity program has been launched that seeks to break 
down ethnic differences between Hutus, Tutsis, and Twa, and in their place 
promote a single Rwandan identity.71
Exclusive Memory Construction
The Rwandan government’s insistence on adding the words “against the 
Tutsi” to “Rwandan genocide” may, in the long run, undermine the rec-
onciliatory efforts fostered by Rwandans and international organizations. 
Internationally, “against the Tutsi” was not mentioned regularly until the 
early 2010s, and it is entirely absent from most international documents 
and resolutions. The ICTR’s mandate and many United Nations Sec-
urity Council (UNSC) resolutions refer to “genocide in Rwanda” or the 
“Rwandan genocide” without specifying ethnicity. The ethnic modifier 
was promoted by the Rwandan government for years and was first for-
mally mentioned in UNSC Resolution 2136 on 30 January 2014. The text 
of the resolution reads, “genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, during 
which Hutu and others who opposed the genocide were also killed.”72 The 
Rwandan government has accentuated “against the Tutsi” and lauded its 
inclusion, willfully ignoring the other victims mentioned in the resolution. 
Strangely, the resolution itself did not specifically focus on Rwanda—it was 
a renewal of an arms embargo in the DRC, and “against the Tutsi” was 
only mentioned once. Official international documentation includes the 
other victim groups and there is a legitimacy issue beyond problems of 
historical accuracy. Clearly, all victims of atrocity deserve historical recog-
nition. As for legitimacy, the Rwandan government is towing a thin ethos 
by claiming international recognition of “against the Tutsi,” even though 
the ethnic modifier was only tangentially mentioned in an arms embargo 
resolution, not even pertaining to Rwanda. Without question, the genocide 
was perpetrated in large part against the Tutsi. More troublesome is how 
the memory of moderate Hutu and Twa victims is either being distorted or 
eliminated by the government.
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Known for his rich and penetrating studies on the Rwandan genocide, 
Scott Straus notes that killing Tutsis at first required the elimination of pol-
itical and social opponents of the Hutu Power movement.73 The first days 
of the genocide were clearly planned and many moderate Hutus, including 
the progressive and moderate Hutu prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyim-
ana, were systematically hunted down and slaughtered by the extremists.74 
The extremists required a mass fear campaign to silence opposition voices; 
the task of killing Tutsis was significantly streamlined as virtually no Hutu 
opponents to the killing still lived or were willing to risk death by express-
ing opposition. Pacifying internal ethnic resistance to killing Tutsis was 
a critical linchpin of the genocidal plan in Rwanda.75 Like Tutsis, these 
moderate Hutus had to be killed—there was no room for opposition in the 
Hutu Power ideology as opposition would undermine toxified and hateful 
messages of ethnic homogeneity and togetherness in killing operations. 
All Hutus were commanded to undertake their duties as Hutus and enact 
their roles as killers of the inyenzi in order to secure Rwanda as a place for 
Hutus. Dissident voices, especially among the Hutu, were not tolerated.
Perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide acted for many different rea-
sons, ranging from personal gain to personality type, particularly the true 
believers identified by Eric Hoffer.76 But not all Hutus were killers, nor did 
all of them support the killing. Many moderate Hutus were resisters, sav-
iours, victims, and perhaps sometimes, forced killers.77 Hutu involvement 
in the genocide is deeply complex, understudied, and requires research 
that is difficult to conduct given the current political situation in Rwanda. 
There were a variety of roles these individuals played and simply reducing 
the memory of the genocide to Tutsi victim and Hutu perpetrator, as the 
title “against the Tutsi” suggests, belies Hutus’ complex memories and nar-
ratives as both individuals and an ethnic group.
The Twa are another largely forgotten victim group. The genocidaires 
often killed the indigenous Twa because of a legacy of discrimination dat-
ing from the colonial period, and because of the generalized hostility of 
Hutu Power to non-Hutus.78 Hutu extremists committed numerous village 
massacres of the Twa throughout Rwanda.79 While some did join the ex-
tremists, Twa were almost exclusively victims. They were “saved” by the 
RPF invasion, but the RPF, like the extremists, also committed individual 
and village massacres of the Twa.80 Approximately one-third of the Twa 
fled during the genocide, one-third were killed, and one-third remained 
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in Rwanda, where they continue to experience socio-economic and pol-
itical marginalization. The Twa have been almost wholly excluded from 
the memory of the Rwandan genocide.81 Their socio-political exclusion 
in Rwanda continues to be a stain on national and international recon-
struction and rehabilitation efforts, and serves as an indictment of the 
divisive politics of the post-genocide regime that has refused to remedy 
this situation.
The Rwandan genocide was a national experience and all individual 
Rwandans participated in varying roles, be they victims, perpetrators, 
bystanders, or, perhaps, a combination of multiple roles. Many Rwandan 
groups were killed during the genocide—Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa alike. Nar-
rowing the memory to solely Tutsi victims is selective history and also 
supports troubling changes in Rwanda’s political culture and its attitudes 
toward the memory of the genocide. The memory the Rwandan govern-
ment wants to construct is that of Tutsi victim and Hutu perpetrator, 
while at the same time spearheading a national program de-ethnicizing 
the population. Amidst this backdrop, “against the Tutsi” can be viewed as 
a deliberate obfuscation of memory for domestic political purposes.
Kagame’s Rwanda: An Emerging Semi-Authoritarian 
Democracy
Marina Ottaway’s concept of semi-authoritarianism is best applied to the 
current situation in Rwanda. Ottaway argued that there are many regimes 
in the world that have democratic institutions, but which engage in au-
thoritarian practices intended to maintain the appearance of a democracy 
without exposing elite actors to the risks posed by free democratic elec-
tions. Regimes insulate themselves by tampering with voter rolls, engaging 
in clientelism, proscribing political candidates, monopolizing media out-
puts and public opinion, subtly harassing opposition, exploiting asym-
metric power structures, and exercising control over state agencies and 
patronage networks to create undemocratic electoral fields.82 Rwanda, to 
its credit, has engaged in democratizing activities, but underlying authori-
tarian principles are still at work among the most elite actors in Rwanda, 
most notably President Kagame.
Kagame’s exclusion of Hutu and Twa victims from the memory of the 
Rwandan genocide manifests itself in three ways: in the Gacaca court sys-
tem, through the persecution of dissidents, and through the development 
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of a Kagame personality cult. The refusal to include all victims has pro-
found political consequences in each of these areas—all of which benefit 
the Kagame administration. The administration’s control over many facets 
of Rwandan life has troubling implications for the future of Rwanda’s 
democracy, the prospects for peace, and also for the historical record and 
memory of all victims of atrocity. 
The Gacaca court system has tried tens of thousands of cases in con-
nection with the Rwandan genocide, but there has been a staged quality 
to these efforts at reconciliation. Instead of operating as unifying insti-
tutions, the Gacaca courts have been silently crystallizing ethnic differ-
ences in Rwanda by enforcing ethnically proscribed roles. Recent research 
indicates that the courts are imposing the Kagame administration’s mem-
ory—“Hutus are perpetrators” and “Tutsis are survivors”—despite the 
supposed plans for an ethnically homogenous Rwanda.83 While Rwan-
dans are supposed to move forward together, Gacaca may act as an anchor 
and prevent reconciliation, in essence creating a Rwanda for Tutsis and a 
Rwanda for Hutus that is separate and unequal (and definitely excludes the 
Twa). Gacaca courts were originally voluntary to attend, but the Kagame 
administration soon made attendance “obligatory—if not by law, then in 
practice.”84 Research on the satisfaction of participants in Gacaca courts 
suggests that they have serious flaws. Rwanda is split along ethnic lines and 
simply commanding difference away from the top down will not attain 
lasting reconciliation. At the same time, this approach instructs Rwandans 
to endorse ethnic difference. Gacaca’s entrenching of ethnicity can be seen 
as an extension of the “against the Tutsi” modification and the ideas be-
hind the modifier are implemented by local officials in the Gacaca system. 
A strong criticism levelled against Gacaca is that the hearings are more 
like a theatrical production.85 Typically, there is a Hutu perpetrator on trial, 
with Tutsi survivors, and other Hutus, testifying against them. A sentence 
is levelled against the Hutu on trial, and reconciliation between perpetra-
tor and victim occurs, whether it is genuine, forced, or insincere.86 This 
is a scripted judicial hearing that occurs repeatedly. Ultimately, Gacaca’s 
effectiveness is questionable and far from fully reliable. It has definitely 
prosecuted thousands of perpetrators—those who incited, supported, and 
executed genocide—but Gacaca may not be providing genuine reconcili-
ation nor actual legal justice. The “against the Tutsi” modifier manifests 
itself in the idea of a “Hutu perpetrator” and the fact that only Hutu crimes 
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are prosecuted; RPF crimes against Hutus and Twa are left unpunished 
and undiscussed, leaving reconciliation in the aftermath of genocide and 
its immediate consequences incomplete.87 Gacaca has also been criticized 
from a legal perspective with regards to a person’s right to due process and 
legal counsel, and from a human rights perspective for being an illegitim-
ate representation of justice.88 If Gacaca is just theatre, and Rwandans are 
either directly or indirectly forced to attend this form of reconciliation, 
what then is its purpose if not to solidify governmental ideas while offering 
limited justice and reconciliation? Gacaca, it should be noted, has been 
vigorously implemented by the Kagame regime.
Forced reconciliation may prosecute inordinate numbers of perpe-
trators. Perpetrator accounts note that individual killers admit to kill-
ing many Tutsis, Hutus, and/or Twa in 1994.89 There were approximate-
ly 800,000 victims in 1994, and there have been approximately 361,590 
perpetrators found guilty in the Gacaca system. This number, however, 
may not be mathematically sound because individual killers have admit-
ted to killing more Rwandans than they can count, signalling that Gacaca 
courts have espoused an inaccurate victim-to-killer ratio.90 In this case 
there may not be enough victims for the number of killers prosecuted, and 
so this problem requires more research. The Gacaca system may be wrong-
ly prosecuting Hutus because they are conceptualized as “Hutu perpetra-
tors,” as is the implied rhetoric under Kagame. Straus’s original estimation 
of 150,000 hardline perpetrators conducting most of the killing may be 
accurate, but the constructed memory of all Hutus as perpetrators is false. 
The “against the Tutsi” aspect of memory surfaces in the Gacaca system 
as Hutus are assumed to be guilty, tried and judged, and are commanded 
to be subservient to the governmental memory du jour. Justice in Rwanda 
is highly politicized and does not necessarily deliver truth. Instead, it de-
livers verdicts. The government’s rhetoric that all Hutus are perpetrators, 
and therefore share a collective ethnic guilt for genocide, is a simplistic 
memory formation that undermines the government’s ethnic unity cam-
paign and has the potential to reinforce ethnic fault lines and the divisions 
undermining future peace.
There are also legitimate and serious questions about the ability of 
Rwandan citizens to express themselves freely, and about the government’s 
receptivity to dissenting points of view.91 Kagame’s administration has a 
tenebrous history of silencing critics and opponents of the regime, and 
Andrew R. Basso188
of causing them to disappear, similar to former Latin American military 
juntas.92 While Rwanda is often hailed by other African states and the 
international community as having made a successful transition from a 
genocidal to a democratic state, there are questions regarding whether this 
transformation is authentic.
Physical and psychological attacks on political opponents in both 
Rwanda and other countries are one mechanism the Rwandan government 
utilizes to silence dissent. Exiled general Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, 
who publicly objected to Kagame’s dictatorial tendencies, was recently 
the target of a failed assassination attempt in South Africa.93 Mounting 
evidence suggests that the Kagame administration is running an assassin-
ation program against dissenters and critics and is willing to do so both at 
home and abroad.94 Theogene Rudasingwa, the former Rwandan ambas-
sador to the United States, and now exiled to that country, claimed that, 
“if you differ strongly with Kagame and make your views known from 
the inside, you will be made to pay the price, and very often that price is 
your life.”95 Augustine Iyamuremye was publically denounced for voicing 
modest criticism of Gacaca and faced being stripped of his role as a senator 
because of it.96 Paul Rusesabagina, the hotel manager at the Hôtel des Mille 
Collines in Kigali who saved over twelve hundred Tutsis and Hutus, has 
also been exiled for his criticisms of the Rwandan government. Kagame 
iconoclastically claimed that Rusesabagina was “a manufactured hero” 
made in the West, and that real heroes are made domestically.97 Rusesa-
bagina is planning on running for president of Rwanda in response to 
Kagame’s semi-authoritarianism.98 For non-Rwandans, the Kagame gov-
ernment is just as much a threat to freedom of expression, research, and 
journalism. Kagame’s administration has been criticized for its crackdown 
on dissenting points of view and the government apparatus that controls 
foreign researchers in Rwanda has the power to reject proposals it deems 
unfit.99 The state of research on Hutu moderates and Twa is underdevel-
oped and needs to be extended for historical accuracy and to preserve the 
memories of all Rwandans—though it will take the Rwandan government 
to approve research projects dealing with Hutu and Twa experiences dur-
ing and after the genocide to make these studies possible.
Domestic censorship also manifests itself in Rwandan election results. 
Post-genocide Rwanda has consistent voter turnout numbers upwards of 
96 percent, and Paul Kagame won 95.05 percent and 93.08 percent of the 
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vote in 2003 and 2010, respectively.100 These numbers seem unrealistic for 
any competitive democracy with multiple parties; they resemble instead 
those of authoritarian countries.101 They suggest political interference, and 
both of Kagame’s elections were marred by systemic voter harassment and 
electoral gerrymandering.102 Beyond these issues, recently Kagame has al-
most singlehandedly rewritten the Rwandan Constitution to extend the 
number of terms a president may run for office. Due to these changes, as of 
2016 it is possible for Kagame to remain president (if he wins all elections) 
until the year 2034, hardly the hallmark of a successful liberal-democratic 
transition.103 While the constitutional change has upset Western donors, 
most notably the United States, the coming years will tell if this change 
disrupts international donations to Rwanda.
None of the political repression in Rwanda, however, would be palat-
able if it were not for the modifier “against the Tutsi” and Kagame’s cult 
of personality. The following logic flow poses serious threats to peace in 
Rwanda: if it is solely the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi, then the 
Tutsis are the only “true” victims afforded space in this memory. If the 
Tutsi are the only victims, then the entity that stopped the genocide (the 
RPF) must be the saviour of the Tutsis, with Kagame as the embodiment of 
this achievement. Kagame, then, is the saviour of the Tutsi and can utilize 
this newfound socio-political capital to gain goodwill, both domestically 
and internationally. If Kagame is considered the saviour of the Tutsi, then 
his policies and actions are legitimized by the skewed memory of the geno-
cide. This, then, allows for the increasingly messianic Kagame to insulate 
himself and institute policies he deems necessary to his administration’s 
survival, bypassing the democratic process without being questioned be-
cause he is perceived as always doing right by Rwanda.104 This assumption 
is percolating through many levels of government and society, deeply af-
fecting policy and its outcomes. Speaking against the saviour of the Tutsi 
is illegitimate, leading to a silencing of voices in addition to the other re-
pressions Kagame has instituted.
The subtle change in memory to make the Tutsi an exclusive victim 
group, while neglecting the Hutu and Twa as victims, appears to be a de-
liberate strategy of the Kagame government to solidify its mythology and 
expand domestic and external political power. The government’s memory 
policies solidify ethnic difference, despite the national unity program. 
Kagame’s semi-authoritarian tendencies are troubling as he is creating 
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intransigent memory roles for Tutsis, Hutus, and Twa that only serve to 
harden ethnic differences. Abusing this memory is a form of revisionist 
history and may undermine reconciliation. The exclusive memories reveal 
the fragility of victim remembrance and how elite actors can emphasize 
some historical truths and omit others. These memories also highlight 
the fact that this process is subtle, manifests itself in many small cultural 
fissures, and has profound impacts on policy and policy outcomes as the 
selective use of history changes the political-cultural lens through which 
events, ideas, and policies are viewed and understood.  
The difference between freedom and repression can be slight. Freedom 
is the ability to speak and express oneself openly. Repression is the ability 
to speak and express oneself only after engaging in self-censorship for fear 
of repercussions. While the modifier “against the Tutsi” did not create the 
political issues discussed in this section, it is a tool by which the Kagame 
administration exercises its will to dominate Rwandan politics. Rwanda is 
an emerging example of how victim groups can be exclusive with mem-
ories, and how elite political actors from a victim group can deliberately 
distort memories for their own semi-authoritarian political gains.
Inclusive and Exclusive Memories of Atrocity Victims
The two cases examined offer perspectives on how a comparative-inclusive 
approach to memory can move towards more grounded macro conclu-
sions. These conclusions can also be a tool to combat exclusive memor-
ialization campaigns. The most important contributions are the stories of 
the “other” victim groups and how these experiences can augment exist-
ing or developing narratives about atrocities. When all victim groups are 
analyzed together, more holistic and accurate understandings of atrocities 
themselves are made possible. All of the various groups’ experiences add 
to our knowledge about the planning and perpetration of crimes. Beyond 
this, accuracy and inclusivity in historical studies may aid in preventing 
the formation of a collective memory that is intentionally confusing, and 
used for political ends. 
Innocent or intended structural denial or exclusive constructions of 
memory can lead to the establishment of political institutions that reinforce 
these problems. These exclusive institutions may lead to individualized and 
isolated histories, and possibly to discrimination and structural violence 
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against omitted victims. For Christian minorities, the severe lack of mem-
ory coordination is troubling and perhaps undermines efforts calling for 
Turkish recognition of past crimes, though Armenia recently recognized 
the victimization of Greeks and Assyrians, which may bring memories of 
shared victimization processes to the fore.105 Coordinated memories from 
multiple groups calling for the recognition of a single memory using a 
macro perspective—the genocide of Christian minorities as a whole—may 
carry deeper political clout than individual recognition efforts from isolat-
ed victim groups. In Rwanda, it is clear that Kagame intends to construct 
memories that only have room for Tutsis, and this action most certainly 
lays the groundwork for discrimination and isolation of Hutus and Twa. 
Despite Kagame’s efforts to create stability and to consolidate and cen-
tralize his power, he may, ironically, destabilize Rwanda’s fragile ethnic 
peace. This would undermine democratizing efforts in the near future and 
threaten the country’s future stability. 
The two cases discussed in this chapter are representative of the in-
depth and holistic analyses that a comparative-inclusive approach can 
offer genocide scholars. An inclusive lens for studying atrocity can lead 
to macro conclusions that accentuate shared victimization experiences. It 
can also aid in undermining deliberate distortions of collective memory. 
Comparative-inclusive studies augment the case studies of individual vic-
tim groups and the conclusions they offer. Comparative studies can and 
will produce complex and layered narratives that include all victim groups 
in analyses rather than privileging one group over the others. As atrocity 
scholars, we owe it to all victim groups to research, understand, and share 
these experiences so the memories of rights violations do not die; com-
parative research will aid us in remembering them all. Scholars should be 
wary of exclusive writings by asking who they include, how these studies 
combine to affect memories of atrocity, and the impacts of our constructed 
memories on historical narratives and contemporary issues. By challen-
ging and understanding the boundaries of genocide studies, and asking 
what the implications of research are, we engage in a timely and critical 
move forward within the field.
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Helping Children Understand Atrocities: 
Developing and Implementing an 
Undergraduate Course Titled War  
and Genocide in Children’s Literature
Sarah Minslow
In fall 2012, I taught War and Genocide in Children’s Literature for the 
first time. The course was offered as a third year cross-listed course at the 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, a large public university with 
majors in English, history, and international studies, and minors in chil-
dren’s literature and childhood studies, and the Holocaust, genocide, and 
human rights. Part of UNC Charlotte’s mission is to “prepare students to 
become active citizens of the world,” and this is a mission that underpins 
most of my pedagogy. While the desire I have for my students to become 
active citizens of the world is multifaceted, the population I focus most 
of my energy on is children in times and areas of conflict. More than a 
million children were murdered during the Holocaust. Today, one in every 
two displaced people is a person under the age of eighteen. According to 
Human Rights Watch, during the Rwandan genocide “countless thou-
sands of children were slaughtered. … [A]t a mass grave in Kibuye prov-
ince, some 44% [of the bodies] were of children under the age of fifteen.”1 
Despite the glaring fact that children are heavily involved in and affected 
by war and genocide, people do not tend to combine war and genocide 
with children’s literature. Partly, this is because when some people outside 
of literary circles hear the term “children’s literature,” they tend to think 
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of books that are happy, simple, apolitical, and unsophisticated. Rarely do 
they think about books that may broach the subjects of atrocity, genocide, 
death, destruction, or war. Whereas Romantic notions of childhood would 
have adults protect children from the unjust and often brutal aspects of 
life, many twenty-first-century authors of children’s literature have found 
interesting ways to represent atrocities to children without traumatizing 
readers in the process of educating and socializing them. While Mavis 
Reimer states that “it is the literature of the last half of the nineteenth cen-
tury that has set many of the narrative paradigms and practices of what 
we continue to recognize as children’s texts,”2 Zohar Shavit acknowledges 
shifts that have occurred in the past twenty years, writing in 2005 that 
“More than a decade ago, children’s literature in the West was opened up 
to a number of subjects that had formerly been taboo and presented them 
in all their hardness—showing no mercy to young readers—in the belief 
that this is the pedagogically and psychologically correct way to prepare 
children to cope with the world.”3  
Children’s “literature of atrocity” does “prepare children to cope with 
the world” when authors demonstrate great care and concern for their 
intended audiences.4 They do not keep the darker realities of being a hu-
man in our world from child readers, but they present darker aspects of 
humanity in ways that allow child readers to gradually understand some 
reasons why conflict occurs—and most offer hope that the world can be 
a more peaceful place. In fact, children’s literature has a long history of 
representing the darker sides of societies, often as a way to encourage chil-
dren to change those societies. Kimberly Reynolds sees representations of 
social issues in writing for young people as potentially radical and trans-
formative; she writes that “childhood is certainly a time for learning to 
negotiate and find a place in society, but it is also about developing indi-
vidual potential suited to a future in which societies could be different in 
some significant ways.”5 This chapter is an examination of the classroom 
as a space for collectively arriving at criteria for children’s “literature of 
atrocity” and understanding how social power can be wielded to change 
societies in significant ways. It is also an examination of strategies em-
ployed to move students from a misconception of children’s literature as 
unsophisticated and apolitical to see its potential for changing attitudes, 
behaviours, and (potentially) the world. 
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 In War and Genocide in Children’s Literature, students read a variety 
of books intended for children and young adults that represent conflict, 
war, and genocide.6 Texts include fiction, poetry, non-fiction, testimonies, 
textbooks, and memoirs. The books selected for the course are written by 
twenty-first-century authors from English-speaking countries, including 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, the 
books chosen have won awards and are popular, widely available, and, 
thanks to high sales, still in print. Choosing books most students have not 
previously read allows the process of discovery to be mutual. This fosters a 
more cohesive sense of community and equality in the classroom, which is 
essential for an effective collaborative learning environment. The intended 
audiences of these texts range from roughly seven to seventeen years old. 
The course begins with a discussion about how we will approach the 
books, and I model how to read for layers of ideological interpretations. 
This begins with the following questions: What is ideology? How do we 
identify ideologies in texts? And which ideologies are being challenged 
and which are being reinforced? Peter Hollindale describes the three main 
ways in which ideologies are represented in children’s books: as either 
“surface ideology,” the explicit and didactic purpose of the text; “passive 
ideology,” the implicit beliefs of the author or narrator; or “underlying cli-
mate of belief,” the surrounding social and cultural influences that give 
meaning to a word, action, label, or belief. He writes, “The first and most 
traceable is made up of the explicit social, political or moral beliefs of the 
individual writer, and his wish to recommend them to children through 
the story … its presence is conscious, deliberate, and in some measure 
‘pointed’. … It is at this level of intended surface ideology that fiction 
carries new ideas, non-conformist or revolutionary attitudes.”7 Passive 
ideology, Hollindale’s second category, embraces those broader cultural 
attitudes, beliefs, and values that shape a text. The third level of ideology 
includes invisible (or underlying) ideologies: “the private, unrepeatable 
configurations which writers make at a subconscious level from the com-
mon stock of their experiences.” Insofar as invisible ideologies often lead 
to “huge commonalities of an age,” Hollindale argues that “a large part of 
any book is written not by its author but by the world its author lives in.”8 
To elucidate the passive and underlying ideologies represented in a text, we 
need an approach to reading children’s literature that ensures we remain 
attuned to multiple levels of ideological representation. Students are asked 
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to consider how authors represent the atrocities associated with war and 
genocide to a young audience and how these books may be used to so-
cialize and educate children. Students also analyze the texts to determine 
whether they encourage positive or negative attitudes towards difference, 
war, and violence. They also consider how literature can function as a tool 
for promoting social change. The course addresses how these texts help 
child readers construct concepts of themselves as global citizens. However, 
at least half of the students are not English majors, and even those who are 
are not always used to close reading and critical engagement with chil-
dren’s literature. Borrowing from the disciplines of history, psychology, 
and political science, I begin by modelling how to read children’s literature 
of atrocity while keeping in mind the multiple layers of ideology presented 
therein.9 Modeling literary analysis gives students a better understanding 
of the expectations for future assignments and is a strategy for scaffolding 
their learning so that they are able to independently analyze texts through 
close reading. I also try to make them more aware of the thought processes 
involved in interpreting picture books. We review different elements of 
images, starting with a painting, and students discuss the body language, 
facial expressions, positioning, juxtaposition, colours, shadows and tones, 
and use of white space. These practice sessions prepare students to be more 
aware of the details in images in picture books they read for class. 
By the end of this course, students are expected to be able to define 
the terms associated with genocide and xenophobia and thoughtfully 
discuss reasons for and the effects of  xenophobia in society; discuss 
the circumstances of several different wars and genocides that have oc-
curred (including who, what, where, and aspects of how), and how their 
effects have resonated in contemporary society; and analyze children’s 
literature about war and genocide from critical positions in reference to 
concepts of the “child” and “childhood,” and how those texts may shape 
children’s attitudes. 
Arguments regarding whether or not literature of atrocity should be 
written for young audiences are, unsurprisingly, numerous, and most stu-
dents are unsure how “war and genocide” marries with “children’s liter-
ature.” So on the first day of class, students are asked to reconsider what 
a “child” is. In the first reading I assign, Susan Honeyman explains that 
“adults construct childhood based on biases that are personal, constant-
ly changing, and often contradictory. There is no irrefutable or universal 
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meaning of ‘child.’ ”10 To proceed, students must understand not only 
how Western societies have constructed concepts of the child as innocent, 
apolitical, asexual, helpless, and dependent, but also how far this concep-
tion is from the realities of childhood for most real children. While it’s true 
that there are millions of children who live in conflict zones and witness 
atrocities on a daily basis (the United Nations Children’s Fund reported 
that 2014 was “a devastating year for children” because “as many as 15 mil-
lion young people are caught in conflicts in the Central African Republic, 
Iraq, South Sudan, the Palestinian territories, Syria and Ukraine”), there 
are also many children who are much more resilient, hopeful, and capable 
of dealing with reality than adults often give them credit for.11 Honeyman 
argues that “the obviousnesses of childhood have been: children are help-
less; children should be protected; and if children do wrong, it is because 
they do not know any better. … [W]e view them as not having agency or 
consequence in ideology.”12 Yet this conception of childhood contradicts 
the evidence of memoirs from people who were children during times of 
war and genocide, such as Alfons Heck’s A Child of Hitler: Germany in the 
Days When God Wore a Swastika or Dith Pran’s Children of Cambodia’s 
Killing Fields: Memoirs by Survivors. What students begin to realize is that 
children are powerful agents who continually reconfigure their identities 
in an attempt to survive within highly political, often traumatic contexts. 
What the students, in turn, begin to realize is that the Western conception 
of childhood is overgeneralized, essentialist, and ignores versions of child-
hood vastly different from middle-class, white, heterosexual ones. 
Honeyman’s concerns about essentializing the child have been ex-
pressed in various ways by multiple scholars of children’s literature, since 
definitions of “children” influence which texts are labelled “children’s lit-
erature.” John Stephens writes that “writing for children is usually pur-
poseful.”13 However, Perry Nodelman believes that “the differences [be-
tween adult literature and children’s literature] are less significant than the 
similarities, that the pleasures of children’s literature are essentially the 
pleasures of all literature.”14 For me, two of the most important “pleasures” 
of literature are its ability to offer alternative perspectives and inspire em-
pathy. As reported in Scientific American, “Researchers at The New School 
in New York City have found evidence that literary fiction improves a read-
er’s capacity to understand what others are thinking and feeling.”15 In the 
chapter “Benefits and Challenges of Genocide Education,” Raffi Sarkissian 
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argues that genocide education “opens possibilities for empathetic forms 
of education to shift the barriers between societies where the concept of 
the Other is frequently raised and reinforced in harmful and destructive 
ways.” As part of genocide education, children’s literature also has the 
power to inspire social change. As Lindsay Myers writes, “If they are made 
with the right care and attention, books can be powerful agents of social 
change. Teaching children about war, however, is not so much about ex-
plaining the past as it is about inciting questions. … By actively involving 
the young reader in the history-making process, they convey in a very 
tangible way the importance of love, responsibility, peace, and truth.”16 So 
how do I get students from a simple awareness of children’s literature of 
atrocity to the point where they are confident in their abilities to determine 
if a particular children’s book about war or genocide is “good” or “bad”?
After defining the key terms for the course—including genocide, 
xenophobia, and war—and complicating students’ conceptions of the 
“child” and “children’s literature,” we delve into categorizing people ac-
cording to their action (or inaction) during genocide. Students are asked to 
consider specific conflicts from the perspectives of perpetrators, victims, 
bystanders, rescuers, and beneficiaries—terms discussed by Steven Baum 
and Christopher Browning. These categories function as a way to begin 
literary discussions about character, morality, ethics, idealism versus real-
ism, and empathy. For instance, when reading Katherine Patterson’s The 
Day of the Pelican, about a family from Kosovo that is forced to flee dur-
ing the Bosnian genocide, readers are positioned to sympathize with the 
family, especially the narrator’s older brother, Mehmet, who is kidnapped 
and beaten by Serbs. Later in the novel, when Mehmet expresses his hatred 
for Serbs and his pleasure in their destruction—“NATO is going to begin 
bombing the Serbs!”—readers are positioned to empathize with his feel-
ings. However, in the next paragraph, Meli, the narrator, states “How could 
Mehmet be so happy. … Bombs don’t know, when they fall, if you are a 
Serbian soldier or a Kosovar child. Bombs don’t ask if you are guilty or 
innocent. They just fall, and if you are below, they kill you.”17 Forty pages 
later, Meli states that Baba took the family to America because it “was far 
from the threat of those Mehmet had learned so well how to hate. Hatred 
and the ancient thirst for revenge: that was what Baba feared most.”18 There 
is a general consensus among scholars of children’s literature that litera-
ture of atrocity should always adopt an ethical position against war. Here, 
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The Day of the Pelican complicates the seeming simplicity of that ethical 
position because the book at once encourages empathy for someone who 
hates the people who have targeted him and his family for persecution, 
while simultaneously reinforcing the ideology that war is never victim-
less and that hate is dangerous and a learned behaviour. Most readers will 
understand why Mehmet is angry and has revenge fantasies against the 
Serbs, yet through the thoughts of Meli and Baba, readers are not allowed 
to ignore the damaging effects of war on humanity if Mehmet is to react 
with violence. Readers of The Day of the Pelican are positioned to consider 
whether Mehmet can have justice without risking the death of innocent 
civilians, and if not, what takes priority.
These ethical dilemmas provide space for young readers to consid-
er the complexities of war. Even though writing literature of atrocity for 
children is complicated, “the subject cannot simply be avoided” because 
there is “a moral obligation upon adults to tell children what happened.”19 
Claiming that literature of atrocity for young audiences “sets out to inform 
a new generation of readers about the horrors” of the past, Ruth Gilbert 
agrees: the reasons children need to be informed are to encourage em-
pathy, to prevent future atrocities, and to prepare children for the real, 
often unjust, world.20 Reynolds has acknowledged a more recent shift after 
the “issue” books of the 1960’s became popular and portrayals of chil-
dren shifted noticeably from those of the “innocent” child to those of the 
“knowing” child. Trying to protect children from history and reality is a 
form of censorship and while many people’s knee-jerk reaction is to dis-
courage an awareness of war and violence among young people, there are 
those who agree with Honeyman that “Denying any young person access 
to certain types of knowledge … is an infringement, not protection—it 
is robbing another person of their rightful agency—but we have moral-
ly twisted the imperative of protecting the innocence of childhood to the 
point that we usually fail to see it clearly, and even more rarely do we feel 
comfortable questioning it, lest we be accused of harshness toward those 
we should protect.”21 Therefore, the first hurdle to overcome for some stu-
dents is understanding why children’s literature of atrocity is important. 
To explain why, students respond to a few simple questions by raising their 
hands. The questions include: How many of you were taught in school that 
what settlers did to Native Americans was genocide? How many of you saw 
images in textbooks of the destruction caused in Japan by the dropping of 
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the atomic bombs? By revealing to students their own gaps in knowledge 
based on selective education and then showing them that there are chil-
dren’s books that fill these gaps, most students begin to wonder why they 
were not taught certain aspects of history as young people. One student 
said that a big part of becoming an adult is realizing you have been lied to 
most of your life.
Yet, the literature of atrocity must also provide special consideration 
for young people who at once need to be encouraged to learn history, 
prevent future wars, and feel some sense of control over or power to re-
spond to or prevent atrocity. “Educating without overwhelming” requires 
a delicate balance.22 At the beginning of the course, we do quite a lot of 
reading to develop a shared vocabulary with which to talk respectfully 
about genocide without creating hierarchies of suffering or victimization. 
Students have to read the first two chapters of Doris Bergen’s War and 
Genocide to get a better understanding of the background to the Holocaust 
and other genocides in general. Students are asked to compose a list of 
criteria they may use to evaluate children’s literature of atrocity before they 
read any scholarly articles. This list becomes a working document. After 
reading several critical articles, such as Lydia Williams’s “We’re All in the 
Dumps with Bakhtin: Humor and the Holocaust,” Sarah Jordan’s “Edu-
cating without Overwhelming,” Elizabeth Baer’s “A New Algorithm in 
Evil: Children’s Literature in a Post-Holocaust World,” and Ruth Gilbert’s 
“Grasping the Unimaginable: Recent Holocaust Novels for Children by 
Morris Gleitzman and John Boyne,” the students evaluate their individual 
lists based on the arguments they have read. Then, as a class, they defend 
their final list until we devise a list of criteria they see as essential do’s and 
don’ts when writing literature of atrocity for young audiences, and as a 
way to begin establishing a method of evaluating the literature. This pro-
cess demonstrates how they can use their informed opinions and voices to 
enter into scholarly discourse, which is an essential skill for undergraduate 
students to learn. 
Writing specifically about the children’s literature on the Holocaust, 
Elizabeth Baer explains the required balancing act in practice when she 
states that creating literature of atrocity for children “calls upon us to 
make judicious choices in sharing the horrors of the Shoah … it calls for a 
consciousness on our part of the crucial need to confront the evil, to con-
textualize it, to warn children, and to provide them with a framework for 
8 | HELPING CHILDREN UNDERSTAND ATROCITIES 207
consciousness, for making moral choices and taking personal responsib-
ility.”23 While emphasizing the need to assist children with seeing the im-
plications between what they are reading and their own personal lives and 
formation as global citizens, I ask students to consider Baer’s call to “con-
front the evil.” In class, we discuss the use of the word “evil” to describe 
the Holocaust. We will never fully understand the Holocaust, so authors of 
children’s literature about the Holocaust or other genocides should not at-
tempt to explain them simply. The use of the word evil implies a force that 
is beyond human; this abstraction negates the emphasis that authors or 
teachers should place on moral choices and personal responsibility when 
writing, reading, or teaching children’s literature of atrocity. In his address 
at the “Understanding Atrocities” conference, James Waller explained that 
we protect ourselves by making the perpetrators into something incredibly 
different from us—evil—and he continued to delineate the processes that 
occur when “ordinary” people choose to commit acts of genocide.24 Evil 
is human, and genocide depends on humans being willing to murder one 
another. Students must understand and be prepared to analyze how texts 
for young readers portray the inhumanity of war and the human aspect of 
violent perpetration.
In my experience teaching human rights, students are most engaged 
when they feel confident that they can meaningfully contribute to the 
course. Even though the course attracts students from political science, 
history, education, English, and international studies, I have found that 
most students know more about the Holocaust than they do about other 
wars and genocides, so one way I have been able to build their confidence 
and create a comfortable learning environment is to begin the course with 
the Holocaust. First, students read excerpts from several Holocaust mem-
oirs, including Heda Kovaly’s Under a Cruel Star, Mira Hamermesh’s River 
of Angry Dogs, and Ruth Kluger’s Still Alive, each from the Jewish child’s 
perspective, and A Child of Hitler by Alfons Heck, from a Nazi child’s per-
spective. While these are not intended for child audiences, they do provide 
insight into the lived experiences of actual children during the Holocaust. 
This also provides a framework for talking about tropes within chil-
dren’s literature of atrocity that include the effects of trauma and the role 
of memory in formulating testimony. This gives a frame of reference for 
the authenticity of fictional texts with child protagonists, which becomes 
increasingly important as the class progresses with a focus on historical 
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accuracy. While there is a plethora of books written for young people that 
address aspects of the Holocaust, I assign Once and Then by Australian au-
thor Morris Gleitzman because they best exemplify most of the strategies 
discussed in the articles assigned. 
Adrienne Kertzer claims that “children’s books about the Holocaust 
seem to function primarily to explain what adult texts often claim is ul-
timately inexplicable.”25 Because of this, Kertzer is critical of books that try 
to offer simple explanations of the Holocaust, specifically, but of war and 
genocide in general, too. Some children’s literature about war and genocide 
is sophisticated, and books that are most worthy of inclusion in curricula, 
such as Breaking Stalin’s Nose by Eugene Yelchin and A Million Shades of 
Gray by Cynthia Kadohata, are those that do not attempt to offer simple 
explanations for complex issues. There are several guidelines that scholars 
have offered to authors who choose to write literature of atrocity for young 
people. These guidelines can be used as evaluation criteria when analyzing 
children’s literature of atrocity. In class, we interrogate these guidelines 
and then use them to create an evaluative framework. To interrogate the 
guidelines, I allow students to choose an article from a list then answer 
questions about the main points of the article. The student must summar-
ize the article for the class, and identify what the writer is saying and what 
it means. Then the student must enter into the academic conversation by 
explaining how the article converses with other articles we have read and 
our class discussions. Thirdly, the student must offer extensions or challen-
ges to the argument presented in the article to input their own voice into 
the conversation. 
Lawrence Langer argues that authors of children’s literature about the 
Holocaust should “create a framework for responding, rather than mean-
ing.”26 By this, he means that authors can raise questions in the readers’ 
minds about the events without “using—and perhaps abusing—its grim 
details.” Langer also warns against creating books about the Holocaust 
designed to entertain or delight children. Although delight is usually a top 
priority for authors, when it applies to literature of atrocity, it is important 
that readers not lose focus on the underlying moral lessons in the narrative 
and that they are repeatedly reminded that while the story they are reading 
may be fictional, the victims of war and genocide are not. These concerns 
merit true consideration and are important in setting up a framework of 
limitations within which authors of children’s literature of atrocity should 
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work. Writing specifically about Holocaust literature, Lydia Williams 
specifies these limitations in her article “We’re All in the Dumps with 
Bakhtin: Humor and the Holocaust”: 
The Holocaust should be represented, in its totality, as a unique 
event in history. Representations of the Holocaust should be as 
accurate and faithful as possible. No changes, even for artistic rea-
sons, are acceptable. The Holocaust should be treated as a solemn, 
even sacred, event, with a seriousness admitting no response that 
might obscure its enormity or dishonor its dead. All writing about 
the Holocaust should adopt an ethical position that fosters resis-
tance. And we must not forget.27 
Students are asked to conceptualize what they should look for in chil-
dren’s literature of atrocity to determine if it is “good” or “appropriate” 
for educating and socializing young readers. Williams argues that “Holo-
caust stories immediately break some of the generally accepted norms of 
children’s fiction. They introduce the child to a world in which parents 
are not in control, where evil is truly present and where survival does not 
depend on one’s wits, but upon luck.”28 Because of this, students must 
reconsider their ideas about what is or is not “appropriate” material to 
include in children’s books. Students reconsider their conceptions of chil-
dren’s literature and begin to understand how to analyze books written for 
young audiences according to authorial strategies used to depict graphic 
violence, provide a framework for understanding, and provide space for 
readers to explore their own ideas about discrimination, morality, and 
personal responsibility. 
Gleitzman’s texts are a good example of books that provide a frame 
of reference for young readers. He has a fantastic ability to write about 
tough subjects—war, death, cults, AIDS, bullying—for young people with 
honesty and without overwhelming them with a sense of impending doom 
or anxiety. Here I model analysis and point out how to pay attention to 
details, word choices, allusions, and the authorial strategies used to create 
distance between the reader and the events described. For example, the 
protagonist in Once and Then is nine-year-old Felix. Left in an orphanage, 
Felix isn’t sure where his parents, Jewish booksellers, have gone, but when 
the Nazis come to the orphanage and burn books, he decides that he has to 
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escape to let his parents know that the Nazis hate books and they must save 
the bookstore. Not until seventy pages in does Felix admit: “Maybe it’s not 
our books the Nazis hate. Maybe it’s us.”29 These kinds of revelations of the 
more gruesome aspects of the Holocaust are gradually introduced to Felix 
and therefore to the child reader. As Felix continues his journey, he also 
encounters good people who assist him. This integration of decent human 
beings in the midst of war and genocide is another technique used to avoid 
horrifying young readers. However, such tales of heroics must be integrat-
ed carefully to avoid negating the reality that more than six million Jews 
were systematically murdered during the Holocaust and more than eleven 
million people in total perished. For instance, Barney and Genia rescue 
children in Once, but neither of them survives Nazi persecution despite 
their righteous acts. When writing about tough subjects, Gleitzman also 
creates a relatable protagonist with whom readers can sympathize, but 
the constant reminders that this boy lives in Poland in the 1940s and has 
been abandoned by his parents during a time of war makes his situation 
less threatening to contemporary young readers in Australia, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, or Canada. 
From reading responses, article summaries, and class discussions, 
students from the previous three years have compiled the following list of 
criteria against which they evaluate the books assigned in the course.
Authors should be historically accurate 
This does not mean that they cannot omit specific details that may be 
too graphic; however, it does require that they not purposefully distort 
history or provide inaccurate details. One way that authors often provide 
accurate historical details without overwhelming readers is through the 
use of paratext. For instance, at the beginning of her picture book Terrible 
Things: An Allegory of the Holocaust, Eve Bunting provides the following 
author’s note:
In Europe, during World War II, many people looked the other 
way while terrible things happened. They pretended not to know 
their neighbors were being taken away and locked in concen-
tration camps. They pretended not to hear their cries for help. 
The Nazis killed millions of Jews and others in the Holocaust. If 
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everyone had stood together at the first sign of evil would this 
have happened? Standing up for what you know is right is not 
always easy. Especially if the one you face is bigger and stronger 
than you. It is easier to look the other way. But if you do, terrible 
things can happen.30
The paratext in this book is important because the “Terrible Things” are 
not clearly defined or recognizable, and those targeted for persecution by 
Nazis are portrayed as forest animals. Baer argues that the book “makes no 
overt reference to the Holocaust and provides no context for understand-
ing.”31 While I agree with Baer that “it would fall to the adult reader to 
provide context,” the book uses paratext to situate the narrative and makes 
an overt reference to the Holocaust in the title. Yet, Baer’s article reminds 
students that literature of atrocity for young children is best shared with 
a knowledgeable adult who can answer questions such books may raise in 
young readers’ minds. My students and I tend to agree that this book is 
highly effective in achieving its intended purpose, which is to introduce 
young people to the Holocaust, to encourage discussion, and to highlight 
that standing by when bad things happen often results in lasting negative 
effects. In this instance, standing by leads to the loss of friends, neigh-
bours, and family. Even though the story has animal characters to make it 
less threatening and perhaps more appealing to young children, the title 
and the paratext ensure that readers make the connection between the 
story and the actual event. Because the “Terrible Things” are portrayed as 
large grey masses without faces or a distinct shape, this book provides an 
opportunity for educators (or other adults) to apply the lesson about stand-
ing by to threats children may face in their daily lives, such as bullying or 
discrimination. The trope of emphasizing personal responsibility and the 
importance of individual choices is represented in this book. 
Authors should strive for emotional honesty as 
well as historical accuracy
In Then, another work that demonstrates the value of paratext, Gleitzman 
explains that he read a lot of books about people who “lived and struggled 
and loved and died and, just a few of them, survived,” but he goes on to 
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say that he “also read about the generosity and bravery of the people who 
risked everything to shelter others … and by doing so sometimes saved 
them.”32 In the novel, Felix’s Polish rescuer and his best friend, Zelda, are 
hanged in the town square, and Felix must find the courage and strength 
to rebuild his life after the devastation of losing those he loved most. While 
some may criticize Gleitzman for “killing off” two of the main characters 
who readers have been positioned to care about most, this allows the read-
er to experience the feelings of sadness and anger just as Felix does, and it 
allows readers the space to humanize the stories of the Holocaust. Reading 
fiction in a safe space acts as a means to make the Holocaust more, rather 
than less, real. The important criteria for children’s literature of atrocity 
here is that authors must be honest about emotionally difficult materials. 
To omit that people lost those closest to them would be an injustice to the 
victims of war and genocide. As Lydia Kokkala writes, “Devices intended 
to spare the child can ultimately result in an evasion of the truth,” and she 
concludes that “any device which limits the amount of truthfulness de-
picted would be acceptably responsible, but, that any device which distorts 
the truth is unethical.”33 
Felix is also an avid storyteller, and when times get scary, such as when 
he is locked into a cattle car heading for Auschwitz, he creates his own 
stories to distance himself from the violence around him, thus distancing 
the child reader as well. While the reader is aware something terrible may 
be about to happen, they do not have to confront graphic violence head on. 
This being said, young readers aren’t completely shielded from violence 
either. The book is about the Holocaust, and the author embraces the need 
to be as historically accurate as possible. When scavenging for food, Felix 
finds a baby, still in its highchair, that has been shot in the face. He meets 
a small group of children with whom he hides in the sewers, and one of 
the children is shot while running from Nazis. When he’s hiding with a 
Polish woman who claims he is her nephew, a German boy bullies him and 
nearly jerks his pants down to reveal his circumcision, but, in what quickly 
becomes a moment of comic relief for a lot of child readers, he defecates to 
deter the bullies and gets away. 
Comic relief is also provided by Felix’s sassy sidekick Zelda, whose par-
ents were Nazis killed by the Polish resistance. Zelda is six, and she repeat-
edly chimes in with “Don’t you know anything?” and we see the events as a 
child might—with a limited understanding of the magnitude of the danger 
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around her, but a clear understanding of its constant presence. Through 
the development of Zelda’s friendship with Felix, and Felix’s cheery con-
versations with a boy from the Hitler Youth with whom he shares a favour-
ite author, child readers are encouraged to consider how these children 
could grow into adults who hate each other enough to kill each other. They 
see that Nazis and Jews are not natural enemies, that Nazis were real hu-
mans, and that even when we belong to different groups, we may still have 
a lot in common. Vahan, the protagonist, echoes this sentiment in Adam 
Bagdasarian’s Forgotten Fire when he thinks, “I had thought servants were 
born servants and that they were different from me. Now I knew that they 
were no different at all.”34 While seemingly simple in their language and 
plot structure, these texts provide a starting point for discussing the more 
complex aspects of genocide and of children’s literature. The main point is 
that hatred of the Other is learned; therefore, it can be unlearned and com-
bated with lessons that encourage respect for and acceptance of the Other.
Authors should resist simple explanations
To encourage child readers to continue thinking about the important 
themes raised in the books, authors often give their stories an ambiguous 
ending. Such endings are popular in more radical or subversive children’s 
literature, such as Lois Lowry’s The Giver, a dystopian novel about a young 
boy choosing to flee from his safe community after realizing that the uto-
pia depends on killing some people for no reason. Three books that we 
read for this course that have particularly ambiguous, thought-provoking 
endings are The Butter Battle Book by Dr. Seuss, Enemy: A Book about 
Peace by Davide Cali and Serge Bloch, and The Rabbits by John Marsden 
and Shaun Tan. In The Butter Battle Book, the Yooks and the Zooks engage 
in a race to build the most destructive weapon to wipe out their enemy 
because they do not butter their bread on the same side. As Tanya Jeffcoat 
explains, “Each group assumes the other is somehow inferior for having 
made a different cultural choice. … Once people decide that their way is 
the best way and that those who don’t agree are somehow essentially in-
ferior, it becomes all too easy to justify discrimination and persecution.”35 
The means by which perpetrators dehumanize potential victims becomes a 
major focus of analysis and discussion for the course. However, the ending 
of The Butter Battle Book portrays a face off on top of the wall between an 
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old Zook and an old Yook. Both hold identical weapons, “the Bitsy Big-Boy 
Boomeroo,” designed to blow the enemy to “small smithereens.” As they 
eye each other and hold out their weapons, the texts reads, “Who’s going 
to drop it? Will you … ? Or will he … ?”36 Again the focus is on individ-
ual choice and personal responsibility emphasized by the use of the word 
“you,” the question marks, and the ellipses to draw the reader in and more 
fully engage them in the tension of being faced with making this choice. 
The question really is: Reader, what would you do? We are encouraged 
by the text to think about the consequences of personal actions, and the 
absurdness of the texts, such as fighting over which side of the bread you 
butter, encourages readers to consider what might actually be a justifiable 
reason to engage in war given the destruction and devastation it causes.
Authors should resist closure and provoke thought
 In The Enemy: A Book about Peace, the only characters are two soldiers sit-
ting in their individual holes. One of the soldiers is the focalizing charac-
ter, and readers get a firsthand account of his inner thought processes as he 
sits in a trench. He is hungry and tired and wants to go home and be with 
his family. Yet, he continues the war because he has been given a manual 
and a gun, and the manual informs him that the enemy is “a wild beast. 
… The enemy is not a human being.”37 While the soldier struggles with 
trying to find a way to end the war, his actions are mirrored by those of 
the other soldier, so readers can safely assume the other soldier’s emotions 
also mirror those of the narrator. When the narrator makes his way to the 
other soldier’s hole, he finds it empty and also discovers the enemy’s manu-
al and family photos. The narrator states, “I didn’t expect him to have a 
family” and recognizes that he himself is portrayed as the “enemy” in the 
other soldier’s manual. This picture book highlights how the “enemy” is 
constructed by those who benefit most from conflict, such as politicians 
and weapons manufacturers, in ways that fully seek to dehumanize the 
people who actually end up fighting the wars. Then it encourages readers 
to acknowledge the actual human toll of conflict by what I call “re-human-
izing” the enemy. The family photos are real black-and-white photographs, 
so when juxtaposed to the simple scratch drawings on every other page, 
the reader is forced to connect the fictional story with real victims of real 
wars. On the last page, the narrator throws a peace request via a message 
8 | HELPING CHILDREN UNDERSTAND ATROCITIES 215
in a bottle to the “enemy” who is now in the narrator’s hole. As he does, the 
“enemy” again mirrors his action, and the book ends with these hopeful 
messages of peace in the air. Upon turning the page, though, readers see a 
full-page spread of soldiers lined up; two spots are empty, representing the 
fact that the two characters in the book are no longer there. Students in my 
class interpret this in several different ways. Some say it means the soldiers 
are dead. Others say it portrays them as deserters, while still others say it 
represents the personal choice and complicity required to carry out war 
and genocide. If all of the soldiers on the page chose to not fight, there 
would not be a war. While all of these are supportable interpretations, they 
demonstrate that the ambiguous ending is a key strategy authors use to 
force readers to think more about the issues associated with war and geno-
cide long after the book is closed.
Authors should inspire hope
This, however, does not mean that the book must have a happy ending. For 
instance, at the end of the picture book Rose Blanche, by Roberto Innocenti 
and Christophe Gallaz, the young protagonist is shot and killed by Russian 
soldiers on their way to liberate the concentration camps. Child readers 
do not witness her death; the text simply states, “There was a shot,” and 
when they turn the page, Rose Blanche, who has been present on every 
spread, is no longer there. While this may sadden readers, the last spread 
is the natural landscape in spring. Whereas the prior spreads were mostly 
grey, dark reds, and browns, this spread shows green grass, flowers of all 
colours blooming, and the regeneration of the natural landscape. This re-
generation is symbolic of the fact that even though people die during war, 
after the war, life continues and can be good. On the last page, in the same 
position where Rose Blanche last stood, there is a red poppy.38
Other criteria students have compiled include emphasizing how things 
happened, not just the outcome—focusing on what led to the event, not 
just the event itself; promoting understanding without offering conclu-
sive resolutions; recognizing and adhering to the limits of representation 
of genocide through the use of silence, allusion, and shadows; and dis-
tancing young readers from the horrors through strategies such as using 
child focalizers who have a limited understanding of what is unfolding 
around them and allowing readers to gradually learn as the character does. 
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Students also acknowledge that there are certain things authors of chil-
dren’s literature of atrocity should not do. For instance, authors should not 
romanticize or glorify conflict; generalize too much or rely on stereotypes; 
or try to offer simple answers to complex questions simply to ease child 
readers’ minds. Interestingly, most of my students agree that while graphic 
violence for its own sake should be excluded from children’s literature of 
atrocity, child readers should be a bit shocked by the texts so that they are 
more likely to continue thinking about it after reading and to do some-
thing to try to prevent such atrocities in the future. 
Other books we read include My Hiroshima, So Far from the Sea, Yer-
tle the Turtle, Breaking Stalin’s Nose, Persepolis, Maus I, Deogratias, A Mil-
lion Shades of Gray, The Bosnia List, Fallen Angels, A Long Walk to Water, 
and Forgotten Fire. To provide context I give some details on each war or 
conflict and use resources not necessarily intended for child audiences. 
These include excerpts from Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, Schindler’s 
List, In the Land of Blood and Honey, The Killing Fields, Hotel Rwanda, 
and War Witch. Another important aspect of the course is that I have 
students read a popular work of fiction that is not as clearly about war 
and genocide as most texts for the class. This is important because it helps 
students see how conflict is ingrained in our society as something that is 
inevitable and that children are exposed to concepts associated with war 
and genocide from early ages with little context. The texts used so far 
are The Hunger Games by Suzanne Collins and Ender’s Game by Orson 
Scott Card. The film versions were released during the semester in which 
the class read them, and students were more engaged with the texts given 
the surrounding hype. In 2014, the class read Suzanne Collins’s newly 
published picture book A Year in the Jungle, about her personal struggles 
being a six-year-old whose dad fought in the Vietnam War and returned 
with post-traumatic stress disorder. 
To assess student learning and provide opportunities for students to 
develop their reading, writing, research, group work, and presentation 
skills, I assign reading responses for each academic article required for the 
course. Most students are juniors or seniors, so I review for them how to 
read academic texts closely as researchers. This involves multiple readings, 
looking for key ideas, identifying claims and evidence, determining their 
own opinions in response, justifying those opinions, and articulating their 
responses. In this way, students become more prepared for further research 
8 | HELPING CHILDREN UNDERSTAND ATROCITIES 217
in the humanities or social sciences, and potentially for graduate school. 
A common weakness among students is their inability to form their own 
responses to the readings, or to interject their own voices into the ongoing 
academic dialogue related to the topics we study. These reading responses 
give each student two chances per semester to practice. After the first, 
formative feedback is provided so student responses are more developed 
the second time. This is designed according to the “seven principles of 
good feedback practice,” which state that formative feedback should “help 
clarify what good performance is … provide opportunities to close the gap 
between current and desired performance … and provide information to 
teachers that can be used to help shape the teaching.”39
Another assignment is a small group project where I allow students 
to choose from a list I provide a book that they would like to analyze and 
present to the class based on the framework we have established. Students 
are given a loosely detailed assignment sheet so that they have a lot of 
choice in determining how they prefer to demonstrate their learning. For 
instance, the minimum requirements are that they provide background 
information and statistics related to the conflict represented in the book 
and that they thoroughly summarize and offer an analysis of the book. 
Groups have addressed these requirements in various ways, including 
standard class presentations using Prezi or PowerPoint, making a video, 
and constructing a website. The group members evaluate one another, 
every student evaluates each group according to a provided rubric, and 
each student completes a reflective writing on what they learned from the 
project about the topic, themselves, and working as a group. While in-
itially, most students cringe at group work, particularly on a campus that 
is made up mostly of commuters, I attempt to motivate them by explain-
ing that knowledge construction occurs in dialogue with others, and that 
learning is communal; that students need the professional skills of being 
able to manage their time, to work with others whose opinions, visions, 
and working styles may differ from their own, and to produce something 
meaningful with other people. All of this contributes to the emphasis 
placed on working together to improve society as a whole. Students also 
have to complete a literary analysis research essay to demonstrate their 
ability to analyze children’s literature of atrocity with close consideration 
of the criteria established during the course.
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War is not inevitable, and if people see it is as such, it removes any per-
sonal responsibility we have to try to prevent it. As a professor, I want my 
students to leave the course empowered to make the world a more peaceful 
place. This is one reason each class completes a Promoting Peace Project. 
Students have to work together to organize a campus- or community-wide 
event that promotes a more peaceful society. This idea was inspired by the 
US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s “From Memory to Action” exhibition. 
This exhibit exists, in part, to get people to think about what they can do to 
prevent atrocities. For this project, the entire class works together to organ-
ize an event aimed at promoting peace on our campus, in our commun-
ity, or around the globe. They begin with a budget of zero and have four 
months to complete the project. Grades are derived from peer evaluations, 
my observations, each person’s willingness to cooperate and collaborate, 
the overall evaluation of the event, and bi-weekly blogs by each student 
throughout the process detailing how the project unfolds and what they 
contribute. Students also complete a reflection on the project and explain 
how it relates to what they have learned in class and about the whole group-
work process. The first year of the course, students organized a bone-mak-
ing event for the national art installation, One Million Bones. Students 
on UNC Charlotte’s campus created more than 600 bones that were then 
shipped to the National Mall for an installation designed to “create a 
powerful visual petition against ongoing genocide and mass atrocities.”40 
In fall 2013, students organized a peace rock painting event on campus 
and created a peace garden behind Atkins Library. When people passed by, 
students asked them to write on a whiteboard what peace means to them 
and then took their picture and posted it to the event’s Facebook and In-
stagram pages. The peace garden full of painted rocks is still on campus. 
In fall 2015, the class organized “Pinwheels for Peace” through the organ-
izations Students Rebuild. Their goal was to have people make at least 300 
pinwheels, and for each pinwheel the Bezos Foundation donated $2 to chil-
dren’s education programs for Syrian refugees. The class surpassed their 
goal, making 581 pinwheels and raising over $1,100. At all events, students 
had children’s books on display and talked to their fellow students about 
what they were learning in class while the students made a bone, folded a 
pinwheel, or painted a rock. People are usually surprised to learn that there 
is so much children’s literature about war and genocide, and it serves to 
remind them of the millions of children affected by conflict every day. 
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Ultimately, my goal as a professor is to do what I can to educate my 
students and empower them to do what they can, where they are, with 
what they have. The War and Genocide in Children’s Literature course 
allows students to gain a deeper awareness and appreciation of children’s 
literature in general because it challenges any misconceptions that chil-
dren’s literature is unsophisticated, apolitical, or unworthy of academic 
study. In addition, they develop the necessary skills for evaluating books 
for young audiences that tackle tough issues, and they gain the ability to 
decide how to best present conflict to young audiences and to talk to chil-
dren about atrocities, such as the events of 9/11, and the ongoing genocide 
in South Sudan. Mostly, I aim to remind students of our common hu-
manity, to teach them that every human life is valuable, that genocide and 
war are preventable, and that we all have a personal responsibility to take 
action to prevent it. One of the students in my course in 2013 summed 
it up best in the personal mantra she was asked to devise after reading 
Linda Sue Park’s novel A Long Walk to Water. She wrote, “The probability 
that what you do will not make a positive difference does not negate your 
responsibility to try.” 
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Thinking About Nazi Atrocities  
Without Thinking About Nazi Atrocities: 
Limited Thinking as Legacy in Schlink’s 
The Reader
Lorraine Markotic
 
 
I love the old questions. Ah the old questions, the old answers, 
there’s nothing like them!1 
—Samuel Beckett, Endgame
Only one who recognizes the new as the same will serve that which 
would be different.
[Nur wer das Neueste als Gleiches erkennt, dient dem, was ver-
schieden wäre.]2
—Theodor Adorno, Reflexionen zur Klassentheorie
 
Introduction
The extent to which Nazi genocidal murderers thought about and reflected 
upon what they did has been a question and a concern at least since Han-
nah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil 
portrayed Eichmann as a fairly mindless, even if overzealous, bureaucrat.3 
9
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Bettina Stangneth’s more recent response to Arendt, Eichmann Before 
Jerusalem, shows that Eichmann was actually an ardent and active believer 
in National Socialist ideas.4  Eichmann’s on-trial presentation of himself 
as someone who simply obeyed orders, as merely a “cog in the machine,” 
was a calculated pose, Stangneth argues. In fact, Eichmann seems to have 
read and dismissed the philosophies of Kant and Nietzsche for being too 
internationally oriented—in other words, for having universal principles.5 
Christopher R. Browning also denies that Eichmann was a mere cog in the 
machine but shows that the Nazi murder apparatus did have many such 
cogs, many ordinary Germans, who were willing to kill Jews, believing 
that they should co-operatively “do their part,” and who allowed this belief 
to override their moral and physical qualms.6  
It is interesting, therefore, that Bernhard Schlink’s The Reader, a novel 
concerned with the Shoah, an influential book that was translated into 
almost forty languages, actively discourages thinking. As well as con-
stitutively proscribing certain questions, it has a narrator who—though 
presented as thoughtful and reflective—does not think much or, if he 
does think, only thinks about certain things and only in a limited way. 
Of course, The Reader is a work of fiction; but this work of fiction is one 
of the most widely read Holocaust novels in the world. It is regarded as 
an important pedagogical tool: the book has been used to teach A-level 
and university students in Britain, to teach German courses in the United 
States, and to teach advanced high school (Gymnasium) students in Ger-
many. To what extent the Nazi perpetrators—whether Eichmann or the 
“ordinary Germans” who pulled triggers—did or did not think is clearly 
an important issue. Hence, an internationally successful work about the 
Shoah that manifests limited thinking on the part of its first-person nar-
rator and which itself intrinsically inhibits questioning—while at the same 
time representing the protagonist and the novel itself as reflective—clearly 
calls for further examination. Although The Reader does not directly aid 
us in understanding atrocities, it unwittingly teaches us to be suspicious 
and distrustful of our thinking precisely when we think about, represent, 
and remember genocide.
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Context and Limited Thinking
The reception of The Reader was, in the astonished words of Ursula Mah-
lendorf, “nothing short of amazing.”7 The novel was welcomed enthusi-
astically, both in Germany and abroad, in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Die Zeit, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, the Observer, and the New York 
Times Book Review, among others. Acclaim for the book emphasized its 
exploration of the imbrications of evil, especially the fact that it presents a 
perpetrator, Hanna Schmitz, who seems not simply evil, but someone with 
whom one might empathize—even while one condemns her actions. The 
main problem, the obvious problem, however, is that The Reader presents 
us with a Nazi perpetrator whose actions stem from her unusual situa-
tion: her illiteracy. In other words, not only does the novel seem to explain 
Hanna’s behaviour; at some level, it seems to excuse it. Cogent critics of the 
book, among them Cynthia Ozcik, Ian Samsom, and William Donahue, 
were quick to point out that The Reader makes too easy the slide between 
empathizing with Hannah’s motives and excusing Hannah’s atrocities.8 
Here I am less interested in Hanna,9 however, than I am in Michael Berg, 
Der Vorleser (the person who reads aloud), the narrator to whom the Ger-
man-language title refers (something lost in the English-language trans-
lation, The Reader, which could eventually refer to Hanna as well). Michael 
does think, but only in a very limited way, and the book does seem to 
encourage reflection, but ultimately does not do so. 
The Reader is a work of what Germans call Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 
the process of coming to terms with, or mastering the past. The novel os-
tensibly explores the relationship between the generation  that lived dur-
ing the Nazi regime and the postwar generation, and the insistence of the 
latter upon Aufarbeitung (reappraisal; working-through) of the National 
Socialist past. In my view, however, The Reader fails to confront National 
Socialism in any genuine way because of the restricted manner in which 
the narrator thinks. Of course, one cannot think about everything. But 
since Michael, the narrator, claims to be concerned with confronting Nazi 
atrocities and with understanding those who lived and acted during the 
Nazi regime, there are certain things about which one would expect him 
to think, certain things that plainly should occur to him. For The Reader 
is filled with the narrator’s reflections, ruminations, associations, thoughts 
chasing down other thoughts, musings on motives, ponderings about 
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decisions and actions, and the relationship between the two. Michael re-
peatedly questions, but there are certain questions he does not ask, certain 
things about which he does not think. 
Precisely in his thoughtlessness, Michael resembles the way the Nazi 
generation behaved both during and after the National Socialist reign—
despite Michael’s preoccupation with the rift between the two generations. 
Again, one cannot prescribe how someone should think—certainly not a 
character in a novel—but one can measure such thinking against the way 
that thinking is presented, either by them, or in the case of fictional beings, 
by the literary work. Michael’s thinking is limited in ways that undercut 
his alleged concerns. He can, of course, simply be regarded as an unreliable 
narrator. Certainly, Michael’s view is skewed.10 But here I focus on Michael 
not as an unreliable narrator, which he definitely is, but on Michael as an 
“unthinking” narrator, a narrator whose thinking is restricted, and whose 
thinking excludes as well as misinterprets. I address what Michael’s reflec-
tions clearly omit. Michael is, in fact, exceedingly introspective, and draws 
us in with his ponderings and deliberations. But just because a character 
has thoughts running through his head, thoughts he pursues and returns 
to and revaluates, does not mean he is doing that much thinking. Just be-
cause a character notes that there are no easy answers, does not mean he 
is considering complexities. And even though a character poses question 
after question, this does not mean he is questioning; neither does it mean 
that there are not many more questions that he does not ask even though 
he may console us with his questioning, something I return to at the end 
of this chapter.11 
As a young man, Michael and his generation actively protest and seek 
to break the taboo-like silence that, during the postwar years, cordoned 
off the period of National Socialism. Unsurprisingly, he and his generation 
regard themselves as distinct from their parents, the generation that refus-
es to talk about the Nazi period and which, for the most part, repudiates 
it.12 But the older Michael, who narrates events, himself tends to repress, 
deny, and simply ignore critical questions and conspicuous concerns. The 
novel purports to be, and has been regarded as being, both an Auseinan-
dersetzung, an attempt to come to terms with the past, and an exploration 
of the intergenerational conflict in Germany. Unfortunately, it is neither. 
The Reader does not explore the Nazi genocide in more than a shallow and 
self-centred manner, and it refuses to think about the ways in which the 
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postwar generation assimilated aspects of Nazi “thinking”—including its 
limited nature.
Continuity
The Reader presents us with an account written by Michael Berg as a mid-
dle-aged man who relates his earlier encounters with Hanna Schmitz. 
During the 1950s, as a young boy of fifteen, Michael has a relationship 
with Hanna, who is thirty-six. He seems to fall in love with her; he visits 
her frequently, sometimes reads aloud to her, and they have a lot of sex (an 
aspect highlighted in the movie). Then Hanna suddenly disappears, leav-
ing Michael bereft and distraught. In the second part of the book, Michael 
graduates from high school and goes on to study law. As a law student in 
the 1960s, he and some classmates are sent to observe the trial of a number 
of former concentration camp guards. Michael suddenly sees Hanna again. 
He learns that before their relationship she had been a guard at Auschwitz. 
Hanna is on trial for having participated in the selections at the camp and 
for letting several hundred Jewish prisoners burn to death. The women 
were on a death march and were locked in a church for the night. A bomb 
hit the church, and the church caught fire, but the guards did not open 
the locked doors and all the women, except for one mother and daughter, 
burned to death. Hanna is accused of having written the report that pro-
vides evidence of the guards’ guilt and of being their leader. At this point, 
well over halfway through the novel, something suddenly hits Michael, 
something of which there were hints all along: Hanna is illiterate and she 
is deeply ashamed of her illiteracy. She could not have written the report, 
but she is too ashamed to admit this.  Michael wrestles with whether or not 
to reveal Hanna’s illiteracy to the judge, but ultimately does not, and part 
2 ends with Hanna sentenced to life imprisonment. 
As Michael recalls his student days, he depicts the feelings of condem-
nation his generation felt towards the generation that experienced the Nazi 
period. Indeed, the novel as a whole explores this intergenerational con-
flict, which played a significant role in German society in the 1960s. Hanna 
clearly represents, and Michael regards her as representing, Germany’s 
perpetrator generation; his having been seduced by Hanna represents 
the postwar generation’s convoluted relationship with the previous one. 
The novel and Michael’s narrative seek to bridge the gap between the two 
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generations. But seeking to bridge a gap is, indubitably, a way of asserting 
that two things are separate and distinct. Although Michael relates that 
his generation objected that after the war “so many old Nazis had made 
careers in the courts, the administration, and the universities,”13 he does 
not consider that such a persistent Nazi presence might have had an influ-
ence on him. As a man in his fifties looking back critically on the tension 
between the two generations, one might expect it to occur to Michael that 
certain attitudes, orientations, or assumptions from the Nazi period could 
have been passed on to him. A dozen years of brutal, fascistic rule—during 
which various atrocities were acceptable—are not going to disappear with-
out leaving a trace. Even when Germany began to lose the war, the Nazi 
regime was not overthrown by the Germans; it was defeated by the Allied 
forces. Michael himself—not just his parent’s generation—manifests a cer-
tain amount of continuity between aspects of the Nazi period and the time 
that came afterwards. It is somewhat peculiar, therefore, that Michael, a 
middle-aged man reflecting back on his earlier self and on the postwar 
period, refuses to think about any continuity between the outlook and be-
haviour of the Nazi generation and that of his own. 
Michael seems oddly unaware that his thinking sometimes remains 
within the parameters of the Nazi generation. In my view, his limited 
thinking illustrates his limited capacity, and perhaps the limited capacity 
of many of his generation, for Aufarbeitung, for a reappraisal or work-
ing-through of the past—although this is exactly their goal. Especially 
during the trial of Hanna and the other guards, aspects of Michael’s re-
flections disconcertingly resemble the thinking of the Nazi generation. 
The way in which Michael thinks through and formulates what happens 
at the trial is telling. Salient for him is the predicament in which he finds 
himself. He agonizes over whether he has the right to reveal Hanna’s illit-
eracy to the court, for Hanna is deeply, deeply ashamed of not being able 
to read and write, and she is determined to conceal her inability. Michael’s 
reflections, however—his deliberations with himself, his discussions of his 
moral dilemma with his friends and eventually his father—are extremely 
narrow. Michael seeks advice, but he seems to want to conceal the fact that 
he is talking about Hanna’s situation, so he provides examples of dilem-
mas he considers analogous.14  In the manner of certain forms of analytic 
philosophy, Michael’s reflections disregard the complexity of the situation, 
filter out its many dimensions, and reduce it to a moral quandary:  whether 
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or not one has the right to go against a person’s wishes and reveal some-
thing about this person in order to help her or him. 
Imagine someone is racing intentionally towards his own de-
struction and you can save him—do you go ahead and save him? 
Imagine there’s an operation, and the patient is a drug user and 
the drugs are incompatible with the anesthetic, but the patient is 
ashamed of being an addict and does not want to tell the anesthe-
siologist—do you talk to the anesthesiologist? Imagine a trial and 
a defendant who will be convicted if he doesn’t admit to being 
left-handed—do you tell the judge what’s going on? Imagine he’s 
gay, and could not have committed the crime because he’s gay, but 
is ashamed of being gay. It isn’t a question of whether the defen-
dant should be ashamed of being left-handed or gay—just imagine 
that he is. (137)
 
Michael does not want his friends to latch onto the examples, but to grasp 
the quandary of whether one should reveal the truth about someone if it 
will benefit this person or whether one should respect the person’s right to 
self-determination even when s/he is not acting in their own best interest. 
Michael does not seem to know what to do and is trying to figure it out. But 
his examples eliminate the victims—as if, like the Nazi generation after the 
war, he cannot face or refuses to think about them.15 In Michael’s first ex-
ample, the addict’s life is threatened because he is so ashamed that he does 
not want to tell an anesthesiologist of his drug consumption even though 
the drugs may be incompatible with the anesthetic; but while this addict 
may have broken the law through drug use, s/he has not harmed anyone 
else. Michael’s second example involves a defendant who will be convicted 
because he does not want to admit being left-handed or gay, but who has 
not committed a crime. Of course, Hanna has not written the report; but 
she has committed a crime and she has certainly harmed others. There is 
therefore something inappropriate, if not a little obscene, about making an 
analogy between a drug user or an innocent left-handed or gay defendant, 
and someone who participated in the Nazi genocide. 
In the end, Michael does go to speak with the judge, but then finds him-
self unable to disclose Hanna’s illiteracy. Moreover, in his self-deliberations 
preceding this visit, he concludes that Hanna would not have wanted him 
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“to barter her self-image for a few years in prison” (137), as if he concurs 
that “exposure as an illiterate” (137) would damage someone’s self-image 
more than designation as leader of a group of murderous concentration 
camp guards. It is rather disconcerting that Michael is not incensed either at 
Hanna, or at his society, that she feels less shame in falsely admitting to be-
ing the leader of guards responsible for hundreds of women burning alive—
for most of the women did not suffocate but literally burned to death—than 
to admitting not to have learned to read and write. 
Shame is a compelling, motivating force for Hanna; furthermore, Mi-
chael repeatedly recounts that his generation felt overcome with shame at 
what their parents’ generation had done. It is striking , therefore, that in 
his narration Michael does not attend more to the experience of shame. 
In fact, The Reader opens with a description of Michael being ill when 
he was fifteen and his shame at this illness. Although the young Michael 
clearly belongs to the postwar generation, his particular feelings of shame 
suggest a continuity between the Nazi and postwar period. In the second 
paragraph of the novel, we read: “I was ashamed of being so weak. I was 
even more ashamed when I threw up” (2).16 Without a doubt, the Nazis had 
little tolerance for weakness and would have thought it should make one 
feel ashamed. Michael is a teenager and it is easy to feel embarrassed at that 
age, but Michael does not say that he felt embarrassed—he says that he felt 
ashamed.17 It seems odd to feel shame at being weak and vomiting. Even 
more odd is that the narrator, the older Michael recalling the event four 
decades later, does not reflect on the feeling he had then: on his shame at 
being “weak,” a “weakness” that the opening sentence explains is hepatitis. 
Clearly, there is a certain continuity between the two generations insofar 
as the postwar generation understands and experiences events through 
inflections of the Nazi period.
Indifference
The court trial is a central aspect of The Reader. But Michael’s thinking 
during the trial has further, disturbing elements. In his reduction of Han-
na’s illiteracy to a dilemma about self-determination, in his preoccupation 
with the question of whether he should or should not reveal Hanna’s secret 
to the court, Michael loses sight of any broader concerns. Michael does 
not think much about justice in relation to the perpetrators, obligation 
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towards the victims, or social responsibility. First, the other guards who 
accuse Hanna of writing the report receive lighter sentences than she does 
because Hanna is considered their leader—even though one of them wrote 
the report. It never seems to disturb Michael, however, that if he keeps 
Hanna’s illiteracy to himself, the other guards (including the one who ac-
tually wrote the report) will have succeeded in lying and laying the blame 
for what they did on someone else. Michael relates that during the 1960s, 
he and his generation felt ashamed that “former” Nazis simply continued 
to occupy their positions in the newly created German Federal Republic. 
The fact that “so many old Nazis had made careers in the courts, the ad-
ministration, and the universities … all this filled us with shame, even 
when we could point at the guilty parties” (168). Michael and his gener-
ation saw the trial of the camp guards as an inculpation of the previous 
generation, the generation that desired to disregard the Nazi past:  “The 
generation that had been served by the guards and enforcers, or had done 
nothing to stop them, or had not banished them from its midst as it could 
have done after 1945, was in the dock, and we explored it, subjected it to 
trial by daylight, and condemned it to shame” [“und wir verurteilten sie in 
einem Verfahren der Aufarbeitung und Aufklärung zu Scham”] (90/87). In 
relation to his father, Michael says that he had
lost his job as lecturer in philosophy for scheduling a lecture on 
Spinoza, and had got himself and us through the war as an edi-
tor for a house that published hiking maps and books. How did 
I decide that he too was under sentence of shame? But I did. We 
all condemned our parents to shame, even if the only charge we 
could bring was that after 1945 they had tolerated the perpetrators 
in their midst. (90)
 
Looking back, Michael obviously thinks it unfair of him to have placed 
his father under a sentence of shame, and unfair of his generation to have 
condemned the previous generation merely for having “tolerated the 
perpetrators in their midst.” But while Michael’s father and his generation 
may have tolerated perpetrators in their midst, Michael himself makes it 
possible for Nazi perpetrators to reside in their midst. His decision to keep 
silent about Hanna’s illiteracy allows the other Nazi guards, including the 
one who actually wrote the report, to return to civilian life more quickly. 
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Yet Michael himself never seems to feel any shame—either at the time or 
looking back—that his own action allows perpetrators to elude justice and 
return to society. The thought does not cross his mind. 
Second, and more disconcerting perhaps, Michael does not feel any 
responsibility to the victims, either to the several hundred18 women who 
died in the burning church or to the mother and daughter who survived. 
The daughter herself comes to the court to testify, but as William Donahue 
points out, Michael does not consider the right of the mother and daughter 
to the truth:
In focusing on the dilemma between Hanna’s happiness versus her 
alienable dignity and freedom as a human subject, [Michael] Berg, 
Schlink, and the critics (at least those who champion the novel’s in-
novative morality) apparently lose sight of those who have at least 
as compelling a claim to the truth that might have been brought 
to light by Berg’s timely intervention in the judicial process: the 
surviving victims. … Though his action could conceivably have 
advanced the cause of those with the most immediate and palpa-
ble interest in learning the truth, the mother and daughter whose 
lives are spared by pure chance, these people, it is worth noticing, 
do not once enter into Michael’s ethical calculations.19 
 
And “calculations” is the correct word here, although “ethical” probably 
is not.
During their affair, a few months before Hanna disappears, Michael 
begins to feel that he is betraying Hanna, and to feel guilt at his betrayal. 
Michael does not acknowledge Hanna to his friends or in front of them, as 
if he were ashamed of her. When Hanna suddenly leaves town, he assumes 
it is because of such an act of betrayal on his part. Later on, he realizes that 
she actually left because she was about to be promoted and would have had 
to take a written test. He recalls and reflects that
I had been sure that I had driven her away because I had betrayed 
and denied her, when in fact she had simply been running away 
from being found out by the streetcar company. However, the fact 
that I had not driven her away did not change the fact that I had 
betrayed her. So I was still guilty. And if I was not guilty because 
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one cannot be guilty of having betrayed a criminal, then I was 
guilty of having loved a criminal. (133)
 
Michael’s reasoning about betrayal and guilt seems rather shaky, and he 
seems somewhat fixated (even looking back) on his betrayal of, and guilt in 
relation to, Hanna.20 What is most noteworthy, however, is that he does not 
experience any guilt at all for betraying the mother and daughter survivors 
who leave the trial with an incorrect version of what happened to them. 
At one point in the novel, Michael hitches a ride from a man who tells 
him that the murder of the Jews took place not because the perpetrators 
felt hate, or even because they were following orders, but rather because 
they were utterly indifferent to what happened to their victims. This man, 
who turns out to have been an officer who executed Jews in Russia, tells 
Michael that it was just a matter of getting the day’s work done: 
An executioner is not under orders. He’s doing his work, he doesn’t 
hate the people he executes, he’s not taking revenge on them, he’s 
not killing them because they’re in his way or threatening him or 
attacking him. They’re a matter of such indifference to him that he 
can kill them as easily as not. (150)
The mother and daughter survivors may not be a matter of complete 
indifference to Michael, but he is not especially concerned with them. 
Even at the end of the novel, when Michael goes in person to visit the 
surviving daughter and tell her about Hanna, he does not feel any shame 
or remorse that she did not learn the truth at the trial—a truth he could 
have revealed.21  
Third, just as Michael does not seem to feel any obligation towards 
the individual survivors and their right to know what happened, so he 
does not seem to feel any broader social responsibility for working through 
the Nazi past. Ironically, he and his generation claim to be preoccupied 
exactly with this: “Reappraisal! Reappraisal of the past. We students in the 
seminar saw ourselves as the avant-garde of the reappraisal” (89, trans-
lation modified).22 Michael further recounts that he and his fellow students 
sought to tear “open the windows and let in the air, the wind that finally 
whirled away the dust that society had permitted to settle over the horror 
of the past” and to make “sure people could breathe and see” (89). The 
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students struggled to expose the atrocities of the Nazi period, which too 
many people wanted to deny or forget. Yet as Michael himself notes, if 
Hanna is clearly understood to have been someone who was in charge as 
the church burned, this tended to absolve the people in the village who 
also did not open the doors: “the existence of a leader exonerated the vil-
lagers; having failed to achieve rescue in the face of a fiercely led opposing 
force looked better than having failed to do anything when confronted 
by a group of confused women” (135). The daughter who testifies at the 
trial writes a book about her experiences in the camps, about the forced 
march, and about being locked in the burning church.23 The daughter’s 
book appears in German, which would result in the incident of the burn-
ing women becoming widely known in Germany. Had Michael felt any 
serious commitment to Aufarbeitung, he would at least have considered 
the broader social consequences of the circulation of an incorrect version 
of this notorious event. To the contrary, Michael refuses to think about 
how he is contributing to the myth of ordinary Germans’ lack of respons-
ibility for Nazi atrocities, how he is shutting the windows, keeping in the 
air, preventing the dust from whirling, permitting it to settle over the hor-
rors of the past, rather than making sure people could breathe and see. 
Let me be clear here: I am not suggesting that Michael should un-
hesitatingly have revealed Hanna’s illiteracy to the presiding judge (Ger-
man trials generally do not involve juries). Rather, I am pointing to the 
deleterious manner in which Michael thinks—or rather does not think—
about the people and the events connected with the trial. To summarize: 
first, Michael does not think about the fact that his silence means that 
perpetrators get away with lies and receive reduced sentences. Second, 
he does not consider the surviving victims’ right to know what happened 
to them. And, finally, he does not feel any concern that an atrocity in a 
German village is publically misrepresented. What is striking is not just 
that Michael’s thinking is so limited during the trial, but that four decades 
later—looking back on his youthful self—Michael does not re-evaluate the 
thoughts he had at the time other than to express his feeling that it was 
unfair of his generation to have condemned their parents to shame: “How 
did I decide that he [Michael’s father] too was under sentence of shame? 
But I did. We all condemned our parents to shame” (90).
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The older Michael is critical of his generation’s attitudes and activities, 
a self-critique that is not only limited, but also injudicious. Michael notes 
that his generation manifested a troubling eagerness: 
When I think about it now, I think that our eagerness to assimilate 
the horrors and our desire to make everyone else aware of them 
was in fact repulsive. The more horrible the events about which we 
read and heard, the more certain we became of our responsibility 
to enlighten and accuse. Even when the facts took our breath away, 
we held them up triumphantly. Look at this! (91)
Although the zealousness of Michael’s generation may have been ques-
tionable, seeking to expose Nazi atrocities should hardly be regretted. In 
the early 1960s, many Germans remained unaware of the extent of the 
network of concentration and extermination camps that had existed in 
Europe under the Nazi regime; moreover, what had been perpetrated in 
the camps was rarely, if ever, discussed. The name Auschwitz was almost 
unknown.24 So while the eagerness of Michael’s generation may have been 
repulsive, exposing the atrocities was important. Even the feeling of tri-
umph is understandable in the face of the systemic repression and denial 
that existed in postwar Germany for almost two decades. Furthermore, 
Nazi war criminals, both within and outside Germany, were not being 
pursued and had readily resumed or rebuilt their lives. The younger gener-
ation’s eagerness definitely deserves to be questioned, but Michael’s sense 
of “responsibility to enlighten and accuse” hardly deserves to be dismissed 
as “repulsive” (91).
Self-Absorption
As noted, during the trial Michael’s thoughts are focused on his own per-
ceived predicament regarding Hanna’s right to self-determination. At an 
earlier point in the novel, however, the older Michael’s train of thought 
regarding his time with Hanna is so self-centred it is almost implausible. 
In this instance of reflection, the older Michael wonders why it makes him 
so sad to think back to the time when he was with Hanna, although it was 
not a sad time for him, but one during which he was extremely happy. He 
poses the following questions:
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Why does it make me so sad when I think back to that time? Is 
it yearning for past happiness—for I was happy in the weeks that 
followed, in which I really did work like a lunatic and passed the 
class, and we made love as if nothing else in the world mattered. 
Is it the knowledge of what came later, and that what came out 
afterwards had been there all along?
Why? Why does what was beautiful suddenly shatter in hind-
sight because it concealed dark truths? Why does the memory 
of years of happy marriage turn to gall when our partner is re-
vealed to have had a lover all those years? Because such a situation 
makes it impossible to be happy? But we were happy! Sometimes 
the memory of happiness cannot stay true because it ended un-
happily. Because happiness is only real if it lasts forever? Because 
things always end painfully if they contained pain, conscious or 
unconscious, all along? But what is unconscious, unrecognized 
pain? (35–36)
Now, the first time one reads the novel, when one does not yet know of 
Hanna’s past, Michael’s line of questioning might seem apposite.25 But 
when one re-reads the novel (or if one already knows the story) Michael’s 
questioning, and the analogies he constructs, are once again extremely 
disconcerting. For it makes complete sense that he would feel sad thinking 
back to his time with Hanna, even if he had felt happy at the time, because 
Hanna is now associated with horror and atrocity. In other words, one 
would assume that Michael’s “beautiful” past is shattered because of the 
hideous images now linked to Hanna. (Had the movie included even a 
short scene of the women inside the church screaming and burning, and 
desperately banging on the door while the guards outside did not open 
them, I’m fairly sure it would have been a different movie.26 In its down-
playing of the atrocities, the movie is true to the book.) 
And there is another related reason for Michael to feel sad thinking 
back: he must now realize that although he had been happy, Hanna could 
not have been that happy: she would have been living in an unabated state 
of anxiety because of her illiteracy. Indeed, later on in the novel, Michael 
reads about illiteracy and realizes that Hanna’s inability to read and write 
must have rendered her constantly insecure and afraid. He states: “I knew 
about the helplessness in everyday activities, finding one’s way or finding 
9 | THINKING ABOUT NAZI ATROCITIES 237
an address or choosing a meal in a restaurant, about how illiterates anx-
iously stick to prescribed patterns and familiar routines, about how much 
energy it takes to conceal one’s inability to read and write, energy lost to 
actual living” (186). 
But Michael does not believe he feels sad when he thinks back to his 
time with Hanna either because he now realizes that he had been in love 
with a mass murderer or because he now realizes how exhaustingly anx-
ious Hanna must have been. Rather, Michael makes a different set of as-
sociations. Thinking back, he recalls the teenager he was then: “My arms 
and legs were too long, not for the suits, which my mother had let down for 
me, but for my own movements. My glasses were a cheap over-the-counter 
pair and my hair a tangled mop, no matter what I did” (36). In other words, 
Michael was gawky, had non-prescription glasses, and experienced per-
petual bad hair days. At that time, however, he felt youthful optimism and 
ebullience:
But there was so much energy in me, such belief that one day I’d be 
handsome and clever and superior and admired, such anticipation 
when I met new people and new situations. Is that what makes me 
feel sad? The eagerness and belief that filled me then and exacted a 
pledge from life that life could never fulfil? (36)
This could, indeed, be why Michael feels sad. But other people in his situ-
ation might feel sad because they cannot rid themselves of an image of 
women screaming as they burned alive, or because they now realize that 
Hanna’s days must have been depleted from concealing her illiteracy. For 
reasons of plot, of course, Michael’s early reflections can reveal neither that 
Hanna is a mass murderer nor that she is illiterate. But this does not make 
it any less disconcerting that the older Michael concludes that he feels sad 
not because of the fact that when he recollects his time with his lover he 
is forced to think about the atrocities she committed but simply because, 
probably like many older people, he no longer experiences the youthful 
exuberance he did then.   
Near the end of the novel, Michael makes his self-preoccupation ex-
plicit. He goes to see Hanna in prison very shortly before her release and 
finally speaks with her about what she did. What he wonders is whether 
she thought of the atrocities when she was with him. She responds that only 
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the dead can call her to account; she says they come to her, especially at 
night, and she is unable to chase them away as she was able to do before 
the trial. Michael’s response, as he thinks about what Hanna has said, is 
to wonder where this leaves the living. But by “the living,” he does not 
mean those who may have survived Hanna’s selections at Auschwitz, or 
the mother and daughter who survived the burning church. The daughter 
was only an adolescent, and it is difficult to imagine (and Michael certainly 
does not try to do so) how she copes with memories of both the burning 
women and the fact that she had to spend the rest of the night and a full 
day hiding amongst several hundred charred corpses. These are not “the 
living” about whom Michael thinks:
I accused her [Hanna], and found it both shabby and too easy, the 
way she had wriggled out of her guilt. Allowing no one but the 
dead to demand an accounting, reducing guilt and atonement to 
insomnia and bad feelings—where did that leave the living? But 
what I meant was not the living, it was me. Did I not have my own 
accounting to demand of her? What about me? (199–200)
Whereas Hanna does think about the surviving daughter, and leaves her 
her money,27 thoughts of the actual survivors do not cross Michael’s mind. 
Michael’s focus on his own well-being to the exclusion of others is troub-
lingly similar to the self-preoccupation of the perpetrator generation. 
Michael is an upper-middle-class person who—until Hanna’s situa-
tion finally hits him—has probably never thought about illiteracy (which 
is probably why it takes so long for it to occur to him that Hanna is illit-
erate). Hanna’s wish to conceal her illiteracy is what led her to abandon 
her streetcar job, and Michael. Earlier, it had led her to leave her job at 
Siemens and join the SS; and subsequently it leads her to “admit”—false-
ly—to writing the report and being the leader of the SS guards. Hanna has 
a lifelong influence on Michael. After she disappears, he feels numb and 
never quite seems to recover. The fact that Michael’s later marriage ends 
in divorce is attributed to his earlier relationship with Hanna. Yet never 
once, in all his ponderings, musings, and reflections, does Michael wonder 
why Hanna is illiterate. His lack of curiosity in this regard is stunning, 
especially given Hanna’s unflagging influence on his life. Michael knows 
little about Hanna other than that she grew up in Siebenburgen (a German 
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community in Romania) and came to Berlin when she was sixteen. Were 
there no schools, or not enough, in Siebenburgen? Was her family too poor 
to allow her to go to school? Why does she so love being read to aloud and 
why does she insist that Michael concentrate on his studies? Is she simply 
in awe of the readerly and writerly world from which she is excluded? Or 
did she want to go to school and was not allowed to attend? Were only boys 
considered worth educating? The questions would seem to go on and on. 
But for Michael they never begin! Never, in all his reflections, does it occur 
to him to wonder why Hanna is illiterate. When Michael recounts the trial, 
his reflections on his dilemma regarding Hanna’s right to self-determina-
tion seem to exclude a concern for other people, including the victims. But 
by the end of the novel, we realize that Michael is not even interested in 
Hanna—certainly not in the Hanna before she met him. 
At the end of World War Two, Germany literally lay in ruins. Many 
non-Jewish families had lost at least one person, and the food shortage was 
dire. Most Germans focused on survival and concentrated on rebuilding 
and trying to leave the past behind. Michael’s extreme self-centredness 
and his lack of interest in others, including even Hanna, resembles the 
perpetrators, but it also resembles the self-preoccupation and the refusal 
to think about the past that characterized the perpetrator generation after 
the war. 
The Reader’s Aporia and Structure
Michael is, at the very least, a flawed and morally confused character, and 
some readers might be tempted to conclude that Michael’s self-centred 
focus on his own “victimization,” and lack of concern for victims of the 
Shoah, illustrates the limits of the postwar generation and its inability to 
face up to the past. But there is more to the novel. The Reader itself discour-
ages us from thinking, and it structurally constructs Michael as a victim. 
As Sansom notes, Hanna’s illiteracy is the novel’s central conceit.28 But it 
is also the novel’s aporia. The novel cannot reveal the reason for Hanna’s 
illiteracy without unravelling (just as showing the burning, screaming 
women would unravel the film). On the one hand, if Hanna did not learn 
to read and write because she was mentally challenged, or because she was 
told she was, then the third part of the book, in which after a few years she 
teaches herself to read by means of books on tape, would be implausible, if 
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not impossible; for Hanna’s accomplishment is nothing short of astound-
ing, even if someone in prison might have a lot of time on their hands. On 
the other hand, if Hanna did not learn to read and write because she was 
not allowed to learn, then her deep shame is preposterous. For Hanna is 
not simply ashamed; she feels deep, overwhelming, unshakable shame—
shame that overrides any shame at being regarded the leader of a group of 
Nazi guards responsible for a massacre. To reiterate: Hanna must believe 
herself at least somewhat intelligent in order to have set about learning to 
read all by herself; this means that she must have been, to some extent at 
least, prevented from learning. But if she was prevented from learning to 
read and write, then the fact that her shame at being illiterate overrides 
her shame about the atrocities she committed becomes odious—and the 
empathy we might otherwise have for her is undermined.  In other words, 
the novel cannot work if we learn why Hanna is illiterate: had she been 
incapable of learning, the novel would be rendered implausible; had she 
been prevented from learning, this would undermine the novel’s ability to 
present a somewhat sympathetic perpetrator. 
Not only, then, is Michael’s thinking severely limited (as well as narcis-
sistic), but the novel itself constitutively proscribes the question of the rea-
son for Hanna’s illiteracy. Schlink has created a protagonist whose think-
ing is limited and whose questioning is circumscribed, but he has also 
written a novel that precludes any attempt to ask or even wonder about the 
very situation—Hanna’s illiteracy—that impels the narrative. Throughout 
this chapter, I have focussed on analyzing Michael and not conflating this 
first-person narrator with the author. But here the fact that the novel in-
trinsically rules out the question of the origin of Hanna’s illiteracy—and 
her extreme shame—needs to be pointed out. This aporia is constitutional, 
and I have not seen it discussed in the secondary literature. It is exceed-
ingly significant that the novel itself inherently precludes thinking outside 
its frame, just as did the Nazis during the war and just as the perpetrator 
generation sought to do after the war. 
In addition to structurally excluding certain questions, the novel (and 
not just Michael’s self-understanding) positions Michael as a victim. As 
the war ended, Germans suffered under the massive Allied bombings, and 
after the war they suffered from hunger and cold in the bombed-out build-
ings. Many felt that they had been carried along by the National Socialists, 
that they had had little chance to oppose the course of destruction, and 
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little knowledge of the extent of the evil committed by the regime. They 
saw themselves as victims of the Nazi Verbrecher (criminals). Michael, too, 
is a victim. When he first meets Hanna, he is underage. Hanna seems to 
be the one who takes control of their relationship and who consistently 
has the upper hand. Michael is devastated when Hanna disappears with-
out saying a word, and even after a few years have passed, he writes: “I 
know that even if I had said goodbye to my memory of Hanna, I had not 
overcome it” (86). After Michael becomes an adult and marries, he is still 
unable to shake Hanna’s influence:
I could never stop comparing the way it was with Gertrud [his 
wife] and the way it had been with Hanna; again and again, Ger-
trud and I would hold each other, and I would feel something was 
wrong, that she was wrong, that she moved wrong and felt wrong, 
smelled wrong and tasted wrong. I thought I would get over it. I 
hoped it would go away. I wanted to be free of Hanna. But I never 
got over the feeling that something was wrong. (171)
Michael gets divorced, and subsequently admits to himself that in order 
to have a relationship with a woman, she “had to move and feel a bit like 
Hanna, smell and taste a bit like her for things to be good between us” 
(172). The relationship Hanna had with Michael when he was fifteen is not 
something he seems able to shake.29 The book makes clear that Michael 
was and will always be a victim of Hanna.30 Insofar as The Reader pos-
itions Michael as victim, and insofar as Michael barely regards himself as 
an agent, this parallels the way in which many people amongst the Nazi 
generation positioned themselves after the war: as bamboozled victims of 
the National Socialist regime.31 
Finally, not only does the structure of the novel position Michael as 
victim—the book’s style reinforces this as well. A chance encounter brings 
Michael (as an adolescent) together with Hanna, and a strange coincidence 
leads him to re-encounter her at the trial.32 As he narrates, Michael depicts 
himself as someone caught up in events, subject to the many things that 
happen to him. The first paragraph of the book’s very short concluding 
chapter ends with the following sentence: “Whatever I had done or not 
done, whatever she had done or not to me—it was the path my life had 
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taken” (214). The novel presents Michael as swept up into his relationship 
with Hanna, forced to confront the fact that earlier she had committed 
atrocities, and unable ever to leave her influence behind. Noteworthy is 
that the way the story is told resembles the way the Nazi generation spoke 
about what had “happened” to them under the National Socialists, how 
they were inadvertently “carried along,” subject to the events that “befell” 
them.
The Novel’s Success and Style
Since its initial success and celebration, The Reader has been incisively and 
convincingly criticized in many ways. But the fact that it was so widely 
acclaimed is worth thinking about. It seems to me that much of the book’s 
allure lies in its style. As Michael looks back and relates the events of his 
past, he reflects on how he felt, on his presumptuousness, his arrogance, 
his uncertainly, his episodes of guilt, his distance from those around him, 
and his helplessness. Michael does not just recount events, he reflects upon 
them (though in a specious way, I have argued), and these reflections seem 
genuine. Michael’s presentation of incidents, experiences, and memories 
does not purport to be unambiguous. We are not told what to think; in 
fact, we do not have to think much, since Michael seems to be doing a lot of 
thinking for us. He seems to be pondering, to be wondering about things, 
to worry that he is retroactively reconstructing what occurred, and to put 
forth ideas and then retract them. Michael’s contemplations and questions 
carry us along, and it is not unpleasant to be carried along. He explores 
possibility after possibility, his thoughts now taking this direction, now 
that—for the most part without presuming he is on the right track: 
I knew none of this then—if indeed I know any of it now and am 
not just making patterns in the air [mir nicht nur zusammenre-
ime]. (14/18)
Everything was easy; nothing weighed heavily. Perhaps that is why 
my bundle of memories is so small. Or do I keep it small? I wonder 
if my memory of happiness is even true. (86)
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I thought that if the right time gets missed, if one has refused or 
been refused something for too long, it’s too late, even if it is final-
ly tackled with energy and received with joy. Or is there no such 
thing as “too late”?  Is there only “late,” and is “late” always better 
than “never”? I don’t know. (187)
Subtly, the novel encourages us to content ourselves with Michael’s in-
conclusive and ongoing reflections. 
Sansom attributes the success of The Reader to the fact that the crit-
ics “have been mesmerised and soothed by Michael’s hypnotic quibbling 
and querying.”33 I would agree. While lauded for the moral complexity 
it allegedly exhibits, The Reader actually lulls and sedates. Michael pon-
ders and muses, pursuing a train of thought here, another one there. He 
pokes his head into all kinds of nooks and crannies. But ultimately, he does 
not stir up too much dust.34 His thinking never goes too far or too deep. 
Michael’s tale may be unsettling, but the way he tells it is quite comfort-
ing.35 He does not just recount his being swept along; his telling sweeps 
us—the readers—along as well. The novel is written in such a way that 
we, as readers, have to shake ourselves out of our stupor to notice not only 
the disturbingly self-involved nature of Michael’s questions, but also the 
narrowly restricted way in which he frames problems and issues, and the 
exceedingly obvious questions he declines to ask—and how well this all 
seems to work.
I fear that part of the success of The Reader may lie in the fact that it 
is a conciliatory work. Michael wants to reconcile himself with the past, 
with the Nazi generation and with Hanna, the representative of this gen-
eration. The novel insists on the complexities of the Nazi period, and seeks 
to reconcile us to the past precisely by complicating it. As noted, many 
commentators have strongly criticized Schlink’s anomalous Hanna char-
acter as representative of Nazi perpetrators. Hanna is not typical. First, 
she is illiterate. Second, at her trial, although Hanna seeks to conceal her 
illiteracy, she actually tries to tell the truth, to answer the judge’s questions 
honestly, and to reflect upon what she has done. Most former concentra-
tion camp guards, including the other characters in the novel who are on 
trial with Hanna, downplay their responsibility and lie when they can get 
away with it. Moreover, as soon as Hanna becomes literate, she begins to 
read about the concentration camps. Hanna is a victim of her illiteracy, of 
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the other guards, and to some extent of the obtuse judge who sentences 
her. Michael is a victim of Hanna and of the events that befall him. All 
in all, The Reader is a novel about victims. Whereas many young postwar 
Germans found themselves in the uncomfortable position of wondering 
whether their parents or grandparents had committed atrocities during 
the era of National Socialism, this is not the case with Michael. Under the 
Nazis, his father planned to teach the work of Spinoza, a Jewish philoso-
pher, and consequently lost his job. His father, too, was a victim. Perpetra-
tors, other than Hanna, only appear in the novel as very minor, unnamed 
characters. The Reader seeks to reconcile us to the past and, concurrently, 
to present itself as an unorthodox work insofar as it challenges Manichean 
representations of this past and caricatured representations of Nazi perpe-
trators. The day before Hanna is about to be released from prison, she com-
mits suicide, presumably out of a feeling of guilt. The novel concludes with 
Michael visiting her grave. The final sentence of The Reader is: “It was the 
first and only time I stood there [at Hanna’s grave].” Ultimately, The Reader 
is not a novel that seeks to understand atrocities, but a work that wants to 
recount a genocidal past, bury it, and move on.
Conclusion
Decades after the war, Germans of the Nazi generation were often accused 
of not having wanted to know about what was happening in the camps. 
Michael belongs to the postwar generation, and he clearly does want to 
know about the camps; he even tries to learn more about them by twice 
going to see a camp (Struthof). But there is much Michael does not want to 
know, many things about which he does not seem to want to think. One of 
these is the influence of the previous generation on his own, even though 
The Reader is concerned precisely with intergenerational relations. And 
generations tend to hand things down: one generation passes things on 
to the next, either explicitly or implicitly. This is not rocket science, as the 
saying goes. Michael, then, seems particularly thoughtless to me insofar as 
he does not wonder what the prior generation might have passed on to him 
and his contemporaries. Michael feels he was deeply in love with Hanna, 
and he never gets over her. One would presume it would occur to him to 
wonder what he might have picked up, consciously or unconsciously, from 
her and from her generation. One would expect Michael to wonder what 
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ideas, attitudes, or orientations he might have assimilated. But Michael 
chooses not to think about this, as he chooses not to think about so many 
other things. It is difficult to avoid wondering if what Michael did pick up 
from the prior generation is precisely the inability or refusal to reflect. 
Neither Michael nor Hanna are, in my view, especially empathetic 
characters. But perhaps The Reader can most charitably be interpreted 
as being about empathy and about how someone who has committed the 
most horrible atrocities might be someone with whom one might empa-
thize in some way. One can conjecture that Schlink, and those who ap-
plaud the book, feel that lack of empathy was a defining characteristic of 
the Nazis, and that encouraging empathy and compassion is a good anti-
dote. Specifically, the novel seems to want to address a dilemma experi-
enced by many young Germans of the postwar generation: the fact that 
one might care deeply about someone whom one subsequently learns has 
been guilty of things one does not want to contemplate. But not wanting to 
contemplate is exactly the problem. If The Reader’s central message is that 
we should not judge, or should not judge too quickly or harshly, the novel 
also encourages us not to think, and not to think too deeply or arduous-
ly—certainly not about the past and our relation to it. And this does not at 
all bode well for the future.
The Reader teaches us little about the Shoah, I have argued, and even 
less about those who lived under, permitted, or participated in the atroci-
ties of the Nazi regime. What the novel does teach us is the importance of 
thinking about how we think about atrocities. Few countries, if any, have 
a history that does not involve some form of genocide, be it a genocide of 
peoples or cultures. If we are trying to understand atrocities from our past, 
it is critical that we think about the fact that our ideas—or aspects of our 
ideas, even in partial or fractional form—may stem from this past and con-
tinue into our present. We may have assimilated certain attitudes, orienta-
tions, or assumptions from the time of the atrocities. It is absolutely crucial 
that we think about this. We need to consider how our thinking and our 
representations might—in whatever small ways—resemble the thinking of 
those who enacted or made possible the atrocities. We need to reflect upon 
the ways in which our thinking might be limited and restricted. We need 
to ask questions about what questions we might not be asking. It is not 
enough to reflect upon and analyze atrocities and instances of genocide. 
It is imperative that we think about the continuity between our own lack 
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or limited thought and the thinking of that time period. What The Reader 
(unthinkingly) teaches us is that remembering and representing genocide 
are hardly enough; we need to think about the ways in which we think 
about our genocidal past. 
NOTES
 1 Samuel Beckett, Endgame (New York: Grove, 1958), 38.   
 2 Theodor W. Adorno, Reflexionen zur Klassentheorie. GS 8, Soziologische Schriften I 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2003), 376.
 3 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: 
Penguin, 1967). 
 4 See also Donna Mounsef ’s critique of Arendt’s presentation of Eichmann’s “thought-
lessness” at the beginning of her chapter in this volume. Mounsef draws on Zizek’s 
appropriation of Lacan to argue that there is always an element of jouissance in 
inflicting suffering, including bureaucratically imposed suffering and humiliation.
 5 Bettina Stangneth, Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murder-
er, trans. Ruth Martin (New York: Knopf, 2014), 283ff. Stangneth concludes the section 
as follows:  “It is temptingly easy to dismiss his [Eichmann’s] ramblings; like all dogma, 
his is ultimately just bad philosophy. But it is a disturbing fact: for Eichmann the logic 
of these terrible constructs provided stability and inner fortitude. To unbalance one 
of the most effective mass murderers in history, the ability to think in itself was not 
enough” (293).
 6 Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final 
Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1993).
 7 See Ursula R. Mahlendorf, “Trauma Narrated, Read and (Mis)understood: Bernhard 
Schlink’s ‘The Reader’: ‘…irrevocably complicit in their crimes,’ ” Monatshefte 95, no. 3 
(2003): 458–481; quote from 459. The appeal of the novel is something I return to at the 
end of this article. 
 8 See Cynthia Ozick, “The Rights of History and the Rights of Imagination,” Commen-
tary, 1 March 1999, 22–27; Ian Sansom, “Doubts about the Reader,” Salmagundi 124/125 
(1999): 3–16; William Collins Donahue, “Illusions of Subtlety: Bernhard Schlink’s Der 
Vorleser and The Moral Limits of Holocaust Fiction,” German Life and Letters 54, no. 1 
(2001): 60–81. Sansom recoils: “If the first part of the book was slightly queasy-making, 
the second part is hugely disturbing” (See “Doubts,” 9). Katharina Hall points out, how-
ever, that no matter how critical academics are of the book, the demands of “readabili-
ty” and conventions of the romance novel shape the general readership’s interpretation 
of the work, just as conventions of hard-boiled detective novels shape interpretations of 
Schlink’s earlier Selbs Justiz (written with Walter Popp), which also deals with the Nazi 
past. Hall draws on Iser’s and especially Eco’s reception theories. See Katharina Hall, 
“The Author, the Novel, the Reader and the Perils of ‘Neue Lesbarkeit’: A Comparative 
Analysis of Bernhard Schlink’s Selbs Justiz and Der Vorleser,”  German Life and Letters 
49, no. 3 (July 2006): 446–467.
 9 An exceedingly problematic character, Hanna has been discussed and criticized by 
many commentators, especially Jane Allison, Bill Niven, and William Collins Donahue. 
See Allison, “The Third Victim in Bernhard Schlink’s Der Vorleser,” The Germanic 
9 | THINKING ABOUT NAZI ATROCITIES 247
Review: Literature, Culture, Theory 81, no. 2 (2006): 163–178; Niven, “Bernhard 
Schlink’s ‘Der Vorleser’ and the Problem of Shame,” The Modern Language Review 98, 
no. 2 (2003): 318–396; Donahue, Holocaust as Fiction: Bernhard Schlink’s “Nazi” Novels 
and Their Films (New York: Palgrave, 2010). Donahue states in his introduction that the 
very fraught figure from The Reader, Hanna Schmitz, makes an appearance in almost 
every chapter of his study (18). 
 10 Mahlendorf (“Trauma Narrated”) thoroughly and convincingly shows the many ways 
in which Michael’s perspective is unreliable. Niven (“Shame”), Helmut Schmitz, and 
Daniel Reynolds also emphasize Michael as an unreliable narrator, especially regarding 
Hanna. See Schmitz “Malen Nach Zahlen? Bernhard Schlinks Der Vorleser und die 
Unfähigkeit zu Trauern,” German Life and Letters 55, no. 3 (July 2002): 296–311 and On 
Their Own Terms: The Legacy of National Socialism in Post-1990 German Fiction (Bir-
mingham: University of Birmingham Press, 2004); and Reynolds “Bernhard Schlink’s 
Der Vorleser,” Seminar 39, no. 3 (2003): 238–256. 
 11 Schmitz argues that “the novel is structured by a chain of questions that for the most 
part remain unanswered, because Schlink’s protagonist is not capable of directing them 
to the sole person who would be able to answer them” [Der Roman ist strukturiert von 
einer Kette von Fragen, die in ihrer Mehrzahl unbeantwortet bleiben, weil Schlinks 
Protagonist sie nicht an die Person zu richten vermag, die allein sie beantworten 
könnte] (“Malen Nach Zahlen?,” 4). I agree, but I also think that Michael neglects to ask 
certain questions, questions that should be ineluctable to someone concerned with the 
relationship between his own and the Nazi generation. 
 12 Mahlendorf, Niven, and Schmitz all commend the novel for showing how the Nazi 
generation’s behaviour harmed the postwar generation, especially in terms of the latter 
generation’s limited ability to emphasize with suffering. Mahlendorf demonstrates that 
the way in which the postwar generation was subject to the power abuses and silence 
of the perpetrator generation led to a traumatization entailing emotional denial and 
an inability to empathize with the victims. She is rightly concerned with the resulting 
“blunting of sensitivity” (See “Trauma Narrated,” 477). Niven regards the novel as 
demonstrating the postwar generation’s “emotional dependency” on the previous gen-
eration (See “Shame,” 389). Schmitz considers the novel to portray Michael’s inability 
to emphasize with the victims of the Nazis. He sees Michael as an almost archetypal 
instance of what the psychoanalysts Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich depict 
as an “inability to mourn” in postwar German society. Michael may have difficulty 
empathizing and difficulty mourning, but he also has difficulty thinking. Schmitz refers 
to “Michael’s troubled and reflective mind” (On Their Own Terms, 71), but although 
Michael’s mind is indeed troubled, in my view it is not sufficiently reflective. Michael’s 
lack of, or limited, reflection may of course be connected with his emotional state, but 
this limited thinking needs to be noted. 
 13 Bernhard Schlink, The Reader, trans. Carol Brown Janeway (New York: Vintage, 1997), 
168 (hereafter cited in text) / Der Vorleser (Zurich: Diogenes, 1995).
 14 It is unclear to me why Michael has to use any analogy with his father. He could simply 
tell his father that he has learned that the defendant is illiterate (without mentioning 
their earlier sexual relationship), and discuss the situation and whether he should 
reveal this information to the judge. The father, with whom the children have to make 
appointments, is completely unlikely to be inquisitive about Michael’s personal life. 
 15 Although, in the early 1960s, someone might have been ashamed to be gay, and in 
Germany to be left-handed, the older Michael, looking back decades later, should 
Lorraine Markotic248
question such oppressive norms, especially since this lack of tolerance echoes that of the 
Nazi period. 
 16 As Martin Swales states: “the key junctures in the story-line have all to do with shame” 
and the narration begins with Michael’s shame about his illness (11). See “Sex, Shame, 
and Guilt: Reflections on Bernhard Schlink’s Der Vorleser (The Reader) and J. M. 
Coetzee’s Disgrace.”  Journal of European Studies 33, no. 1 (March 2003): 7–22.
 17 Swales makes the important distinction between shame and guilt (“Shame,” 10). I 
would also want to distinguish shame and embarrassment. 
 18 Michael never clarifies and does not seem interested in how many women died – 
whether it was two hundred, three hundred or five hundred. It is unlikely that any court 
would accuse defendants of being responsible for deaths, but leave the number vague. 
(The film, if I recall, refers to three hundred.)  Michael becomes a lawyer (as was Sch-
link), so what can be the purpose of the imprecise and implausible “several hundred” 
(mehrere hundert) other than to suggest that it does not really matter to Michael or 
postwar Germans how many Jews died.
 19 Donahue, “Illusions of Subtlety,” 79. 
 20 The final chapter of the book makes clear that it is feelings of guilt in relation to Hanna 
that are most significant for him. The final chapter begins: “All this happened ten years 
ago. In the first few years after Hanna’s death, I was tormented by the old questions of 
whether I had denied and betrayed her” (214).
 21 Allison shows the quite numerous ways in which the novel positions Hanna in order to 
favourably and sympathetically contrast Hanna with her surviving Jewish victim. Sher-
idan focuses on how Hanna’s poverty, in the novel and especially the film, is contrasted 
with the surviving daughter’s wealth in a way that garners sympathy for Hanna and 
draws on certain anti-Semitic stereotypes.
 22 Janeway’s English translation is:  “Exploration! Exploring the past! We students in 
the camps seminar considered ourselves radical explorers.” The original German is: 
“Aufarbeitung! Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit! Wir Studenten des Seminars sahen 
uns als Avantgarde der Aufarbeitung” (87). 
 23 Here I would conjecture that Schlink was influenced by Ruth Klüger’s autobiographical 
Weiter Leben: Eine Jugend (Munich: dtv, 1994). Klüger’s book contains no account of 
a burning church but Michael’s description of the tone of the book that was written 
by the daughter (who like Klüger was pubescent at Auschwitz) and Schlink having his 
mother and daughter characters survive because the mother did the “right thing for the 
wrong reasons” (122) seems to have been drawn from Klüger’s Weiter Leben. Ruth Sher-
idan points out that the daughter’s statement in the film (“Nothing good comes out of 
the camps”) “appears to be lifted straight from the pages of Ruth Klüger’s memoir.” See 
Sheridan, “Sympathy with the Perpetrators: Examining the Appropriation of Schlink’s 
‘Der Vorleser’ in the Film ‘The Reader’,” The Australian Journal of Jewish Studies 27 
(2013): 131. 
 24 This lack of awareness of Auschwitz, and the extent of the torture and exterminations 
that took place there, is presented in the film Labyrinth of Lies (German: Im Labyrinth 
des Schweigens—literally “In the Labyrinth of Silence”) that fictionally portrays the dif-
ficulties and opposition state prosecutors experienced in their quest to bring Auschwitz 
workers to trial in the early 1960s. Labyrinth of Lies, directed by Giulio Ricciarelli 
(Universal 2014; Sony Home Video, 2016), DVD. 
9 | THINKING ABOUT NAZI ATROCITIES 249
 25 As Sansom notes: “Michael’s orgies of questioning do become tiresome, and many 
of his questions are simply trite, or simply self-absorbed, or obvious, irrelevant, or 
uninteresting (Why does what was beautiful suddenly shatter …)” (“Doubts,” 12–13).
 26 The striking images from the movie are the steamy sex scenes at the beginning with an 
exceedingly attractive Hanna (Kate Winslet); as a result, the most shocking scene for 
the audience is when the middle-aged Michael re-encounters Hanna and sees an old 
woman.
 27 As Ann Parry notes, Hanna’s gesture reveals that “even at this late stage” (i.e., after 
Hanna has read accounts written by Holocaust survivors) Hanna somehow “thought 
that a gift could be a trade-off that would somehow mitigate that ‘zero moment’ that 
occurred when she and those with her refused to release the Jewish women from the 
burning church and save their lives.” See Ann Parry, “The caesura of the Holocaust in 
Martin Amis’s Time’s Arrow and Bernhard Schlink’s The Reader,” Journal of European 
Studies 29, no. 3 (Sept 1999): 261. 
 28 Sansom states: “The book’s really big and important confusion is the central conceit of 
Hanna’s illiteracy, which is presumably supposed to represent but which in fact exag-
gerates and caricatures her lack of moral intelligence. Because it is something that can 
be taught and easily remedied, it both diminishes the seriousness of Hanna’s failings 
and holds out the promise of improvement and perfectibility” (“Doubts,”14).
 29 Joseph Metz makes a thorough and convincing argument for the many ways in which 
fascism is coded as feminine throughout the novel and how that femininity is destruc-
tive: “the hapless male protagonist is duped and undone by Hanna and her sexuality, 
before which he is helpless and to which he systematically loses his moral subjecthood.” 
See Metz, “ ‘Truth is a Woman’: Post-Holocaust Narrative, Postmodernism, and the 
Gender of Fascism in Bernhard Schlink’s Der Vorleser,” German Quarterly 77, no. 3 
(Summer 2004): 305. Schmitz—less critically—also regards Michael as an injured party. 
He states that Michael says he has made peace with his and Hanna’s story, but that 
“this peace does not consist of a closure in which the past is ‘aufgehoben’ (sublated) 
in the Hegelian sense, rather it consists of an acceptance of the failed life which is still 
determined by the injuries of youth.” See Schmitz, On Their Own Terms, 77.
 30 When Michael, as an older man, meets up with the surviving daughter in New York, 
the daughter refers to Hanna’s “brutality” (“Was that woman ever brutal,” 211—my 
translation [Was ist diese Frau brutal gewesen, 202]). In Holocaust as Fiction, Donahue 
points out: 
   What she means, we soon discover, is not Hanna’s treatment of the inmates 
trapped in the burning church, or her behaviour as camp guard, or even 
what she did (or failed to do) on the death march, as one might expect; 
rather, the survivor is referring to the sexual and emotional abuse that the 
young [Michael] Berg endured during the mismatched love affair. … This 
validation of Berg as victim, bestowed at this privileged moment in the novel 
by the sole Jewish survivor, may finally explain why Hanna’s war crimes 
have never been clearly delineated: they would have distracted from her 
victimization of Berg.” (129) 
  Donahue further points out that the surviving daughter asks Michael whether he 
thought Hanna realized what she had done to him: “In the novel as well as in the 
Lorraine Markotic250
film, this amounts to a conferral of victim status from an unimpeachable source.” See 
Donahue, Holocaust as Fiction, 180. 
 31 Although he makes a quite different argument, John E. Mackinnon argues that The 
Reader involves a “studied effort to erode the distinctions between guilty and innocent, 
between perpetrators and victims” (16), ending his article—appropriately I feel—with 
the word “insidious.” See Mackinnon, “Crime, Compassion, and the Reader,” Philos-
ophy and Literature 27 (2003): 1–20; quote from 16. See also Omar Bartov’s “Germany 
as Victim,” New German Critique 80, Special Issue on the Holocaust (Spring–Summer 
2000): 29–40. Richard Crownshaw, to the contrary, argues that Schlink attempts to in-
tervene critically in the binary thinking that marked German memory of perpetrators 
and victims in both the 1960s and 1990s. See Crownshaw, “Reading the Perpetrator: 
Bernhard Schlink’s Der Vorleser (The Reader) and Die Heimkehr (Homecoming),” in 
The Afterlife of Holocaust Memory in Contemporary Literature and Culture (London: 
Palgrave McMillan, 2010), 145–181.
 32 As Carola Jensen recently reminded me, a novel that centres around former Nazis on 
trial in a German court distracts from the fact that the vast majority of Nazis were 
never even tried. Not only were many able to emigrate shortly after the war, but others 
simply remained in Germany without legal consequences. In 2014, the German justice 
system finally sought (for the most part, unsuccessfully) to prosecute still living former 
SS guards from Auschwitz, all of whom were eighty-eight or older and generally unfit 
to stand trial. In other words, almost seventy years after the end of war, there seemed 
to be a concerted attempt to “catch up,” visibly to make up for all the trials that never 
took place. An article in Der Spiegel by Klaus Wiegrefe, “The Auschwitz Files: Why the 
Last SS Guards Will Go Unpunished,” quotes the historian Andreas Eichmüller: “of the 
6,500 members of the SS who served in Auschwitz and survived the war, only 29 were 
convicted in West Germany and reunified Germany, while about 20 were convicted in 
East Germany.” See Wiegrefe, “The Auschwitz Files: Why the Last SS Guards Will Go 
Unpunished,” Der Spiegel, 28 August 2014, 1. 
   Cynthia Ozick protests that “the plot of Schlink’s narrative turns not on the 
literacy that was overwhelmingly typical of Germany, but rather on an anomalous case 
of illiteracy, which the novel itself recognizes as freakish” (See Ozick, “The Rights of 
History vs Imagination” 26–27). Ozick objects to this violation of the “right of history” 
by the alleged “right of the imagination.” Although students who now learn about the 
Shoah through The Reader will likely realize that illiteracy was atypical, or presume 
it is a metaphor in the novel, they might not know just how extremely rare were trials 
(not to mention convictions) of former Nazis in postwar Germany. Hence, the “right 
of history” that is violated by the “right of imagination” in the novel might be less the 
“freakish” case of illiteracy that it portrays than the overall impression it leaves:  that 
in the 1960s former Nazis were finally legally pursued in Germany. Such an impression 
could easily have been corrected by Michael, who is a lawyer and works as a legal 
researcher. During the trial, Michael does reflect on the question of what the second 
generation should do with the knowledge of the horrors of the extermination of the 
Jews, and he mentions the lack of convictions (102), but this fact is not emphasized, and 
the courtroom drama is centre stage in the novel (and movie). Moreover, the plot of 
Schlink’s novel turns not on the denial of culpability that was overwhelmingly typical 
of perpetrators, but rather on an anomalous case of a Nazi perpetrator who, with the 
one exception, seeks to speak the truth during her trial. 
   In his book, Ordinary Men, Christopher Browning states that Reserve Police 
Battalion 101 “participated in the direct shooting deaths of at least 38,000 Jews” (142) 
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and that overall, for this “battalion of less than 500 men, the ultimate body count was 
at 83,000 Jews” (142). Browning concludes his chapter “Aftermath” with the following 
paragraph: “The interrogations of 210 men from Reserve Police Battalion 101 remain in 
the archives of the Office of the State Prosecutor in Hamburg. They constitute the prime 
source for this study. It is hoped that they will serve history better than they have served 
justice” (146). The last chapter of Wendy Lower’s book, Hitler’s Furies: German Women 
in the Nazi Killing Fields, is titled “What Happened to Them?” Here Lower recounts that 
very few of the women who contributed to, or directly participated in, the genocide in 
the east were prosecuted, and “even fewer were judged and convicted” (196). The final 
two sentences of the chapter are: “What happened to them? The short answer is that 
most got away with murder” (197). See Wendy Lower Hitler’s Furies: German Women in 
the Nazi Killing Fields (London: Chatto & Windus, 2013).   
   Of course, one of Schlink’s points seems to be that courts and legal proceedings 
are not to be equated with justice. But in The Reader the court is presented as actively 
interested in pursuing justice for the victims, which is misleading if not dishonest. See 
Lower’s Hitler’s Furies, 167ff.   
 33 Sansom, “Doubts,” 14.
 34 Schmitz writes: “Schlink’s book and its version of Vergangenheitsbewältigung without 
closure, peace without appeasement, is a further indication of a gradual shift towards an 
ownership of the heritage of National Socialism that is aware of its inherent problems 
and ruptures” (See Schmitz, On Their Own Terms, 78). My argument has been that 
the novel seems to eschew closure and appeasement, but actually serves to appease by 
closing itself off from all too many considerations. It excludes ownership (assuming that 
there could be such a thing) of the heritage of National Socialism by not thinking about 
what might have been inherited. Hall notes that while both The Reader and Selbs Justiz 
(Schlink’s earlier co-written mystery) “challenge their readers to consider genuinely 
difficult questions about guilt and moral accountability in relation to the Holocaust, they 
also close these questions down.” See Hall, “The Author, the Novel, the Reader,” 449. 
 35 In choosing which books to read aloud to Hanna, Michael states: “I do not ever re-
member asking myself whether I should go beyond Kafka, Frisch, Johnson, Bachmann, 
and Lenz, and read experimental literature, literature in which I do not recognize the 
story or like any of the characters” (183). One’s first response might be: What Kafka did 
Michael read wherein he recognized the story and liked the characters? One’s second 
response might be to realize that this is probably the kind of account Michael himself 
is seeking to write: one in which we recognize the story and like the characters. But 
a recognizable story with likeable characters does not seem especially appropriate to 
the Shoah, even if one’s focus is the relationship of the postwar generation to the war 
generation. 
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Atrocity, Banality, and Jouissance  
in Performance
Donia Mounsef
The Banality of Evil in Performance
In Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Hannah Arendt 
argued that atrocities are committed by ordinary people who are victims 
of neither perversion nor monstrosity. For Arendt, reporting on Otto Adolf 
Eichmann’s trial from Jerusalem in 1961, evil is the result of two systems: 
the first is a system that commits atrocities by merely diverting the atten-
tion of its participants onto bureaucratic concerns; the second is a system 
that fails to accomplish its goals by disconnecting its participants from 
the principles of the institutions they are serving. Eichmann, according to 
Arendt, “was not stupid. It was sheer thoughtlessness … that predisposed 
him to become one of the greatest criminals of that period. And if this is 
‘banal’ and even funny, if with the best will in the world one cannot extract 
any diabolical or demonic profundity from Eichmann, that is still far from 
calling it commonplace.”1 This, in essence, is “the banality of evil”—that 
atrocities can be committed by ordinary people who are “neither demonic 
nor monstrous.” In a lecture Arendt gave ten years after the Eichmann 
trial, she asserted that large-scale evil deeds—“which could not be traced 
to any particularity of wickedness, pathology, or ideological conviction in 
the doer”—were perhaps the result of extraordinary shallowness.2 
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It would have been more “comforting indeed to believe that Eichmann 
was a monster” writes Arendt.3 But the problem with evildoers like Eich-
mann is precisely
that so many were like him, and that the many were neither per-
verted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are terribly and terri-
fyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and of 
our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more 
terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it implied … that 
this new type of criminal, who is in actual fact hostis generis huma-
ni, commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh 
impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong.4 
 
What became evident in the Eichmann trial is that the perpetrator fol-
lowed ordinances and rules within the confines of the law, demonstrating 
that there is a certain blind obedience governing the actions of people like 
Eichmann, who follow bureaucratic rules to the teeth but fail to reflect on 
the content of such arbitrary rules.
Arendt’s position on Eichmann is frequently criticized for failing to 
account for the evil that is committed with full knowledge and intent, or as 
a blatant disregard for ethics. Most critical positions on Arendt’s rendering 
of the Eichmann trial argue that she trivialized the man’s fanatical and 
radical anti-Semitism by ascertaining that evil has no roots, that it is never 
“radical, that it is only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor 
any demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world 
precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. … That is its ‘ba-
nality.’ Only the good has depth and can be radical.”5 For Arendt, it is 
unequivocally “sheer thoughtlessness—something by no means identical 
with stupidity—that predisposed [Eichmann] to become one of the great-
est criminals of that period.”6 
Other critics, such as Slavoj Žižek in The Plague of Fantasies, have 
pointed out different blind spots in Arendt’s position: that jouissance 
makes clear the inadequacy of the “banality of evil.” From the French, jou-
issance is contrasted with pleasure as a form of transgressive enjoyment 
combined with a sense of loss. Using Lacan’s notion of the master’s en-
joyment in inflicting pain that structures the relationship of domination, 
Žižek contends that, beyond its banality, evil is a function of an “imaginary 
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screen” that maintains distance with the victim and the horror inflicted. 
The “imaginary screen” is the self-delusion, the story that glosses over the 
real motivation for becoming an agent of atrocity. For example, the Nazi 
guards hide behind an imaginary screen by telling themselves that they 
are “civilized Germans” who are doing a “necessary job” and following 
orders thoroughly while drawing secret enjoyment or sadistic jouissance 
from the bureaucratic violence they are committing. In other words, pol-
itical subjects are allowed “inherent transgressions” sanctioned by the sys-
tem to produce this secret jouissance. For Žižek, in order to understand 
the way executioners carry out atrocities without the slightest indignation, 
we have to supplement the purely symbolic bureaucratic logic involved in 
the notion of the “banality of evil” with these two other components: the 
imaginary screen of satisfactions and myths “which enable the subjects to 
maintain a distance towards (and thus to ‘neutralize’) the horrors they are 
involved in and the knowledge they have about them,” and “the real of the 
perverse (sadistic) jouissance in what they were doing (torturing, killing, 
dismembering bodies).”7 This very neutralization of the crime, according 
to Žižek, is precisely what makes it “ambiguous in its libidinal impact,” 
and thus morbidly enjoyable since 
on the one hand, it enabled (some of) the participants to neutral-
ize the horror and take it as “just another job”; on the other, the 
basic lesson of the perverse ritual … was in itself a source of an 
additional jouissance (does it not provide an additional kick if one 
performs the killing as a complicated administrative-criminal 
operation? Is it not more satisfying to torture prisoners as part 
of some orderly procedure—say, the meaningless “morning exer-
cises” which served only to torment them—didn’t it give another 
“kick” to the guards’ satisfaction when they were inflicting pain 
on their victims not only by directly beating them up but in the 
guise of an activity officially destined to maintain their health?). 
… One cannot claim that [the Nazi guards] were grey, dispas-
sionate bureaucrats blindly following orders in accordance with 
the German authoritarian tradition of unconditional obedience: 
numerous testimonies bear witness to the excess of enjoyment of 
“unnecessary” supplementary inflicting of pain or humiliation. 
… One cannot claim that the executioners were a bunch of crazy 
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fanatics oblivious of even the most elementary moral norms. … 
One cannot claim that they were terrorized into submission, since 
any refusal to execute an order would be severely punished: before 
doing any “dirty work,” members of the police unit were regularly 
asked if they were able to do it, and those who refused were ex-
cused without punishment.8  
It is this very “libidinal impact” that makes representations of atrocities 
highly problematic, as artistic, creative, and fictional works often risk 
trivializing, aestheticizing, or sensationalizing the atrocity they represent. 
Adrienne Rich underlined this same contradiction by arguing in favour 
of art as a necessary critique of totalizing systems in “Legislators of the 
World,” an article she wrote for the Guardian in 2006:
Poetry has been charged with “aestheticizing,” thus being complic-
it in the violent realities of power. … If to “aestheticize” is to glide 
across brutality and cruelty, treat them merely as dramatic occa-
sions for the artist rather than structures of power to be described 
and dismantled—much hangs on that word “merely”. … We can 
also define the “aesthetic,” not as a privileged and sequestered ren-
dering of human suffering, but as news of an awareness, a resis-
tance, which totalizing systems want to quell: art reaching into us 
for what’s still passionate, still unintimidated, still unquenched.9 
There is an undeniable disjunction between art, politics, violence, and 
jouissance that reframes the binary distinction between “ethicism” (the 
notion that art is guided by ethical concerns) and aestheticism (the no-
tion that art and ethics belong to autonomous spheres). If perpetrators 
of atrocities can hide behind an “imaginary screen,” so can audiences of 
atrocity conceal themselves behind the safety of the fourth wall. Can art 
represent atrocity without being complicit in the structures of power that 
it purports to critique?  
After tracing a brief history of violence in performance, this chapter 
will interrogate the way recent theatrical representations have challenged 
binary configurations of good and evil, and problematized simplistic re-
gimes of “us” and “them,” giving shape to Arendt’s view that evil is as or-
dinary as it is banal all the while embodying Žižek’s “libidinal impact” 
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of such representations. Three examples of recent artistic representations 
of atrocities will be examined: a play by Canadian playwright Judith 
Thompson, Palace of the End (2007), and multimedia performances by the 
Iraqi-American performance artist Wafaa Bilal, Shoot an Iraqi (2007), and 
… and Counting (2010). These plays and performances question the rep-
resentation of violence and the violence of representation by arguing that 
performance does not construct the real violence or reconstruct it for the 
audience—on the contrary, it estranges it, not unlike Brechtian alienation, 
revealing an exchange that is both realist and anti-realist, artistic repre-
sentation and reproduction of actuality, spectacle and mimesis. 
Spectacular Atrocity
How can theatre and performance, in their intimate and contained set-
tings, speak about atrocities, and other acts committed on a large scale, 
with a complex set of actors, victims, and perpetrators? Unlike representa-
tions of other major historical traumas, atrocities and genocide are not 
simply reproduced, nor are they reproducible on stage for a variety of rea-
sons. Theatre has, for the most part, subscribed to a certain sense of decor-
um (propriety, or what the French call bienséance) when it comes to repre-
senting extreme violence. The rule of good taste, as it has been known, gov-
erns what is allowed on stage and what shall remain off stage. In general, 
extreme violence was not depicted in front of an audience for a good part 
of theatre history even though violated bodies found their way into ancient 
Greek theatre, but they had to be moved off stage using the ekkyklema, or 
the wheeled platform, to conceal their provocative horror. Nevertheless, 
ancient Romans introduced blood spectacles and gladiator fights depicting 
the live slaughter of humans for the entertainment of the elite. Similarly, 
medieval drama and passion plays showed martyrdom, sacrifice, and mor-
bid mutilations as part of the action. Even Shakespeare’s theatre did not 
avoid some gory stage violence. Except in seventeenth-century neoclassic-
al France, the rule of good taste did not categorically prohibit the showing 
of extreme violence, which became the hallmark of the modern theatre. 
Whereas the early twentieth century showed a moderate amount of vio-
lence on stage—acting mostly as a contemplation of its consequences in 
the theatre of Bertolt Brecht or Samuel Beckett, for example—the theatre 
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of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century, influenced by 
television and media, exploited a more graphic depiction of violence.
What became known in the 1990s as “in-yer-face” theatre (as per Aleks 
Sierz’s term) was part of a long tradition of theatre of provocation, which 
is most broadly defined as a theatre that aims at shocking, provoking, and 
offending an audience. Like other forms of provocation theatre, what in 
Britain became known as the New Brutalist movement10 dominated the 
London scene of the 1990s with daringly graphic representation of vio-
lence as part and parcel of the theatrical avant-garde. New Brutalists such 
as Sarah Kane, Anthony Neilson, Naomi Wallace, David Eldridge, Martin 
McDonagh, and Mark Ravenhill pushed the limits of what is acceptable on 
stage, multiplying physical and verbal violence, mutilated bodies, horrific 
tortures, and gory scenes, and frequently offending their audiences with 
an extremely gruesome and unapologetic cruelty. Sarah Kane’s Blasted 
(1995), which coincided with the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, is 
often considered the quintessence of the New Brutalist movement. These 
violent and offensive acts changed the way we experience or “consume” 
staged violence. They aimed not at creating new scenes of gore, as nothing 
could shock an audience accustomed to filmic and mediatized violence, 
but at breaking the codes of how we see and experience that brutality.
Despite the ubiquitous rule of good taste, from Aeschylus to Mc-
Donagh, the theatre has a long tradition of terrifying acts of physical ag-
gression, murder, dismemberment, even cannibalism. The difference is 
that in the late twentieth century, instead of following the classical rule of 
bienséance, playwrights represented the violence with either extreme real-
ism or extreme stylization combined with an autobiographical impulse. 
For example, one cannot dissociate Sarah Kane’s Psychosis 4.48 from the 
playwright’s relationship to self-harm, and the severe depression that lead 
to her suicide in 1999. Nevertheless, as violent and as horrifically real as 
the New Brutalist aesthetic was, there is a distancing effect at play—not in 
the Brechtian sense of distance for critical awareness—but in the sense of 
a numbing distance. 
If stages in the 1990s were littered with corpses, rape, murder, blood, 
and bones it was perhaps a way to express ideological disillusionment after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the end of 
the binary opposition between the Eastern and the Western Blocs, while 
the international will to stop mass atrocities (from Rwanda to Somalia to 
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Kosovo to Bosnia) was being challenged. With the end of the Cold War and 
the disappearance of a clearly defined ideological Other, theatre turned 
violently inward, where the body became the site of a real and imagined 
violence packaged in realist, surrealist, or farcical overtones. 
Yet, as in any representation of symbolic violence, the audience will 
always demand more, making the need for excess at best tedious and at 
worst ethically problematic. What would the logical evolution from ex-
treme “represented” violence be if not “presented” violence or the un-
acceptable terrain of snuff, where “actors” (not characters) are actually 
tortured and subjected to extreme violence? Is there a danger of rendering 
an audience immune to such violence to the point that it may identify not 
with the victim but with the perpetrator? How do we control, if that is 
even possible, the slippery slope of representation and identification with 
atrocity in live performance? I am not sure if these questions are on the 
minds of most playwrights when they are writing extremely violent and 
gory scenes, but they are likely on the minds of audience members leav-
ing the theatre who may feel guilty, angry, or simply offended for having 
willingly or unwillingly, consensually or non-consensually, participated 
in brutally orgiastic violence. 
And yet, the mass dissemination and representation of atrocities con-
tinued past 9/11 and into the War on Terror with the return to spectacular 
violence exposed in the massive distribution of the images of the Amer-
ican prison scandal at Abu Ghraib.11 Beyond their political or military 
significance, the Abu Ghraib photographs performed a certain colonial 
nostalgia for a fetishistic representation or desire to subjugate otherness 
through the mise en scène of a soft-core pornographic performance meant 
to endow the director/soldier/voyeur with a “screen” of superiority over the 
dangerous “subhuman” Other. Spectacular atrocities such as the Abu Gh-
raib prison scandal (and the continued fallout of torture scandals revealed 
in massive cable leaks) or the highly stylized ISIS beheading videos put 
an end to Michel Foucault’s “age of sobriety” in punishment and brought 
back to the forefront questions of the representation and representability 
of violence on a large scale. It is perhaps because atrocities in the global 
era have morphed into messy crises made even messier by what Michael 
Mann called “the dark side of democracy,” and because democratic ideals 
convert demos into ethnos, we are witnessing the rise of “organic nation-
alism” that only helps promote the cleansing of minorities. Consequently, 
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representations of these atrocities have become problematic: no longer is 
it important to stage these events as a reminder of our struggle to “remain 
human,” as Christian Biet argued when he wrote that representations of 
the Holocaust were necessary “to lead the audience to a humanistic and 
universal understanding of the difficulty every human must face in the 
struggle to remain human.”12 But beyond that need to remain human, vio-
lent history is un-representable because it destroys the very foundation of 
language we need to represent it. In effect, it may only be possible to repre-
sent history in an artistic rendering. As Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub 
pointed out in Testimony: Crises in Witnessing, “art alone can live up to the 
task of contemporary thinking and of meeting the incredible demands of 
suffering, of politics and of contemporary consciousness, and yet escape 
the subtly omnipresent and the almost unavoidable cultural betrayal both 
of history and of the victims.”13 
“Between the Spectacular and the Embodied”
In their book, Violence Performed, Patrick Anderson and Jisha Menon 
suggest that “violence acquires its immense significance in a delicate pivot 
between the spectacular and the embodied.”14 This delicate pivot is what 
brings the public to convene around scenes of mass atrocity, as Mark Selt-
zer observed in his classic study of trauma and wound culture. According 
to Seltzer, the pathological public sphere functions as a form of “conven-
ing of the public around scenes of violence,” with a “fascination with torn 
and opened bodies and torn and opened persons, the collective gathering 
around shock, trauma and the wound.”15 As fascinated as we are by torn 
bodies, we continue to grapple with their representability in art and the 
paradox of the impossibility of witnessing. Felman and Laub observed ju-
diciously that a witness is required “when historical accuracy is in doubt 
and when both the truth and its supporting elements of evidence are called 
into question.”16 Conversely, writing on Arendt’s Eichmann, Felman warns 
of the danger of dramatizing the struggle between law and pathology, and 
the surfacing of a “juridical unconscious” during trials that attempt to 
give a voice to victims of trauma. She maintains that a pattern “emerges in 
which the trial, while it tries to put an end to trauma, inadvertently per-
forms an acting out of it. Unknowingly, the trial thus repeats the trauma, 
reenacts its structures.”17 There is, however, a contradictory process at play 
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in representing atrocities: the compulsion to speak and make the trauma 
visible and the pressure to remain silent in the face of one’s inability to 
articulate a truthful representation of the experience. As Felman observed 
brilliantly: “testimony does not simply tell about the impossibility of tell-
ing: it dramatizes it—enacts it—through its own lapse into coma and its 
own collapse into silence.”18 Theatre is the site of this problematic drama-
tization between the experience, the understanding, the re-enactment, 
and the recollection. 
The Spectacular 
In Judith Thompson’s 2007 play, Palace of the End, the first of a three-part 
monologue titled “My Pyramids” is told from the perspective of the fe-
male soldier, Lynndie England, who appeared in many of the Abu Ghraib 
photographs gleefully committing acts of atrocity and torture, and later 
becoming the scapegoat for the entire debacle. An earlier incarnation of 
the play, from 2005, showcased a single monologue entitled “My Pyra-
mids,” and was then expanded into three monologues with the addition 
of “Harrowdown Hill” and “Instruments of Yearning.” The three-part play 
was first produced in Toronto at the Canadian Stage in 2007. “My Pyra-
mids” gives us a different and more human side to Lynndie England, who 
appears pregnant and in good health after her return from a tour of duty 
in Iraq that ended with the infamous scandal. The monologue begins with 
Lynndie (referred to as “Soldier”) “googling” herself to find out, much to 
her naïve surprise, that her name produces six hundred thousand hits. The 
media frenzy around Lynndie’s actions at Abu Ghraib sheds light on the 
way the public response often works to assign blame without any complex 
analysis of ethical or political responsibility. Lynndie’s naïveté makes her 
lament the fact that she will never be a hero like Jessica Lynch:
SOLDIER. I mighta had a TV movie made about me, too. She is 
truly a hero she is, and hey, did you know she’s from West Virginia 
too? Yeah, she’s a country girl, like me, and us country girls kick 
butt! Nobody messes with a country girl, oh no, let go! Can you 
imagine how scared she felt? Everybody in her company killed 
except her? Prisoner of the most brutal people on earth? Yeah. I 
reckon Jessica Lynch is America’s sweetheart. I am America’s se-
cret that got shouted out to the world.19 
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If it is possible to scapegoat this young naïve woman from West Virginia 
it is because she is, compared to the other female hero, an anti-hero, an 
“anti-Jessica Lynch,” as Melissa Brittain proposed in her chapter “Benevo-
lent Invaders, Heroic Victims and Depraved Villains,” in (En)Gendering 
the War on Terror.20 Lynndie expects that the public will demonize her 
and condemn her for her despicable actions—all those “liberals, PEACE 
PINHEADS. Pink cotton candy cowards afraid of being at war.”21 This is 
perhaps the playwright’s attempt at implicating her audience in an active 
dialogue with the banality of evil veiled in naïve patriotism or nationalistic 
rhetoric. When Lynndie is done with her racist, orientalist tirade we are 
left with a crash through the “looking glass of culture,” as she imagines 
herself standing in—metonymically—for what makes America powerful 
and vulnerable: “I said you don’t MESS with the eagle you don’t MESS 
with the eagle, dude or the eagle tear your eyes out and that’s what I did I 
tore ‘em out and I flew, man, for just that night I flew through Abu G. my 
wingspan like a football field. And I soared through the air. ‘Til I crashed 
back. Through the looking glass.”22 
Brittain further observes that when the Abu Ghraib prison scandal 
erupted we saw many photographs of male perpetrators and their male 
and female victims. When the pictures became public and the story turned 
into a scandal, “we began seeing fewer and fewer photographs of male sol-
diers torturing Iraqi men, and began seeing and hearing more and more 
about the photographs that depicted Lynndie England sexually humiliat-
ing Iraqi male prisoners.”23 The images of white female perpetrators served 
a different purpose, according to Brittain: 
The images of Arab men being broken, subdued, shamed and dis-
ciplined by a white woman allow for the realization of the “Amer-
ican dream” of the total demasculation and humiliation of Arab 
men, while white masculinity remains outside the category of 
“depravity,” and the white male establishment, both military and 
governmental avoids blame. The pleasure a deeply racist society 
experiences when viewing images of a white woman grinning at 
the sexual humiliation of Arab men diverts attention away from 
the larger question of who is ultimately responsible for the abuses, 
and on to a discussion of one “sexually deviant” woman.24 
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This is because, according to Brittain, focusing on England was an effect-
ive way to manage yet another crisis in US authority: “In the fantasy world 
of US benevolence, England is the ‘anti-Jessica Lynch,’ the ‘whore’ in the 
conventional virgin/whore dichotomy. The fetishization of England as a 
‘phallic female’ turned the scandal into a cautionary tale of what happens 
when women get too much power, while sparing white masculinity the bad 
press.”25 Similarly, in contrast to the elemental evil portrayed by Lynndie, 
the “media mobilized Lynch’s working-class status through reference to 
her humble ambitions and ‘down-home’ tastes, replacing the middle-class 
femininity of colonial narratives with an image of working-class white 
femininity worth protecting.”26 Thompson’s play works against the ideo-
logical manipulations of England versus Lynch by offering a vision of the 
female soldier as yet another pawn in a hyper-military, hyper-masculine 
system that turns atrocity into spectacle.
In an earlier interview with playwright Ann Holloway, Judith Thomp-
son discusses the same issue of dehumanizing the soldier in “My Pyra-
mids.” The portrayal in “My Pyramids” of Lynndie’s childish amusement 
at her torture of Iraqi prisoners as well as her tendency to downplay her 
personal responsibility for the abuse of these prisoners is highlighted in 
the interview.27 Thompson reminds Holloway that at Abu Ghraib, Lynndie 
went as far as to perform certain torture “skits”—such as walking the sol-
diers on leashes—for the entertainment of other, mostly male, soldiers.28 
Thompson sees in Lynndie more than just elemental evil, and points to 
her lack of education and sophistication and her pathetic susceptibil-
ity to the flattery of any kind of sexual attention from male soldiers. In 
a sense Thompson gives credence to Arendt’s view that thoughtlessness 
and delusion are at the roots of evil when she remarks in the interview 
that “self-delusion is funny, and the way she talks is funny. And I do think 
that unfortunately there is an element of class condescension—that we are 
laughing, I guess, at her lack of education.”29 
In the play, the thoughtlessness with which Lynndie proceeds is evi-
dent in her complete ignorance of her obligation as a jailer and of her pris-
oner-subjects. She starts by viewing Iraqis not as men, but as a “bunch of 
terrorists” who all look and act the same: “these are not men, they are ter-
rorists. … Actually, it’s the first thing that came to my mind when I walked 
into that prison and seen all them men that look exactly alike. I know what 
might be fun: HUMAN PYRAMID WITH NIKKID CAPTIVE MEN.”30 
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Following these racist musings, Lynndie recalls an incident where as a 
child she tormented a young girl in West Virginia: “Lee Ann Wibby is 
an American, she was very VERY different from the APES AT ABU GH-
RAIB. They was monsters in the shape of human beings.”31 What makes 
Lee Ann Wibby different from the Iraqi “apes”? Is it because the victim is 
an American girl who is by definition innocent? Or is it because in tor-
turing and dehumanizing Arab men who are “animals” and “monsters” 
she feels more useful in this system of instrumentalized power without 
responsibility? As an agent of this unquestionable neo-colonial system, 
Lynndie rules over “evil RAKEES” who must be subdued and moulded 
into an ideological entity that carries its guilt by simply being the Other in 
the colonial binary. 
Nick Stevenson observed that the American war machine must often 
construct otherness as evil at the outset of war in order to justify abuse and 
domination. He writes that leading up to the first Gulf War in 1991, media 
and television stories were constructed to focus on “the personalised evil 
of Saddam Hussein, the promotion of inadequately verified horror stories 
of Iraqi atrocities, racist projections of uncivilised Arabs and the mar-
ginalisation of alternate perspectives.”32 The media hallucination (or the 
“ecstasy of communication” as Jean Baudrillard would call it) makes it 
possible to hide behind our self-deluded view of our neo-colonial mission 
and helps us avoid any ethical and historical responsibility. Even though 
no one in the West believes that the war was about exporting democracy to 
Iraq or ridding it of its evil dictator, it became absolutely necessary for the 
media to represent the “savage,” uncivilized Other in need of help, while 
in effect bringing out layers and layers of violence, exploitation, and abuse. 
“My Pyramids” is a piece about our ethical porosity and inability to look 
at the Other as equal, which the play’s second monologue addresses in dif-
ferent ways. 
In “Harrowdown Hill” we are presented with the perspective of Dr. 
David Kelly, the British weapons inspector who was found dead in mys-
terious circumstances in 2003—an apparent suicide—two days after he 
appeared in front of a British government inquiry and denied claims that 
Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The title references the wooded area 
near his home where Kelly’s body was found. In the play, we meet him 
in the last few hours before his death, and we hear a monologue that is 
more dialogic and less self-centred than Lynndie’s “Pyramids,” in which 
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he addresses the audience and invites us into the scene of his death. Kelly 
predicts the public response to his impending death: “almost nobody will 
believe it. There will be rock songs, art installations by angry Germans, 
television movies and the Internet will roil with talk of the murder of 
David Kelly by men in black, that’s how I’ll be remembered. The mousey 
scientist who set off a storm. Another casualty of the War in Iraq.”33 Kelly 
is capable of discerning the constructed division between a neo-colonial 
self, and a cultural Other by demonstrating a capacity to apprehend the 
humanity of Iraqis. In his hazy rant, he recounts his close friendship with 
Jalal—the bookshop owner in Baghdad—who was killed along with his 
family by American soldiers, who also raped his young daughter.34 Jalal, 
having noticed that some US soldiers were watching his daughter with 
“evil in their eyes,” had appealed to Kelly for help. Kelly was unable to help 
his Iraqi friend and his daughter while reassuring him that the soldiers are 
“carefully monitored by their commanding officers, and they would never 
dare approach her.”35
 Kelly’s monologue is a reminder of what happens when we stand idly 
by and do nothing to stop the atrocities committed in our name. Susan 
Sontag argued in Regarding the Pain of Others that the pain of others is 
what interpolates us in pictures of atrocity, but if we are left unable to 
do anything about what we are witnessing, and if we are unable to learn 
something from what we are seeing, then we succumb to our voyeuristic 
tendencies. Dr. Kelly’s final testament is a reminder that doing nothing 
is damning in itself because it strips us of our conscience and makes us 
complicit in the very acts that we purport to condemn:
[DAVID] You see, this might be the only way I can have an impact, 
the only way I can make up for what I did not do. …
I’m beginning to think that it’s the greatest sin of our time. 
Knowing, and pretending that we don’t know, so that we won’t be 
inconvenienced in any way. Do you understand what I am saying?
I knew. All the things I knew. And I did nothing.36 
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Like Lynndie, Kelly must walk “through the looking glass” in his final 
scene, revealing the truth about his guilt-ridden self. After he shouts his 
need to tell the truth, his breathing becomes laborious, he lies down, 
thanks the audience for witnessing his dying moments, has an imaginary 
conversation with his daughter, to whom he sings a song from “Winnie 
the Pooh,” and then prepares to let go: “But I, David Kelly, I am here, and 
I promise, I will always be here.”37 David Kelly’s ghostliness transforms 
the stage into a thanatological site where the living become memorials to 
unrecoverable loss. 
Foreshadowing the spectral appearance of its protagonist, the third 
monologue begins where the second left off: “One of my earliest memories 
is drawing with my own blood” says Nehrjas Al Saffarh of “Instruments 
of Yearning.”38 The final monologue is recited by the ghost of an Iraqi 
woman, tortured along with her children by the Saddam regime. We soon 
find out that she was killed in a US bombing during the first Gulf War. She 
was subjected to all sorts of brutality by the Saddam regime for refusing 
to reveal the whereabouts of her husband, the leader of the Iraqi Com-
munist Party. The monologue is titled “Instruments of Yearning” after the 
nickname given to Saddam’s secret police. Nehrjas (which means daffodil 
in Arabic) is a gentle, loving mother whose poetic recounting brings the 
audience close to the stage. She even comments on the cultural divide that 
separated her from us: “Wait. I can see you are pulling away from me 
when I say ‘Communist.’ But this is not the Communist Party of Stalin, 
or Mao or Pol Pot, or post-war Europe, far far from it. All the kind and 
thinking and peace loving people in Iraq at that time were members of 
the Communist Party.”39 Some critics have dismissed the first two mono-
logues, perhaps because of the unease with which we have to face a West-
ern subjectivity responsible for either perpetrating or justifying atrocities. 
Sam Thielman writes in the online magazine Variety: “If ‘Palace of the 
End’ was nothing but this third section, it would be an excellent play with 
a lot to say about an underexplored period in history. As it is, it’s a pain-
fully mediocre retread of everything everyone thinks about Iraq. But, with 
a triumphant finale.”40 
Nevertheless, “Instruments of Yearning” is the most graphic of the 
three monologues in terms of its depiction of atrocities, and yet it remains 
the most poetic. As we listen to Nehrjas recount the death of her sons and 
her torture at the hands of Saddam’s secret police, we also listen to her 
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recite beautiful Arabic poetry and describe in poetic terms the mythical 
significance of the palm tree, which seems surreal when contrasted with 
her horrendous accounts: 
NEHRJAS. Like an American horror movie. Now, the castle has 
three stories. The highest floor is where they would take you to 
talk. … Then if you didn’t wish to talk, they would send you down 
to main floor. It was what we call Torture Lite.
Beatings. Broken bones. Nails removed. … And if you still didn’t 
talk, you were sent to the basement. There were bodies everywhere. 
Bodies of people you knew. Once you have smelled the smell of 
death, of mass murder and suffering, nothing smells sweet again, 
not ever again.41 
The Nehrjas of “Instruments of Yearning” is everything we refuse to see or 
relate to in Iraq: she is a woman, she is gentle, she recites poetry, and she is 
strong in the face of unspeakable suffering. To the death, she will not be-
tray her political convictions, even when her son is tortured and killed on 
the roof of the prison.42 While we witness Lynndie’s vibrant health and ob-
vious pregnancy in the beginning, and are called to witness as Dr. Kelly’s 
dying moments are consumed by guilt, we are invited to listen to Nehrjas’s 
posthumous testimony as a tribute to what remains human in all of us in 
the face of unimaginable atrocity. If the soldier, Lynndie, needs to defend 
her innocence and irresponsibility, and Dr. Kelly pleads for forgiveness for 
his inaction, then Nehrjas wants us to open our eyes in the hope that we 
better understand what happens on the other side of our war machine. By 
performing three different first-person accounts, these three testimonies 
imply that it is up to the spectator to move from irresponsibility, guilt, 
and complacency to action, empathy, and understanding. The triptych of 
Palace of the End references the tension between atrocity and representa-
tion, and poses a fundamental question as old as the Oresteia, as Marvin 
Carlson observed in The Haunted Stage: “How does one break out of an 
ongoing cycle of almost unimaginable cruelty and revenge?”43 
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The Embodied 
Wafaa Bilal, an Iraqi-American performance artist, proposes a different 
perspective on the problems of responsibility, atrocity, and representation. 
By showing and enacting the atrocity, performance art offers an ontologic-
al approach to the epistemological tension between telling and showing. 
While texts narrate the horror, sometimes metaphorically, performance 
art locates us face to face with the suffering body and the difficult embodi-
ment of otherness as “a people” not just “people.” As Adam Muller argued 
in chapter 3 of this collection, “the signal casualty of genocide is a people, 
not people, and thus a highly morally and politically charged form of (and 
capacity for) belonging.”44
Bilal’s performance piece and interactive installation, Shoot an Iraqi 
(2007; also known as Domestic Tension), was based on the artist’s experi-
ence of living for one month in a Chicago gallery with an internet-con-
trolled paintball gun aimed at him at all times that allowed people all over 
the world to shoot him. Bilal explains that the idea came from a newspaper 
article he read about a young American soldier who goes to work every day 
in Colorado to execute orders of firing remotely controlled missiles and 
drones at Iraqis. After the first twelve days in the gallery, Bilal was shot 
at over forty thousand times. By the end of the performance, over sixty 
thousand people from over a hundred and thirty countries had fired the 
internet paintball gun at him, while some hackers tampered with the gun 
to make it fire automatically instead of a single shot per person. 
Shoot an Iraqi does not expose the banality of evil; on the contrary, 
it performs the banality of jouissance associated with the enjoyment of 
perpetrating a remote violence with no tangible consequences. It shows 
that our complacency is the result of being desensitized to the suffering 
of others. Not unlike the ethical complexities revealed in the Milgram 
Yale experiment and the Zimbardo Stanford experiment,45 where people’s 
critical resistance is easily compromised by authoritarian regimes, Bilal’s 
gallery experiment reveals how easy it is for ordinary people to inflict 
extreme violence and gleefully become agents of the most unimaginable 
atrocity. Bilal foresees that his approach may be controversial; he argues 
that this “sensational approach to the war is meant to engage people who 
may not be willing to engage in political dialogue through conventional 
means. DOMESTIC TENSION [depicts] the suffering of war not through 
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human displays of dramatic emotion, but rather through engaging people 
in the sort of playful interactive video game with which they are familiar.”46 
Bilal’s experiment points to Žižek’s critique of Arendt: that there is 
an avoidable enjoyment or jouissance associated with inflicting pain that 
underpins the relationship of domination. The internet gun is a function 
of an “imaginary screen” that maintains distance from the victim and “the 
real of the perverse and sadistic jouissance” discussed above. Bilal critiques 
this perversity further in his other performance project … and Counting. 
In this 2010 live tattooing session set up at the gallery of the Elizabeth 
Foundation for the Arts in New York, Bilal had 105,000 dots representing 
the official Iraqi death count, and 5,000 dots representing American 
deaths, tattooed on his back. Green ink was used to represent Iraqi deaths, 
and was visible only under ultraviolet light, while red ink was used for 
the American deaths. Bilal explains that the dots also embody the death 
of his brother Haji, who was “killed by a missile at a checkpoint in their 
hometown of Kufa, Iraq in 2004. Wafaa Bilal feels the pain of both Amer-
ican and Iraqi families who’ve lost loved ones in the war, but the deaths 
of Iraqis like his brother are largely invisible to the American public.”47 In 
addition to the tattooing, during the performance different people from 
different backgrounds were invited to read the long list of names of Iraqis 
and Americans killed in the war. 
Turning his body into a living gravestone, Bilal uses primitive forms 
of engraving to slow down the frenzied violence of modern regimes, who 
through a click of a button can annihilate a whole people. There is a secu-
lar mythopoiesis (the creation of myth) at play in this performance as the 
sharing of the tattoo session encodes the body with the here and now, 
transforming the distancing and telematic structures of remote violence 
into embodied experiences—a shared modern Eucharist, elevated to the 
level of mythology devoid of mystical connotations. Bilal shows us how 
important it is to embody suffering and atrocity through a violation of 
textual boundaries producing permanent, fleshy documentary evidence 
which cannot be disputed. Bilal’s tattooing displays atrocity by bringing 
the external experience inward in order to resist sensationalizing, trivial-
izing, or aestheticizing it. Consequently, by becoming the corporeal site 
of suffering, Bilal’s embodied testimonial points to the fact that repre-
senting atrocity is not only a story of trauma—it is also a story of survival 
and resistance.
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Conclusion
Both Judith Thompson and Wafaa Bilal point out that what is real, what 
is plausible, what is provable, and what is reproducible, is not necessarily 
representable. When we are asked to witness the dying moments of David 
Kelly, or the painful live tattooing of the artist in order to make a statement 
on the embodied nature of atrocity, we assume that there is a general cul-
tural context in which this shared knowledge is recognizable. Addressing 
the modalities of perception of the audience bearing witness to atrocities, 
this chapter argues in favour of considering the space of performance not 
as a site of construction of truth or a mirror to atrocity, but as a space of 
resistance where being present, listening, and reflecting becomes an ethi-
cal responsibility. While we are faced with the ethical density of atrocities, 
we have a responsibility as cultural critics and as artists to reflect on their 
historical, material, and existential conditions. In conclusion, we can only 
echo what Toni Morrison said when asked how she can write about slav-
ery: “if they can survive it, I can write about it.” 
NOTES
 1 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: 
Penguin, 1994), 287–288.
 2 Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture,” Social Research 38, 
no. 3 (Fall 1971): 418.
 3 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 5.
 4 Ibid., 276.  
 5 Ibid., 26.  
 6 Ibid., 27–28. 
 7 Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997), 55.
 8 Ibid., 55–56. Italics in original.
 9 Adrienne Rich, “Legislators of the World,” Guardian (London), 18 November 2006,  
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2006/nov/18/featuresreviews.guardianreview15 
(accessed 20 January 2013). 
 10 The expression “New Brutalism” was coined by the British architects Alison and 
Peter Smithson to refer to the architectural style exhibiting a brutalist aesthetic (from 
“brutalism,” derived from Le Corbusier’s use of béton brut, or raw cement, in the 1950s).
 11 The Abu Ghraib prison scandal erupted in 2004 when internet accounts and photo-
graphs of abuse and torture of Iraqi prisoners held by the US Army’s 372nd Military 
Police Company were made public. The senior officer in Iraq at the time, Lieutenant 
General Ricardo Sanchez, ordered an investigation which Major General Antonio 
Taguba conducted, issuing a damning report that confirmed widespread prisoner 
10 | ATROCITY, BANALITY, AND JOUISSANCE IN PERFORMANCE 271
abuses at the hands of US Army personnel: waterboarding, humiliation, sodomy, attack 
with dogs, sleep deprivation, burning with phosphoric acid, etc. A media storm ensued 
with in-depth reporting by programs such as 60 minutes (broadcast on 28 April 2004), 
and the New Yorker magazine (10 May 2004), accusing high-ranking officers of turning 
a blind eye to the violations.
 12 Christian Biet, “Rwanda 94: Theater, Film, and Intervention,” Cardozo Law Review 31, 
no. 4 (2010): 1046.  
 13 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psycho-
analysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1991), 34.
 14 Patrick Anderson and Jisha Menon, eds., Violence Performed: Local Roots and Global 
Routes of Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 5.
 15 Mark Seltzer, “Wound Culture: Trauma in the Pathological Public Sphere,” October 80 
(1997): 3.
 16 Felman and Laub, Testimony, 6.
 17 Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 5.
 18 Ibid., 161. Italics in original.  
 19 Judith Thompson, Palace of the End (Toronto: Playwrights Canada Press, 2007), 10. 
 20 Melissa Brittain, “Benevolent Invaders, Heroic Victims and Depraved Villains” (En)
Gendering the War on Terror, ed. Krista Hunt and Kim Rygiel Eds (Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 2006), 86.  
 21 Thompson, Palace of the End, 7.  
 22 Ibid., 18–19.
 23 Brittain, “Benevolent Invaders,” 89.  
 24 Ibid.
 25 Ibid., 89–90.
 26 Ibid., 88.  
 27 Quoted in Ann Holloway, “Hedda & Lynndie & Jabber & Ciel: An Interview with Judith 
Thompson,” in The Masks of Judith Thompson, ed. Ric Knowles (Toronto: Playwrights 
Canada Press, 2006), 143.  
 28 Ibid., 141.  
 29 Ibid.  
 30 Thompson, Palace of the End, 12.  
 31 Ibid., 14.
 32 Nick Stevenson, Understanding Media Cultures: Social Theory and Mass Communica-
tion (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 188.
 33 Thompson, Palace of the End, 23.  
 34 Ibid., 25–26.  
 35 Ibid., 28.
 36 Ibid., 24.
 37 Ibid., 30.  
Donia Mounsef272
 38 Ibid., 32.
 39 Ibid., 38.
 40 Sam Thielman, “Palace of the End,” Variety, 23 June 2008, http://variety.com/2008/
legit/reviews/palace-of the-end-1200508877/ (accessed 1 February 2014). 
 41 Thompson, Palace of the End, 41.
 42 Ibid., 44.
 43 Marvin Carlson, The Haunted Stage: The Theatre as Memory Machine (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 2002), 47.   
 44 See Adam Muller’s contribution to this volume, “Troubling History, Troubling Law: 
The Question of Indigenous Genocide in Canada.”
 45 The Milgram shock experiment was conducted at Yale University in 1961 shortly after 
the beginning of the Eichmann trial. The experiment was devised by social psychol-
ogist Stanley Milgram to measure the willingness of participants to follow orders 
even if those orders contravened their ethical and moral imperatives. The experiment 
measured how much pain an ordinary citizen would inflict on another through a fake 
electric shock just because he was ordered to do so. By the end of the experiment, 26 of 
the 40 participants (65 percent) would have inflicted the highest voltage, enough to kill 
their subject. The Zimbardo experiment, also known as the Stanford prison experiment, 
was conducted by a team of researchers in 1971 headed by psychology professor Philip 
Zimbardo and funded by the US Office of Naval Research. The experiment, which was 
interrupted after six days, examined the behavior of 24 participants randomly assigned 
the role of prisoner or guard. The guards were instructed to inflict psychological torture 
and mild abuse on the prisoners, a role that many assumed willingly, demonstrating 
that abusive behaviour by average individuals without sadistic or authoritarian tenden-
cies develops by virtue of being in an oppressive setting. 
 46 Wafaa Bilal, Shoot an Iraqi. Domestic Tension, 2007, artist’s website: http://wafaabilal.
com/html/domesticTension.html (accessed 1 May 2012). 
 47 Wafaa Bilal, . . . And Counting, 2010, artist’s website: http://wafaabilal.com/html/and-
Counting.php (accessed 1 May 2012).
273
Contributors
AMARNATH AMARASINGAM is a Social Science and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada Postdoctoral Fellow in the Resilience 
Research Centre at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
ANDREW R. BASSO is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political 
Science at the University of Calgary in Calgary, Alberta. 
KRISTIN BURNETT is an associate professor in the Department of 
Indigenous Learning at Lakehead University in Thunder Bay, Ontario.
LORI CHAMBERS is a professor in the Department of Women’s Studies 
at Lakehead University in Thunder Bay, Ontario.
LAURA BETH COHEN is a PhD candidate in the Division of Global 
Affairs at Rutgers University in Newark, New Jersey.
TRAVIS HAY is a PhD candidate in the Department of History at York 
University in Toronto, Ontario.
STEVEN LEONARD JACOBS holds the Aaron Aronov Endowed Chair 
of Judaic Studies and is an associate professor of religious studies in 
the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Alabama in 
Tuscaloosa, Alabama.
LORRAINE MARKOTIC is an associate professor in the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of Calgary in Calgary, Alberta.
Understanding Atrocities274
SARAH MINSLOW is an adjunct lecturer in the Department of English 
and the Department of Global, International and Area Studies at the 
University of North Carolina in Charlotte, North Carolina.
DONIA MOUNSEF is an associate professor in the Department of 
Drama at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Alberta.
ADAM MULLER is an associate professor in the Department of English, 
Film, and Theatre at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Manitoba.
SCOTT W. MURRAY is an associate professor of history in the 
Department of Humanities at Mount Royal University in Calgary, 
Alberta.
CHRISTOPHER POWELL is an associate professor in the Department of 
Sociology at Ryerson University in Toronto, Ontario.
RAFFI SARKISSIAN is the founder and chair of the Sara Corning 
Centre for Genocide Education, an instructor at Centennial College, and 
vice principal at A.R.S. Armenian Private School in Toronto, Ontario.
275
Attawapiskat, 145–148, 151–60, 163n.19
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 42–43n.9, 87
B
Baer, Elizabeth, 206–7, 211
Balakian, Peter, 88
Balkans, 58, 172
“banality of evil”, 223–24, 253–54, 255, 262, 
268; responses to/criticisms of 224, 
254–56. See also Arendt, Hannah
Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D., 28–29, 32
Barta, Tony, 6, 23, 39–40
Bauman, Zygmunt, 6
Baum, Steven K, 204
Bearhead, Charlene, 84–85
Bedrosyan, Raffi, 119
Berg, Michael (The Reader), chapter 9
Bergen, Doris, 206
Bilal, Wafaa, 257, 268–269, 270
Biziouras, Nikolaos, 32
Bizimungu, Pasteur, 182
Black July pogrom (Sri Lanka), 30–33
Blatchford, Christie, 157–58
Borneman, John, 67–68
Bosnia, chapter 2; Army of Bosnia i Herze-
govina (ARBiH), xiii, 53, 66, 80n.89; 
Bosnia i Herzegovina, Republic 
of, 52; Bosnian Croats, 49, 74n.18; 
Bosnian Muslims (Bošniak), xiii, 49, 
52–53, 66, 68, 73n.8, 74n.18; Bosnian 
Serbs, 49, 51, 53, 58, 64, 68, 69, 
74n.18, 204–205; Bosnian Serb Army 
(VRS), xiv, 52–53, 64; Bosnian War, 
A 
Aboriginal peoples (Canada): genocide 
against, 7–8, 85, chapters 3 and 6; 
Canadian on-reserve housing crisis, 
153; Christianization, 100. See also 
First Nations; Indigenous peoples
Abu Ghraib Prison scandal, 259, 261–264, 
270–1n.11. See also Lynndie England
Ackam, Taner, 118
All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, 28
Al Saffarh, Nehrjas (in “Instruments of 
Yearning”), 266–67. See also Thomp-
son, Judith
Ambos, Kai, 8, 94
Amele taburlari, 178
American Civil Rights Movement, 128–30, 
135, 139n.1, 141n.18, 
Amnesty International, 6
Anderson, Benedict, 22, 62
Anderson, Patrick, 11, 260
Arendt, Hannah, 12, 55, 62, 223–24, 246n.4, 
253–56, 260, 263, 269. See also “ba-
nality of evil”
Armenian genocide, 8, 9–10, 16n.31, 83–84, 
138, 174, chapter 4. See also Otto-
man genocides.
Assembly of Turkish–American Associa-
tions (ATAA), xiii, 114, 116, 118
assimilation: policies of, in Canada, 97, 
98–99; in Armenian genocide, 177, 
179
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 170. See also 
Kemalists
atrocity and genocide, 1, 4–7, 8, 10, 20–23
Index
Understanding Atrocities276
Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat 
ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Turkey), 111, 
119, 173 
Communist Party: in Iraq, 266; In the Unit-
ed States, 127–28, 128–29, 131, 134, 
139 (FN 1), 141n.17, 142n.32
concentration camps, 210, 215, 227, 230, 
235, 243–44
Conservative Party of Canada, 157–58
Council of Turkish Canadians (CTC), xiii, 
109–12, 114, 116, 118
Cree communities in Canada, 146, 149, 
163n.19, 
Croats, Bosnian, see Bosnia
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Act (Canada), 102n.7
cultural genocide, 19, 39; in Canada, 7–8, 
15n.28, 102, 102n.5; Raphael Lemkin 
on, 87–90, 91, 103n.18; in Sri Lanka, 
39–41; in the UN Genocide Conven-
tion, 8; in the United States, 132–33;
D
Darfur, 2, 3, 107, 138
Dayton Peace Agreement, see General 
Framework Agreement on Peace 
“deferentiation” (Christopher Powell), 22
Dink, Hrant, 115
“district quotas” in education (Sri Lanka), 
29
Djemal, Ahmed, 173. See also Enver; Talaat; 
Three Pashas
Documentation Center Srebrenica, 66, 
80n.88
Drina Valley, 52–53
Duranti, Marco, 88
Duthie, Roger, 7
E
Eichmann, Adolf, 223–24, 246n.4 and 5, 
253–54, 260, 272n.45. See also “ba-
nality of evil”; Arendt, Hannah
Elias, Norbert, 22, 24
England, Lynndie, 261–64, 266, 267
Enver, Ismail, 119, 173. See also Djemal; 
Talaat; Three Pashas
Eskicioglu, Lale, 110
49, 51, 52–53, 58–60, 71–72; Bosnian 
War Crimes Chamber, 52, 80n.89; 
Dutch United Nations Peacekeeping 
Battalion (DutchBat), xii, 51, 52–53, 
64, 66, 73n.16; Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, xiii, 59, 74n.18; 
genocide in, 52–53, 58–60, 73n.16, 
77n.59, 138, 204–5, 259; Missing 
Persons Institute of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina (MPI), 77n.58; Republika 
Srpksa (RS), xiv, 53, 74n.18. See also 
Srebrenica; Srebrenica Memorial
Brazeau, Patrick, 158–59
Browning, Christopher, 204, 224, 250–
51n.32 
Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the 
East, 5–6
Burghers (Sri Lanka), 26
C
Cambodian genocide, 54, 107, 203
Canada and World Studies curriculum 
(Ontario), 118
Canadian Museum for Human Rights 
(CMHR), xiii, 84, 85
Ceylon, 28, 29, 33; Workers’ Congress, 29
Charny, Israel, 3, 9, 15n.28, 16n.31, 115, 150
Christians: in the American Civil Rights 
Movement, 143n.36; in the Ottoman 
Empire/Turkey, 9–10, 169, 170–81, 
174–80, 191; in Sri Lanka, 26; vic-
tims of ISIS/ISIL, 14n.19
Clinton, Bill, 58–59
Civil Rights Congress (CRC - U.S.A.), xiii, 
125, 127, 130, 131, 134, 135, 138, 
139n.1, 141n.24
Civil Rights Act (U.S.A.), 135, 138 
Colombo (Sri Lanka), 35, 38; riots in, 31, 
32–33. See also “Black July pogrom”
Coloroso, Barbara, 110
commemoration (memorialization), 6–7, 
50, 55–58; of the Armenian Geno-
cide, 109–110, 115, 118, 120; of the 
Holocaust, 4–5; in Sri Lanka, 38–39; 
in Srebrenica, chapter 2. See also 
Srebrenica Memorial
INDEX 277
86–88,  92–96, 96–101 104n.29 and 
30, 131–33; of Indigenous peoples, 
see settler colonialism as genocide; 
prevention of, 1–3, 53, 85, 113, 120–
21, 133–34, 138, 205–6, 216, 218–19; 
Rwandan, see Rwandan genocide; 
in Sri Lanka, see Sri Lanka. See also 
atrocity and genocide
Genocide Awareness Month, 116
genocide denial, 8–10, 16n.31, 60–63, 
107–8, 110, 118–20; of Armenian 
genocide, 8, 9–10, 16n.31. chapter 4; 
of Bosnian genocide, 60–61, 63, 69, 
70–72; of genocide against African 
American peoples, 134–38; of the 
Holocaust, 108, 139n 4, 235, 247n.12; 
of some victim groups’ claims to 
genocide, 8–10, 120–21, 135–36, 
181–90, 190–91; of settler colonial-
ism as genocide, 9, 100–102, 146–47, 
149–51
Genocide Studies and Prevention (GSP), 2–3
Genocide Studies International (GSI), 3
“genocidal society”, 23, 39–40, 120
“genocidal priming”, 40
German Federal Republic, 231
Gil Gil, Alicia, 95
Gladstone, William, 5–6, 14n.17
Gleitzman, Morris, 206, 208, 209–10, 
211–12
Goldhagen, Daniel, 94
Great Fire of Smyrna, 179
Greco-Turkish War, 179–80
Greenwalt, Alexandar, 95
Gunn Allen, Paula, 9, 146
Gunter, Lorne, 147, 155–56, 163n.9
H
Habyarimana, Juvénal, 181
Hayner, Priscilla, 7, 73
Heimat, 10
Herero (Namibia), 91, 133, 138
Hilberg, Raul, 92
Himmler, Heinrich, 93
Hinton, Alexander, 3, 6–7, 40, 66, 180
Hindu peoples, 26, 33, 29
Historikerstreit (“historians’ quarrel”), 10 
ethnocentricity, 71. See also cultural geno-
cide; settler colonialism 
ethnosphere, 21–23
Europa, Europa, 10
extermination camps, 235
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, 54
F
Fallace, Thomas, 108
Federal Party (in Ceylon), 29–30
Federation of Turkish Canadian Associa-
tions (FTCA), xiii, 116, 
Fein, Helen, 6, 25, 176
Felman, Shoshana, 11, 260–61
First Nations, 9, 142n.29, 145–47, 151–54, 
155–56, 161, 163n.9. See also Aborig-
inal Peoples; Indigenous Peoples
First World War, 118, 172, 175, 176, 177, 
179, 180 
Fort Albany, 145, 151, 161
Foucault, Michel, 96, 259
Foundation for Human Rights, 37
Friedlander, Saul, 104n.30
G
Gacaca courts (Rwanda), 183, 185–88
gender, 9,  147–8, 156–60, 160–61, 261–64. 
See also misogyny; patriarchy; sexu-
al violence
General Framework Agreement on Peace 
(Dayton Peace Agreement), 49, 53, 
74n.18
genocide: of African American peoples, 
chapter 5; Armenian, see Armenian 
genocide; Bosnian, see Bosnia; by-
standers to, 20–21, 61, 112, 117, 185, 
204; Cambodian, see Cambodian 
genocide; comparative studies of, 4, 
9, 107, 136, 169–70, 175–76, 180–81, 
190–91; complicity in, 4, 100, 108, 
132, 215; cultural, see cultural geno-
cide; definitions and definitional 
debates, 4–6, 8, 9–10, 20–23, 23–26, 
85–90, 92–93, 102n.7, 104n.29, 131, 
135–36, 149–51, 202; Holocaust, see 
Holocaust; intent, 6, 7–8, 23, 54, 85, 
Understanding Atrocities278
International Association of Genocide 
Scholars (IAGS), xiii, 2–3, 83–84, 87, 
102n.3, 113
International Court of Justice, xiii, 51, 
133–34
International Criminal Tribunals, xiii, 53, 
54, 58–59; for the former Yugoslavia 
Bosnia, 49–51, 73n.15, 80n.88 and 
89; for Rwanda, 54, 183; for 
International Crisis Group, 35
International Institute for Genocide and 
Human Rights Studies (IIGHRS), 2
International Network of Genocide Schol-
ars (INOGS), xiii, 3
Iran, 3, 121
Iraq War, 260–67, 268–69, 270, 270n.11
Islamic State (also ISIS, ISIL, Daesh), xiii, 6, 
14n.19, 259 
Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, see Committee 
of Union and Progress
Iyamuremye, Augustine, 188
J
Jäckel, Eberhard, 104n.30
Jim Crow, 134, 137
Jones, Adam, 40
Journal of Genocide Research (JGR), 2–3
justice, 54–58, 58–60, 70–71, 120–21, 156, 
169, 186–87, 250–51n.32; restorative, 
55; retrospective, 55; transitional, 
6–7, 49–51, 54–57, 63, 66–67, 70–71, 
182–83
K
Kafka, Franz, 67–68, 251n.35
Kagame, Paul, 181–82, 185–90, 190–91
Karadžić, Radovan, 52, 58
Kashechewan, 145, 161
Katz, Stephen, 92
Kelly, David, 264–67
Kemalists, 170, 174–80
Kiernan, Ben, 3, 6
Kosovo, 73, 204–5, 259
Krstić, Radislav, 53, 58, 73n.15,  
Hitler, Adolf, 93, 94, 98, 119, 157, 203, 207, 
213, 250–51n.32
Holocaust (Shoah), 3, 9–13, 16n.31, 17n.39, 
20, 87–88, 92, 101, 104n. 30, 136, 137, 
139n.4, 199, 206–13, 218, 251n.35, 
260, chapter 9; denial of, see geno-
cide denial; Holocaust education, 
107–9, 112–15, 120–21, 126, 180; 
exceptionalism/uniqueness of, 1–5, 
92–93, 150–51. 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 1–2
Honeyman, Susan, 202–206
Hovanissian, Richard, 114–15
Hoffman, Tessa, 9–10
Horne, Gerald, 134
Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda, 137–38
Hudson, Graham, 97, 102
Hussein, Saddam, 264, 266–67
Hutu, 10, 120–21, 169, 181–190, 191; Hutu 
Power Movement, 184–85
I
identity-difference, 21–22, 23–26, 27, 28–31
Idle No More, 160
“imagined communities” (Benedict Ander-
son), 22, 62, 66
“imaginary screen” (Slavoj Žižek), 254–56, 
269
India, 26, 30–32
Indian Land Treaties in Canada, 151, 161
Indian Residential Schools (IRS), xiii, 
7–8, 83–84, 86, 97, 99–101, 102n.5, 
150–51, 163n.21, 
Indigenous peoples, 1, 7–10, 15.n28, 26, 40, 
42–3n.9, 57, 142n.29, 184, chapters 3 
and 6. See also Aboriginal peoples; 
First Nations; Native American In-
dian; settler colonialism as genocide
“intent to destroy”, see genocide; intent.
interdisciplinarity, 1–2, 83–84
International Commission on Missing 
Persons (ICMP), xiii, 59, 77n.58
International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg, 54, 73n.14
inyenzi (Hutu extremist slur for Tutsi), 182, 
184
INDEX 279
N
National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP), xiv, 
128–29, 139n.1 
National Socialist German Workers Party 
(Nazi Party), 157, 224–27, 240–42, 
251n.34
nationalism, 22, 259–60, 262; Bulgarian, 
5; Sinhalese, 6, 27–29, 38, 40–41; 
Turkish, 115, 174, 179
Native American Indian peoples, 113, 
128–29, 138, 205
Nettelfield, Lara, 69
Niven, Bill, 246–7n.9, 247n.10 and 12
Northern Provincial Council (NPC - Sri 
Lanka), 34–35
Nyamwasa, Faustin Kayumba, 188
O
Occupy Wall Street movement, 160
Orić, Naser, 80n.89
Orientalism (Orientalist), 28–29, 262
Otherness (the Other), 22, 25, 107–8, 
114–15, 148, 160, 203–4, 213, 258, 
259, 264, 268
Ottoman Empire, 5, 112, 117, 119, chapter 7
Ottoman genocides: Armenian victims, 
9–10, 116, 138, 174; Assyrian 
victims, 9–10, 116, 169–71, 174–76, 
177–80, 191; Greek victims, 9–10, 
116, 169, 170–71, 174–81, 190–91; 
Kurdish victims, 175. See also Arme-
nian genocide
Outcome Governing System (OGS), 97–99
P
patriarchy: and settler colonialism in Cana-
da, 9, 145–47, 156–61
Patterson, William L. 8–9, chapter 5 
perpetrators, 24–26, 44n.28, 57, 61–63, 119–
20, 175–76, 184–85, 185–88, 207, 
231–34, 247n.12, 250n.31, 253–57
Podrinje, 52, 59, 68
Pontic Greeks (victims in Ottoman geno-
cide), see Ottoman genocides
proto–genocide, 6–7, 19–20, 26–47
L
Langer, Lawrence, 11–12, 208–9,
LaRocque, Emma, 9, 148
Lemkin, Raphael, 7–9, 15–16n.29, 31, and 
33, 21–23, 42–43n.9, 85, 87–90, 90–
92, 92–93, 101–2, 103n.18, 104n.29, 
125–28, 132–33, 139n.4, 140n.5–7 
and 10, 142n.29 
Lemkin on Genocide, 132–33, 139n.4 
Levant, Ezra, 158–60
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Com-
mission (LLRC - Sri Lanka), xiii, 6–7
Levene, Mark, 6
Levi, Primo, 12
Lewy, Guenter, 110–11
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or 
Tamil Tigers), xiii, 26, 30, 31, 33–34, 
37–38
Lower, Wendy, 250–51n.32 
M
MacDonald, David, 97, 102 
Mahlendorf, Ursula R., 225, 247n.10 and 12
Mahavamsa, 28
Martin, Charles H., 139n.1
McCarthy, Justin, 110–11
McDonnell, Michael A., 90–92
McParland, Kelly, 156, 164n.23
Meierhenrich, Jens, 2–3
Mein Kampf, 93, 98
Menon, Jisha, 11–12, 260
misogyny, 158–160. See also genocide; pa-
triarchy; sexual violence; women 
Missing Persons Institute of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (MPI), 77n.58, 
Mladić, Ratko, 52–53, 58, 69, 71, 81–82n.110
Moghalu, Kingsley Chiedu, 54–55 
Morgenthau, Henry (American Ambassa-
dor), 179
Moses, Dirk, 3–4, 90–92 
Moyn, Samuel, 88
Mothers of Srebrenica, 52, 59, 68–69, 73n.6, 
77n.56 and 62, 81n.102
Mount Royal University, xi, 1, 150
Muslim peoples, 14n.19, 26, 29, 32–33, 49, 
64, 171–74, 175, 178
Understanding Atrocities280
sexual violence, 31, 37, 97, 129, 141n.15, 
158–60, 160–62, 163–64n.21, 178, 
179, 181–82, 261–65
Shaw, Martin, 24, 92
Short, Geoffery, 8, 108
Simpson, Audra, 147, 162n.3
Simpson, Leanne Betasamosake, 148–49, 
160
Sinhala, 6, 26–33, 40–41; “Sinhalization” 
38–39
Sivathamby, Karthigesu, 33
Smith, Andrea, 9
Snyder, Timothy, 2
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 52
Sontag, Susan, 12, 265
Spence, Theresa, 145–49, 153–62, 162n.3 
Spomen Soba, 60, 64, 80n.86
Srebrenica, see Bosnia
Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center and 
Cemetery to the Victims of the 1995 
Genocide, 7, chapter 2
Sri Lanka, 6–7; atrocities in, 19–20, 26–41; 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party, xiv, 28
St. Anne’s Residential School, 151, 163n.21
sterilization campaigns, 98
Stangneth, Bettina, 224, 246n.5
Stanton, Gregory, 3, 6, 39–40, 115, 118, 120
Stone, Dan, 3–4
Stover, Eric, 56
Straus, Scott, 184
subaltern genocides, 40
Sudan, 2–3, 33, 125, 203, 219
Syria, 3, 178, 203, 218
T
Talaat, Mehmad, 173–74. See also Enver; 
Djemal; Three Pashas
Tamil, 6, 19–20, 26–41; Tamil Eelam 26; 
Tamil Congress, 29; Tamil United 
Front, xiv, 29; Tamil United Libera-
tion Front (TULF), xiv, 30
Tanzimat, 172–73
terrorism, 27, 34, 37–38, 111, 157, 160, 259, 
262, 263
Thomas, Laurence Mordecai, 136
Thompson, Judith, 256–57, 261–67, 270
R
Razack, Sherene 9, 148, 159
The Reader 10–11, chapter 9
Reed, Hayter, 100
“relations of genocide”, 23, 39
representation of atrocity and/or genocide, 
4, 10–12, chapters 2, 6, 8, and 9
Robeson, Paul 127, 129, 134, 141n.17
Robins, Nicholas A. 13n.8, 40
Robinson, Randall 136–8
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
(RCAP), 153
Rubenstein, Richard, 6
Rudasingwa, Theogene, 188
Rusesabagina, Paul, 188
Russia, 113, 127, 129, 171, 173, 177, 179, 215, 
233; Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.), 87, 127, 
129, 134, 258
Rwandan genocide, 3, 10, 107, 120–21, 125, 
138, 169–70, 180, 181–98, 199, 216, 
258–59. See also Hutu; Tutsi; Twa
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), xiv, 181–82, 
184, 187, 189
S
Sansom, Ian, 239–40, 243, 246n.8, 249n.25 
and 28
Sarajevo, 52, 73n.6, 81–2n.110
Sara Corning Centre for Genocide Educa-
tion, 120
Schindler’s List, 10, 119, 216
Schlink, Bernhard, chapter 9
Schmitz, Hanna (The Reader), 225, 227–30, 
230–39, 239–242, 243–46, 246–
47n.9, 248n.20 and 21, 249n.26, 27 
and 29, 249–50n.30, 251n.35
Schoenfeld, Gabriel, 3–4
Scott, Duncan Campbell, 96, 98–99, 
Second World War, 87, 127, 133, 137, 210–11
September 11 attacks, 219, 259
settler colonialism: as genocide 7–8, 9, 
84–85, 91, 93, 96–100, 100–102, 
104n.29, 145–49, 149–51, 154–56, 
156–62, 163n.10, 205
sexism, 9, 145–46, 156–60. See also gender; 
patriarchy; misogyny; sexual 
violence
INDEX 281
V
Veddas, 26
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, 10–11, 17n.38, 
225, 251n.34
W
Wagner, Sarah, 58–59, 69, 77n.58
Waller, James, 207
“war on terror”, (U.S.) 259–60, 262
We Charge Genocide, 8–9, 42–43n.9, chap-
ter 5. See also Patterson, William L.
Welikade Prison massacre, 31–32
Whitaker Report, 91–92
Whitehorn, Alan 115
white supremacy, 146, 156, 161–62
Williams, Lydia, 206, 209
Woolford, Andrew, 8, 87, 96–100, 104n.39, 
World Conference against Racism and 
Anti–Semitism, 129
X
Xenophobia, 202, 204
Y
Young Turks, xiv, 170–74, 174–81
Yugoslavia, 3, 50, 52, 125. See also Bosnia; 
Yugoslav People’s Party (JNA) xiii
Z
Zimbabwe, 3
Žižek, Slavoj, 246n.4, 254–57, 269
“Three Pashas”, 173–74; See also Djemal; 
Enver; Talaat 
Toronto District School Board (TDSB), 8, 
109–13, 116–17, 120–21
Totten, Samuel, 8, 108, 140n.7
transitional justice, 6–7, 50–51, 54–57, 63, 
66–68, 70–71, 183
trauma, 11–12, 20–1, 37–8, 50, 56, 64, 
66–67, 69–71, 120, 150, 200, 203, 
207, 247n.12, 260–61, 269
Triffterer, Otto, 95
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Canada (TRC), xiv, 7–8, 83–84; 
National Centre for 84
Turkey, 3, 109, 112–15, 118, 119–21, 170. See 
also Ottoman Empire
Tutsi, 120–21, 169, 181–91
Twa, 10, 169, 181–91
U
Understanding Atrocities (conference), 1, 
150, 207, 
United Nations (UN), 9, 26–27, 51, 128, 
130–34, 135–36, 138, 141n.18 and 24, 
142n.32, 153, 154; Children’s Fund 
203; Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention) 8, 
53, 85–88, 91–96, 101–2, 111, 125–27, 
131–34, 138, 140n.5 and 7; Decla-
ration of the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) xiii, 101; General 
Assembly Resolution 260 85; Hu-
man Rights Council 34; Mechanism 
for International Criminal Tribunals 
(MICT) 58; Security Council 52, 
133; Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights 135–36, 140n.7, 142n.35
University of Manitoba, 83–84
University of North Carolina, Charlotte, 
199
USHMM (United States Holocaust Memo-
rial Museum), xiv, 2, 12
Uwilingiyimana, Agathe, 184

Understanding Atrocities is a wide-ranging collection 
of essays bridging scholarly and community-based efforts 
to understand and respond to the global, transhistorical 
problem of genocide. The essays in this volume investigate 
how evolving, contemporary views on mass atrocity frame 
and complicate the possibilities for the understanding and 
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• • • 
Understanding Atrocities helps us to think “about how we think 
about the past,” and doesn’t offer easy passe-partouts for unlocking 
or framing humanity’s monstrous history and its representation. 
Instead, this book provides insightful and necessary roadmaps for 
our encounters with the demonic events themselves, as well as the 
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